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Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Society
ROBERT C. TUCKER

From Town to City: Boston in the 1820s
ROBERT A. MCCAUGHEY

Will Tactical Nuclear Weapons Ever Be Used?
PHILIP W. DYER

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The United States and Forced Repatriation of Soviet Citizens, 1944-47
MARK ELLIOTT

Book Reviews

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Contents

Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Society	ROBERT C. TUCKER	173
From Town to City: Boston in the 1820s	ROBERT A. McCAUGHEY	191
Will Tactical Nuclear Weapons Ever Be Used?	PHILIP W. DYER	214
The Southern Tenant Farmers Union and Depression Politics	LOWELL K. DYSON	230
The United States and Forced Repatriation of Soviet Citizens, 1944-47	MARK ELLIOTT	253
Book Reviews		276

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest — CARL SOLBERG — 276
Moore, Law and the Indo-China War — EUGENE V. ROSTOW — 278
Morgan, Suffragists and Democrats — GERDA LERNER — 279
Urofsky and Levy, eds., Letters of Louis D. Brandeis, 1907-1912 — OSMOND K. FRAENKEL — 281
Bonomi, A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New York — LAWRENCE H. LEDER — 283
Buel Jr., Securing the Revolution — MICHAEL WALLACE — 285
Daniell, Experiment in Republicanism; *Zemsky*, Merchants, Farmers, and River Gods — JACK P. GREENE — 287
McLoughlin, New England Dissent, 1630-1833 — ROBERT T. HANDY — 290
Rossiter, The American Quest, 1790-1860 — GEORGE DANGERFIELD — 292
Hawkins, Between Harvard and America — ROBERT A. MCCAUGHEY — 293
Daniel, The Shadow of Slavery — CAREY MCWILLIAMS — 294
Parris and Brooks, Blacks in the City — KENNETH T. JACKSON — 296
Miller, Railroads and the Granger Laws — EDWARD C. KIRKLAND — 298
Johnson, The Administration of United States Foreign Policy; *Platt*, The Cinderella Service; *Jones*, The Nineteenth-Century Foreign Office — HENRY M. WRISTON — 299
Barnett, A New U.S. Policy Toward China; *Moorsteen and Abramowitz*, Remaking China Policy; *Stoessinger*, Nations in Darkness: China, Russia, and America; *Cohen*, America's Response to China; *Van Ness*, Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation — JONATHAN MIRSKY — 301
Hayes, American Deserters in Sweden; *Williams*, The New Exiles; *Killmer, Lecky, and Wiley*, They Can't Go Home Again — THOMAS R. LINDEN — 305
Crossman, The Myths of Cabinet Government — LEON D. EPSTEIN — 307
Hamer, Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery — STEPHEN E. KOSS — 309
Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill — H.J. HANHAM — 310
Namier, Lewis Namier: A Biography — JACOB M. PRICE — 311
Eayrs, In Defence of Canada — THOMAS P. PEARDON — 313
Cohen, The Indian Army — KURT LANG — 315
Hartley, Gaullism: The Rise and Fall of a Political Movement — P.M. WILLIAMS — 317
Knapton, France—An Interpretive History; *Beales*, The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy — RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ — 318
Kessler, In the Twenties: The Diaries of Harry Kessler — NORMAN RICH — 320
Mastny, The Czechs under Nazi Rule — GERHARD L. WEINBERG — 322
Grosser, Germany in Our Time — F.L. CARSTEN — 324
Zeman, The Gentlemen Negotiators: A Diplomatic History of the First World War; *Sontag*, A Broken World, 1919-1939 — RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ — 325

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Carsten, Revolution in Central Europe, 1918-1919 — Theodore S. Hamerow — 327

Kusin, Political Grouping in the Czechoslovak Reform Movement; *Krejci*, Social Change and Stratification in Postwar Czechoslovakia — Jiri Kolaja — 329

Connor, Deviance in Soviet Society — John N. Hazard — 331

Curtis, Election Campaigning Japanese Style — John M. Maki — 332

Boyle, China and Japan at War, 1937-1945 — John M. Maki — 334

Vatikiotis, ed., Revolution in the Middle East and Other Case Studies — Charles Issawi — 335

Shaw, Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire Under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807 — Helen Anne B. Rivlin — 337

Hanna and Hanna, Urban Dynamics in Black Africa — Remi Clignet — 338

Adam, Modernizing Racial Domination: South Africa's Political Dynamics — Julius Lewin — 340

Goldhamer, The Foreign Powers in Latin America — Bryce Wood — 341

Gordenker, ed., The United Nations in International Politics — Inis L. Claude, Jr. — 342

Office of Public Information, United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1968; Yearbook of the United Nations, 1969 — Leland M. Goodrich — 344

Runciman, A Critique of Max Weber's Philosophy of Social Science — Talcott Parsons — 345

Wilkinson, The Broken Rebel: A Study in Culture, Politics, and Authoritarian Character — M. Brewster Smith — 347

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The *Political Science Quarterly* is a nonpartisan journal devoted to the analysis of contemporary and historical aspects of government, politics, and public affairs. Manuscripts, books for review, and editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor. Manuscripts must be submitted in duplicate and accompanied by an abstract of between 100 and 200 words specifying the article's major theme or conclusions. Correspondence concerning advertising and reprint permission should be addressed to the Business Manager, The Academy of Political Science. Editorial and business offices: 49 Claremont Avenue, New York, New York 10027.

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Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Society*

ROBERT C. TUCKER
Princeton University

Among the less noticed centenaries of 1971 was that of Edward Tylor's *Primitive Culture*, the book that launched the anthropological concept of culture on its remarkable career.[1] Like most important events in intellectual history, it was not so much a beginning as a further advance. Tylor's definition of culture—"that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society"—derived in part from Gustav Klemm, whose *Allgemeine Culturgeschichte der Menschheit* (1843-52) had in turn stated that it was Voltaire "who first put aside dynasties, king lists, and battles, and sought what is essential in history, namely culture, as it is manifest in customs, in beliefs, and in forms of government."[2]

The century since *Primitive Culture*'s appearance has seen both a prodigious effort in the empirical study of cultures and, along with

* In slightly different form this paper was presented to the conference on political culture and communist studies held at Arden House in November 1971.

[1] Edward Tylor, *Primitive Culture*.

[2] A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* (New York: Vintage Books, n.d.), 14.

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it, a gradually expanding discussion of the culture concept itself. In their critical review, Kroeber and Kluckhohn cite 164 definitions of culture from anthropological and related literature. Eschewing a further definition of their own, they observe that "all cultures are largely made up of overt patterned ways of behaving, feeling, and reacting. But cultures likewise include a characteristic set of unstated premises and categories ('implicit culture') which vary greatly between societies." Further, they summarize the main themes of the 164 definitions as: "culture is a product; is historical; includes ideas, patterns, and values; is selective; is learned; is based upon symbols; and is an abstraction from behavior and the products of behavior." Finally, they conclude that although the anthropological concept of culture had become a fairly well delineated one, no full theory of culture had yet emerged. There are "plenty of definitions but too little theory."[3] I have the impression that their conclusion, drawn nearly 25 years ago, would still stand today. The nature of culture, its salient characteristics, culture processes, and the relation of culture and personality are the composite subject of a rich literature of analysis and generalization. But no general theory of culture yet exists.

Even though anthropology has far outgrown its origins as the ethnography of preliterate societies, the culture concept has proved too large for it. If man is the culturebearing and culturecreating animal, then the idea of culture must play a central role in every one of the disciplines dealing with man—psychology, history, and the several social sciences; and culture becomes, as Kroeber and Kluckhohn put it, "a major concept in a possible unified science of human behavior."[4] Such a unified science of man is at best a thing of the future, but the increasing penetration of the culture concept into the social sciences is very probably one of the signs of present progress in that direction.

I

Since the Second World War, the culture concept has come into American political science by two different routes. First, there were

[3] *Ibid.*, 308, 357.
[4] *Ibid.*, 70.

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efforts to look at political phenomena in cultural or psychocultural terms, as instanced by Nathan Leites's 1948 article.[5] This work, in turn, was largely an outgrowth of wartime research that sought to bring culturological and psychological searchlights to bear upon the ways of the enemy. Ruth Benedict's *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* is the best known single product of that research.[6] As the Second World War gave way to the cold war, it seemed logical to seek psychocultural insight into the ways of thought and behavior of Russian Communists. One of the results was a work by the British anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer, who had published a study of "Themes in Japanese Culture" in 1943. His new book, *The People of Great Russia*, explained Soviet aggressiveness and the psychology of "capitalist encirclement" by the fact that the Bolshevik leaders had presumably been subjected in infancy to the Russian folk practice of swaddling young children.[7]

The idea of political culture is the second form in which the culture concept has made its appearance in contemporary political science. It arose partly in reaction against the kind of psychocultural theorizing that tended to treat public political life as a simple extension or reproduction of the patterns of family experience prevalent in a particular culture. Such a reaction was in Gabriel Almond's mind when he argued that a society's political system is embedded in a *political culture*, comprising that society's pattern of orientations to political action, which is "a differentiated part of the culture and has a certain autonomy."[8] He wanted, among other things, particularly to underline the "certain autonomy" of a society's political culture.

The political-culture approach is by now rather deeply embedded in the culture of American political science. If a critical stock-taking

[5] Nathan Leites, "Psycho-Cultural Hypotheses About Political Acts," *World Politics*, I (1948), 102-19.

[6] Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (New York, 1946).

[7] Geoffrey Gorer and John Rickman, *The People of Great Russia: A Psychological Study* (London, 1949).

[8] H. Eulau, S. Eldersveld, and M. Janowitz, eds., *Political Behavior* (Glencoe, 1956), 36. The article originally appeared in *The Journal of Politics*, XVIII (1956). My remarks on the background of Almond's innovation derive in part from a conversation with him in September 1970.

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is in order, there are three questions about the notion and the approach that seem to me especially worth considering. They concern the scope of the concept of political culture; whether we should think of political culture as comprising an autonomous realm within the total culture of a society; and the relationship between the concept of political culture and systems theory in political science.

The Question of Scope

Almond's original conceptualization of political culture was presumably influenced by his intellectual purpose at the time, which was to create a typology of political systems. Perhaps because he approached political culture in terms of its relevance to this particular scholarly enterprise, he was led to give the phenomenon a subjective or psychological characterization—as the "set of meanings and purposes" in which any political system is embedded. Most political scientists interested in political culture have followed his lead. The dominant definitional tendency is reflected in Verba's formula of 1965: "The political culture of a society consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the situation in which political action takes place. It provides the subjective orientation to politics."[9]

In so defining political culture, political scientists have parted company with the great majority of anthropologists. Viewing culture as the socially learned and transmitted way of life of a society, the anthropologists have treated it as a behavioral as well as a psychological concept. They have used devices like Linton's dichotomy of "overt" and "covert" culture in order to distinguish between culture as the patterned behavior of man in society and culture as the knowledge, attitudes, and values shared by the members of a society.[10] It is true that anthropologists are in disagreement about the semantics or epistemology of this matter. Some, like Linton and the earlier Kroeber, hold that culture embraces the culturally conditioned concrete behavior of the members of a society. Thus

[9] Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton, 1965), 513.

[10] Ralph Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality* (New York, 1945), 38. The phrase "patterned behavior of man in society" is used by David Bidney, *Theoretical Anthropology* (New York, 1967), 155.

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Kroeber wrote that "the mass of learned and transmitted motor reactions, habits, techniques, ideas, and values—and the behavior they induce—is what constitutes *culture*."[11] On the other hand, Kluckhohn and the later Kroeber argue that not the concrete behavior itself but the patterns reflected in it are what belong to culture.[12] But however the anthropologists may divide on this issue, their culture concept in one way or the other covers what people culturally do as well as what they culturally feel and think. The anthropologists also take account of the important distinction between cultural behavior and cultural norms. Linton distinguishes, for example, between "real cultural patterns"[13] and "ideal culture patterns," the latter being characterized as consensuses of opinion on the part of the society's members as to how people *should* behave in particular situations.[14]

It is hardly surprising, then, that the definition of political culture given above should appear to an anthropologist to involve a "radical subjectification of the concept."[15] Of course, there is no obligation lying upon political science to follow the anthropologists' culture concept in their own conceptualizing of political culture. But is this deviation from anthropological usage desirable?

To some of the more recent writers on political culture, it has not seemed so. For example, in his study of the effort of Castro's movement to transform the traditional political culture of Cuba, Richard Fagen views political culture in anthropologist style as embracing "patterned ways of life and action as well as the states of mind that sustain and condition these patterns." Apart from pointing to the

[11] A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (rev.ed., New York, 1948), 8.

[12] Kroeber and Kluckhohn, *Culture*, p. 305. They contend here that "culture being basically a form or pattern or design or way, it is an abstraction from concrete human behavior, but is not itself behavior." Linton, it seems to me, deals successfully with this problem by defining a culture pattern as "the limited range of behaviors within which the responses of a society's members to a particular situation will normally fall" (*The Cultural Background of Personality*, p. 46).

[13] See n. 12.

[14] Linton, 52.

[15] Clifford Geertz, "A Study of National Character," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, January 1964, p. 207. Geertz was reviewing Lucian Pye's *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building*, in which Pye states: "a political culture can be found only in men's minds in the patterns of action, feelings, and reflections which they have internalized and made a part of their very existence."

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anthropologist's culture concept as authority for doing this, he argues that the psychological concept of political culture is more useful in explaining why certain political institutions function or fail to function than in investigating a process of "directed transformation" of the institutions themselves. He points out, too, that the new Cuban elite has not been aiming its political socialization process solely toward influencing ways of thinking or feeling about politics, but also at influencing behavior.[16]

To epitomize the issue, Fagen observes that if a large number of people in a certain country habitually cheat on their income tax returns, this would not be taken by the proponents of the psychological definition as an item of that country's political culture. I should like to pursue the question with a comparable example spelled out in more detail. Let us assume that in a certain country, X, people in the great majority believe that it is wrong for government officials to accept bribes; and, further, that government officials do quite often, indeed habitually, take bribes. On the psychological approach, the belief would constitute an item in X's political culture but the behavioral pattern would not. On an anthropological view of political culture, however, both the belief and the behavioral pattern would belong to X's political culture, the belief being (in Lintonian terms) an ideal political culture pattern and the bribe-taking practice being a real political culture pattern. Looking at the matter in these terms, we would be faced with a discrepancy *within* the political culture rather than one between political culture and conduct. Admittedly, it is ultimately a matter of scholarly expediency which position we take. But this seems to be one of those issues of expediency which carry significant implications for research orientation and for theory.

The question is occasionally discussed on the plane of explanation. Some defenders of the psychological definition have argued that the explanatory enterprise suffers when political culture is taken to include the political behavior patterns—which may, in fact, be what one wants to explain by reference to the political culture. On the other hand, Geertz, while agreeing with those anthro-

[16] Richard R. Fagen, *The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba* (Stanford, 1969), 5-6. Fagen also argues (pp. 230-31) that those who follow the psychological definition of the concept of political culture do not always hew to it fully consistently in their work.

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pologists who are becoming dissatisfied with an "omnibus concept of culture," argues that "by absorbing properly cultural and social processes into psychological ones, explanation is short-circuited and the precise weight and importance of psychological factors as such rendered indeterminate."[17] My question is this: does the scholarly value of the concept of political culture turn on its explanatory potency? Might not the central importance of a concept like that of political culture be that it assists us to take our bearings in the study of the political life of a society, to focus on what is happening or not happening, to describe and analyze and order many significant data, and to raise fruitful questions for thought and research—*without explaining anything?* May it not be, further, that political culture and its vicissitudes comprise a great deal of what it is that we as political scientists should wish to explain?

The Question of Autonomy

Almond, it was noted earlier, postulated the existence of a political culture which "is a differentiated part of the culture and has a certain autonomy." It is the particular pattern of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations to political action prevailing in a society. Whether we accept this psychological characterization of the political culture or opt for the anthropological approach that includes patterns of behavior, we need to raise the question of the political culture's autonomy. Given that a society's culturally patterned way of life includes its way of political life, should we conceptualize this "way of political life" as a more or less autonomous realm of culture? Since the case for an affirmative answer is implicit in much of the existing literature on political culture, it may be justified to concentrate here upon the possible bases for doubt.

We may ask, first, whether the notion of an autonomous political culture may not itself reflect a cultural bias—the preconceptions of modernity in the West. A recent anthropological analysis of modern European culture supports such a view. Louis Dumont contends that the emergence of religion, economics, politics, art, etc., as relatively self-contained autonomous spheres of society is a feature of the evolution of culture in the modern West that makes it an "ex-

[17] Geertz, 208.

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ceptional development" and even an "eccentric phenomenon" in the wide experience of mankind. He particularly mentions the birth of "an autonomous world of political institutions and speculations" as an example of this deviation from the holistic cultural situation in which politics, religion, morality and so on blend and interpenetrate one another.[18] From such a point of view, the notion of political culture as a relatively self-contained autonomous sphere might appear as an ideological expression of the modern West's cultural exceptionalism.

In church-state cultures like Byzantium, Islam, and medieval Christendom, religion and theology so radically affected orientations toward political action that the very notion of "political action" meant something different from what modern Western men may mean by it (imagine Thomas Aquinas reacting to Harold Lasswell's formula for all politics as "who gets what, when, how"); the political culture itself inhered in the religious culture. Or to take an example from a different quarter, Geertz describes the traditional Balinese state as a "theatre-state" which was pointed not toward governance *per se* but "rather toward spectacle, toward ceremony, toward the public dramatization of the ruling obsessions of Balinese culture: social inequality and status pride. . . . To govern was not so much to choose as to perform. . . . Power served pomp, not pomp power."[19] What becomes of the autonomy of the political culture in such a case?[20]

[18] Louis Dumont, "Religion, Politics, and Society in the Individualistic Universe," *Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, London, 1971, pp. 31-32. According to Dumont, "politics as we know it is not, as is often assumed, a universal category, and, I believe, not a category capable of being generalized."

[19] Clifford Geertz, "Politics Past, Politics Present: Some Notes on the Uses of Anthropology in Understanding the New States." Paper presented to the International Sociological Conference, Evian, Sept. 1966, p. 12.

[20] Having specified that the objects of political orientation include the political system as a whole, particular political roles or structures, public policies, and the like, Almond and Powell go on to speak of "cultural secularization" as embracing "a movement from diffuseness to specificity of orientations" (as well as being "the process whereby men become increasingly rational, analytical and empirical in their political action"). Illustrating, they point out that in a traditional or primitive political culture the roles of the polity are not differentiated from other societal roles, e.g., that of hunter or shaman in an Eskimo society. Political cultures characterized by such diffuseness are then said to be "parochial cultures," in which people have "little or no awareness of the politi-

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Examples need not be multiplied, although we may observe in passing that when we view the communist *party-state* as a cultural or political-cultural formation, we are dealing with a phenomenon that shows in its self-conception, and even in its institutional configuration, a suggestive resemblance to the classic church-state. The question bears upon the conceptual foundations of a comparative politics that would study political life in cultural terms. Conceivably, we could relinquish the concept of political culture in favor of what might be called simply a cultural approach to politics: an orientation toward the study of political institutions, ideologies, practices, values, etc., as phenomena embedded in the larger cultures of particular societies. Alternatively, or at the same time, we could retain the notion of a political culture—meaning by it the predominantly political aspects of a culture—but beware of treating it as something clearly differentiated from the larger cultural pattern and forming an autonomous sphere. Could we do so, however, without risking a relapse into the type of intellectual pitfall that Almond was trying to avoid by means of his very stress on the autonomy of the political culture?

Political Culture and Systems Theory

As developed by American political scientists over the past fifteen years, the concept of political culture has been rather closely associated with a particular pattern of orientation toward political-science activity itself: the systems or "functional-systems" approach to politics. The political scientist has posited the polity as a coercion-monopolizing or authoritative-value-allocating social system interacting with its environment via inputs and outputs mediated by conversion functions like interest articulation, interest aggregation, and political communication. He has analyzed the phenomena of political life in these terms. He has been interested

cal system as a distinct and specialized entity." *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston 1966), 24, 58. This seems to take the cultural differentiation of spheres characteristic of modern Western society as a developmental norm. To put it differently, a society without a clearly differentiated political culture tends to be seen as lower on the developmental scale, in need of cultural secularization; and the cultural exceptionalism of the modern West in regard to the political sphere is lost to view.

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in the polity as a functioning system, in its performance characteristics, viability, stability, and developmental tendency. It is largely in the context of these intellectual concerns that political culture has figured in his thinking: "In studying any political system," say Almond and Powell, "we need to know its underlying propensities as well as its actual performance over a given period of time. We refer to these propensities, or this psychological dimension of the political system, as the *political culture*."[21]

The association of the political-culture concept with the functional-systems analysis of politics is a historical fact. My final general question is whether this historical association may not be methodologically adventitious. In raising this question, or (to reveal my intent) in affirming the detachability of the political-culture concept from the systems analysis, I wish neither to polemicize against the latter nor to question the intellectual propriety of dealing with political culture in its terms. I do assume, though, that there is no ineluctable need for a contemporary theory-oriented political scientist to pursue the study of comparative politics from the systems standpoint.

A cultural approach to politics could, presumably, be viewed as one of the alternatives to the systems approach. Political culture, politics as a form of culture, and politics as an activity related to the larger culture of a society, might in other words be taken as the central subject matter of the discipline. Instead of treating political culture as an attribute of a political system, we would then view the political system of a society in cultural terms, i.e., as a complex of real and ideal culture patterns, including political roles and their interrelations, political structures, and so on.

To avoid confusion, it needs to be mentioned that anthropologists themselves sometimes follow a systems approach of their own. Thus Anthony Wallace, taking culture as a macro-entity, uses the term "sociocultural system," meaning by system "a set of variable entities (persons, objects, customs, atoms, or whatever) so related that, first, some variation in any one is followed by a predictable (that is, nonrandom) variation in at least one other; second, that there is at least one sequence of variations which involves all of the

[21] *Ibid.*, 23.

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entities."[22] A political scientist seeking to develop the cultural approach to politics could, of course, accept the notion of a culture as a sociocultural system in this broad and abstract sense without subscribing to the "functional-systems" analysis of politics in the sense specified above.

It is true that the functional-systems analysis of politics exists, whereas the general principles of a cultural approach to politics remain, for the most part, to be worked out. On the other hand, a culturally oriented political science could avail itself of the resources of contemporary anthropology as a body of theory and lore related to the study and understanding of culture. Moreover, a considerable body of descriptive-analytic material on particular political cultures is already in being. It is to be hoped that this kind of work ("political ethnography," to use a term suggested by Clifford Geertz) can go forward successfully before we make much more progress in elaborating the principles of a cultural approach to politics. Perhaps, indeed, it can be one of the avenues of such progress.

II

As a conscious research strategy employing the concept of political culture, the cultural approach to communist politics is something quite new. In a different way, however, it is not new at all, but preceded our more customary academic modes of attack on the problem. Professor Samuel Harper's *Civic Training in Soviet Russia* might have been called (anticipating Fagen) *The Transformation of Political Culture in Russia;* and his *Making Bolsheviks* could appropriately have been subtitled "A Study in Political Socialization."[23] René Fülöp-Miller's *The Mind and Face of Bolshevism* was not simply the "Examination of Cultural Life in Soviet Russia" that its subtitle proclaimed it, but an examination of Soviet Communism in its early years under the aspect of Russia's cultural transformation.[24] This list could be lengthened.

[22] Anthony F. C. Wallace, *Culture and Personality* (2nd Ed., New York, 1970), 27.

[23] Samuel Harper, *Civic Training* (Chicago, 1929); Samuel Harper, *Making Bolsheviks* (Chicago, 1931).

[24] Rene Fulop-Miller, *The Mind and Face of Bolshevism* (New York, 1928).

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Yet, the cultural approach did not prevail when communist studies (in the form of Russian studies) took its rise as an academic field after the Second World War. Although some psychocultural studies appeared, such as Gorer's study and Leites's work on Bolshevism as an operational code, the dominant theoretical perspective was an adaptation of the systems approach, perhaps best reflected in a work summarizing a collective postwar project of Harvard's Russian Research Center, *How the Soviet System Works.*[25] Russian studies developed under the dual aegis of Parsonsian social systems theory and the concept of totalitarianism as elaborated in the 1930s and after by Franz and Sigmund Neumann, Hannah Arendt, Carl Friedrich, and others.

Historical context merits consideration here. The cultural orientation was conspicuous in Russian studies at a time when the object, Soviet Communism, was still engaged in a strenuous and loudly proclaimed effort to transform the ethos inherited from the Russian past, a time of attempted cultural revolution. Russian studies became an academic field, however, during high Stalinism, when seeming constancies—like purge and terror—were salient in the object of study. By then something like a Soviet political culture had crystallized, containing elements taken over deliberately from the old Russian ethos that the early Communists wanted to extirpate, and the spirit of Soviet Communism had in many ways turned conservative. Not unreasonably, what seemed most in need of explaining was how the system worked.

The recent spate of political-culture studies of communism includes work on Russia,[26] but most conspicuously relates to the newer communist states. Solomon's study of Mao's revolution and the Chinese political culture[27] and Fagen's on the transformation of Cuban political culture under Castro are indicative of the trend.

[25] R. A. Bauer, A. Inkeles, and C. Kluckhohn, *How the Soviet System Works: Cultural, Psychological, and Social Themes* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956). Significantly, though "cultural" appeared in the subtitle, the word "culture" is not in the book's index. The introductory chapter offered the study as a contribution to "social systems analysis."

[26] Mainly the work of Frederick Barghoorn on "Soviet Russia: Orthodoxy and Adaptiveness" in Pye and Verba and developed further in Frederick Barghoorn, *Politics in the U.S.S.R.* (Boston and Toronto, 1966).

[27] R. Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture* (Berkeley, 1971).

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It seems that the most attractive objects for political-culture studies are countries with relatively recent revolutions, countries more similar in certain ways to the Russia of the 1920s than to contemporary Russia. Does this, together with the account just given of the evolution of Russian studies, suggest that a cultural approach to communist politics is more appropriate for the earlier stages of communist regimes than for the later ones?

The special interest of the earlier stages to culturally oriented political scientists is understandable. Every successful communist revolution has been attended by a sustained and strenuous effort of the newly established regime to transform the way of life of the population; and where the revolutionary takeover process has been protracted—as in China, Yugoslavia, and Vietnam—the transformation of the culture has begun in the course of the revolution, on liberated *parts* of the national territory, and has constituted an integral part of the revolution. Although it brings with it an elaborate ideology, a new institutional setup, and a host of characteristic new practices, the communist movement should not be thought of, it seems, as simply imposing a ready-made, new "communist culture" upon the receptive (or nonreceptive) populace. Rather, the new culture, or new political culture, is something that emerges in and through the transformative process over a period of years; something, moreover, in which the new cultural ingredients that communism brings with it as a movement blend with elements of the preexisting national cultural ethos. Indeed, *some* of these latter elements will already be a part of the movement's culture in the prerevolutionary stage; for its leaders have not become denationalized, or totally Russified, in the course of their conversion to and immersion in communism, although Russian Communism under Stalin strove to achieve this and may have succeeded in some instances (e.g., Ulbricht, Bierut, Rakosi).

Because of their particular interest in the formative stages of communist societies, some culturally oriented scholars have looked to anthropology not simply for a general notion of culture but also for some conception of how and why it is that sometimes in history attempts are made to change cultures drastically (i.e., to make revolutions). One important contribution in this regard is Anthony F. C. Wallace's conception of the revitalization movement, which he defines as "a deliberate organized conscious effort by members

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of a society to construct a more satisfying culture."[28] Wallace discusses religious and revivalistic movements, cargo cults, etc., under this heading, and allows that a few professedly irreligious political movements belong under it too, including Russian Communism. In a later restatement and elaboration of the conception, he draws the distinction between the existing culture or society as it is, the "goal culture" or image of an ideal society that the revitalization movement offers, and, finally, the "transfer culture" or system of operations that the movement prescribes for transforming the existing culture into the goal culture.[29] A communist movement's "goal culture" would, of course, be its version of Marxism-Leninism as a blueprint for the transformation of society.

Returning now to the question posed above, does a cultural approach have less relevance to the later stages, when the communist regime presides over an essentially nonrevolutionary society, like Soviet society today? A part of the answer may be that we cannot really be sure what the "later" stages will look like in different instances, as China's latterday Cultural Revolution indicates. Second, even though a communist movement may lose its culture-transforming *élan* as it undergoes eventual deradicalization (with the possible consequence that it has to confront a Marxist countercultural movement within its midst), the cultural approach to its politics is no more precluded in principle than is the cultural approach to the politics of other unrevolutionary societies. Third, we should not take it for granted that noncultural approaches to the Soviet "later stages" have been successful. The social-systems approach that so deeply influenced Russian studies in the 1940s and early 1950s was in important ways a failure. It didn't satisfactorily explain how the system worked in Stalin's time. Its picture of a totalitarian social system made no conceptual provision for the Stalin autocracy as a dynamism of the system (a cultural approach was likely to be more cognizant of the revival of the Tsarist autocratic tradition as a major fact in the evolution of Soviet political

[28] Anthony F. C. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements," *American Anthropologist*, LVIII (1956), 265. Wallace, 264, describes the revitalization movement as an instance of "attempted and sometimes successful innovation of whole cultural systems, or at least substantial portions of such systems." Fagen, 230-31, has expressed a special debt to Wallace's conception.

[29] Wallace, *Culture and Personality*, 192.

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culture under Stalin). Moreover, concentrating as it did upon supposedly functional constancies, called "operating characteristics" in *How the Soviet System Works*, that approach had a built-in perspective of stable totalitarianism, save in the event of violent upheaval from below. In no way did it point to the eventuality of regime-sponsored politico-cultural change after such a juncture as Stalin's death, nor did it provide tools for effective analysis of the process of change when it occurred in Khrushchev's time.

In the growing mood of disillusion with the totalitarian social-systems approach, some scholars have turned to a developmental perspective; others have sought to combine the one with the other. In an essay of 1966 that argued for methodological pluralism, Alex Inkeles stressed the possible uses of a "development model" in Soviet studies, stating that the Soviet regime's central concerns have included creating a flexible administrative system, building a technological base for the development of a modern society, modernizing through the spread of literacy, and attempting "to organize things so that they really ran."[30] In these and numerous additional respects the Soviet Union and other communist-ruled countries have, of course, been developing countries. The problem has to do with the selection of an analytic "model."

If we employ a highly abstract model, there is a danger of formalism or unilluminating morphology. If the model incorporates specificities of Western developmental experience, there is the danger, discussed above, of treating historical exceptionalism as universal.[31] All of which suggests that a developmental perspective should be informed with acceptance of the culturetransforming and culture-building process as the *central content* of "development" in its communist forms. Instead of treating communism as a modernizing movement, we will see certain ingredients of what Westerners call

[30] Alex Inkeles, *Social Change in Soviet Russia* (New York, 1968), 422-25. The essay, entitled "Models and Issues in the Analysis of Soviet Society," originally appeared in *Survey*, no. 60, July 1966.

[31] For example, the "syndrome" of political development constructed by members of the Comparative Politics Committee of the Social Science Research Council takes differentiation and specialization of structures resulting in division of labor within the realm of government as one of three basic aspects of political development. See, Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston 1966), 45-47. On this criterion, the communist party-states would for the most part have to be set down as developmentally laggard.

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"modernization" as present in the processes of directed cultural change observable in communist societies. We will, in short, take care not to assume that the communists are recapitulating our developmental history in their peculiar manner; our theoretical perspective itself will become culture conscious. This, I take it, is a generalization of the point that Benjamin Schwartz was making when he cautioned against applying a "monistic modernization theory" to Communist China and emphasized that in the Chinese leadership's view "the only desirable modernization is a modernization which can be incorporated into the Maoist vision." He argued in the same context that the Maoist vision of the good society, though founded in part on Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology, draws also upon certain traditional Chinese habits of thought and behavior and upon the actual experience of the Chinese Communist movement during the 1930s and 1940s.[32]

All well and good, the reader must be saying by now, but how do we follow the cultural approach in analyzing communist society and politics? Some part of the answer, but surely no more than a part, is implicit in work already done, including studies mentioned earlier in these pages. Broadly speaking, the pertinent existing scholarship falls under the heading of political ethnography, with particular emphasis upon the culturetransforming activities of communist regimes in their earlier stages. Much more such political ethnography of individual societies under communism is needed, in part as one of the bases for future generalizing studies. Presumably, too, we need more studies that focus upon cultural processes and cultural politics at later stages in the life of these societies and studies that examine the major developmental patterns in cultural terms. Still a further need is for a consciously cultural approach in the study of communist movements not in power, movements which exist as revolutionary or not-so-revolutionary *counter*cultures in noncommunist social settings. Such studies can be a source of valuable insights into the nature of modern communism as a culture-transforming movement. Too, they have, in certain cases, a feasibility advantage due to the greater accessibility of their leaders, their members, and their activities. In general, one of the strong

[32] Benjamin Schwartz, "Modernization and the Maoist Vision: Some Reflections on Chinese Communist Goals," *The China Quarterly*, (January-March, 1965).

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points of the cultural approach to communism is that it transcends the division between the study of nonruling communist movements and the study of communism in power.

Finally, comparative studies should become increasingly feasible and fruitful as the political ethnography of communist movements and societies advances. Comparativism has so far been disappointingly slow to develop in communist studies, largely because of the lack of conceptual approaches that sensitize us to diversity and its significance and that prompt us to raise interesting comparative questions. Thus, when we think of a communist polity as a totalitarian system or a mobilization system or a modernizing system, the uniformity of the communist phenomenon *in its essentials* is salient, and diversity seems to be secondary, a matter of the details, and therefore not worth worrying about very much. This is notably at variance with the attitudes of communists themselves, who frequently attach great importance to differences, including differences of emphasis in ideological formulas, which we, given our ways of thinking about communism, tend to regard as trivial or "merely tactical." The emergence of the rift between Moscow and Peking is an historic case in point. Not only political leaders but very many scholarly specialists on communism were extremely slow to recognize the potential significance of the division as the evidence—or seeming evidence—of it began to appear in the press of the two countries. Even now, after years of open polemics between the two capitals over their differing interpretations of communism as a way of life and thought, the Western mind is inclined to perceive these polemics as mainly a screen for a power contest over tangible things like territory or for an historic enmity between Russians and Chinese as peoples. That it could be at bottom, or in large part, a clash of communist cultures, is not an easy position for us to take, even as an hypothesis, because, in the final analysis, we have not treated communism as a form of culture.

There are, of course, different ways of arriving at comparativism in communist studies via the cultural approach. One could, conceivably, try to construct a "modal" culture via generalization from the features that communism has shown when in power in different countries and then investigate divergencies from type in concrete cases. Another method, which I find more attractive, is to historicize our comparative studies and make use of all that anthropology

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has to offer on the process of the transmission or "diffusion" of cultures. Russia was not only the birthplace of modern communism as a political movement; after the Revolution this movement and this system offered itself to other countries as a mandatory model. Meanwhile, however, as pointed out earlier in this paper, it had taken over certain elements from the Russian politico-cultural heritage. Insofar as other communist movements were doing, or would in future do, the same thing, despite all the efforts Moscow was making to prevent it, the seeds were being planted not only for future diversity of communisms but for collision of communist cultures. The principle implicit in all this may be stated in general form: if communism in practice tends to be an amalgam of an innovated cultural system and elements of a national cultural ethos, then divergencies of national cultural ethos will be one of the factors making for developmental diversity and cultural tension between different movements. I do not mean to suggest that this is the only important source of diversity in communist cultures.

In conclusion, it needs to be said with heavy emphasis that the cultural approach is no panacea for communist studies, any more than it is for any other branch of scholarship concerned with man. If it promises certain intellectual advantages, or breakthroughs even, it also involves serious problems. The problem of primary data, always a difficult one in this field, may be in some ways even more difficult for the student of communism as a form of culture than for the exponent of other approaches. The historicizing of our studies may take us farther than ever from general theory even as it opens up avenues for analysis of specifics and for low-level generalization. The list of problems could be, and should be, extended. The most that one could say in favor of the cultural approach would be something similar to what Churchill said of democracy. A most inefficient form of government. The problem is, all the others are worse.

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From Town to City: Boston in the 1820s

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The belief in the unbroken quality of Boston's history from the Revolution to the 1840s, a pillar of Brahmin historiography, has proved surprisingly durable. The fact that Boston underwent an official change from town to city in 1822 has been noted, but with little attention paid to its possible significance. Lucius Beebe dismisses the change as inconsequential, describing Boston in the next decade as still "an almost pastoral community." After acknowledging its rapid growth in the 1820s and the progressive administration of Mayor Josiah Quincy from 1823 to 1828, Roland Stromberg goes on to describe Boston of the 1830s as "an overgrown village, where everybody likely enough knew everybody else, and nobody escaped the scrutiny of the collective eye." Oscar Handlin writes that "there had been no disruption in the essential continuity of the city's history" during the half-century prior to the Irish migrations of the late 1840s. According to Martin Green, only with the coming of the Irish and industrialism were Boston's "communal hopes of earlier times . . . spoiled."[1]

[1] Lucius Beebe, *Boston and the Boston Legend* (New York, 1936), 111-12; Roland Stromberg, "Boston in the 1820's and 1830's," *History Today*, XI (1961), 591-92; Oscar Handlin, *Boston's Immigrants* (2nd ed., Boston, 1959), 24;

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The purpose of this essay is to suggest an alternative interpretation, that a decisive break occurred in Boston's history around 1820, at which point the population of Boston had not only increased significantly in number, but changed in character from the Boston of the 1780s. The change from town to city in 1822 was not inconsequential, but was the logical institutional response to that change in character. Moreover, Josiah Quincy's mayoralty, rather than having been in the tradition of elite rule in a homogeneous, orderly, consensual community extending back to John Winthrop, may be understood as the first attempt to govern a Boston where anonymity, disorder, and conflict-oriented politics—phenomena associated with contemporary American urban life[2]—were already manifesting themselves.

I

Few ideas appealed less to colonial Bostonians than incorporation. By 1800, seven separate proposals to replace the town meeting with a mayor and city council had been rejected, and all for the reason offered by one conservative Bostonian in 1714: "A People can hardly be guilty of greater folly than to change a Government under which, not only they, but their Fathers also, for a long time have Lived, Flourished and Prospered; it having been ever looked on as a very hazardous, perillous and dangerous thing for a People so to do."[3]

On October 16, 1815, the Boston Town Meeting heard a *Report on the Expediency of Making an Alteration in the Municipal Government*, the fourth such since 1784. Disclaiming any desire "to alter forms that are settled and familiar to our citizens . . . in conformity to some chosen or theoretic form of city government," the report recommended only modest changes in the prevailing arrange-

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Martin Green, *The Problem of Boston: Some Readings in Cultural History* (New York, 1966), 44-45.

[2] Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," in Richard Sennett, ed., *Classic Essays on the Culture of Cities* (New York, 1969), 143-64; Richard Sennett, *The Uses of Disorder* (New York, 1971); Edward Banfield, *The Unheavenly City* (Boston, 1970).

[3] "A Dialogue Between a Boston Man and a Countryman, 1714-1715," *Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts*, X (1904-06), 348.

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ments.[4] Nevertheless, four weeks later a majority of Bostonians voted against making any alterations in the way they governed themselves. "Where the spirit of liberty is on so high a key," Timothy Dwight observed the year before while visiting Boston, "necessity only, and that little less than absolute, will persuade most men to admit cheerfully the unpleasant change from a smaller to a greater number of restrictions."[5]

But more than loyalty continued to commend ancestral forms to Bostonians at a time when fifty other American communities had already opted for incorporation. During its long history, town government had proved both responsive to community needs and effective in meeting them. Although ultimate power resided in the meeting, the administrative details of governance were left to a board of selectmen. As Boston grew and its problems became more readily differentiated, special boards were established by the town meeting to deal with them. In 1679, following a fire that gutted much of the town, a board of firewards was created and charged with directing all firefighting operations. Thirteen years later, a board of overseers of the poor was formed, ostensibly to manage the almshouse, but also to discourage vagrants from taking up residence in the town. A school committee was created in 1790 to administer the town's growing educational system; nine years later, in the wake of a yellow fever epidemic, a board of health was established. The members of these boards were elected annually in a general meeting of all freeholding townsmen. In theory, a more democratic, decentralized arrangement would be difficult to imagine.

Town government had also met two other important criteria: it was cheap and it was honest. All elected officials, except the senior selectman, who was usually superintendent of police as well, served without salary. Yet, because these positions reflected standing in the community, they did not lack for volunteers. Indeed, however democratic in theory, town government was controlled by an oligarchy. According to James A. Henretta, all the important offices of Boston in the 1770s, "were lodged firmly in the hands of a broad

[4] *Report* reprinted in *Boston Town Records, 1814-1822*, Vol. XXXVII of *Boston Record Commissioners' Reports* (Boston, 1906), 45-48.

[5] Timothy Dwight, *Travels in New England and New York* (1821; Cambridge, 1969), I, 362-63.

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elite, entry into which was conditioned by commercial achievement and family background."[6] Educated, propertied, and politically conservative—which by the 1790s meant Federalist—this elite retained into the early 1800s that indispensable character of a dominant group which Robert Dahl has defined as "the sense, shared not only by themselves but by the populace, that their claim to govern was legitimate."[7] So long as this sense prevailed, town government worked.

But by 1820 it was no longer working, at least not well. Of several factors contributing to the declining effectiveness of town government, the overriding one was demography. After having reached a population of 16,000 in the 1740s, Boston had remained at that level throughout the 1760s. During the Revolution the town experienced a net loss in population, in part due to the Loyalist exodus and in part due to the growth in New England of secondary ports. Then, in the late 1780s, Boston's population began to grow again. The 18,000 recorded in the 1790 census grew to more than 43,000 by 1820, an increase of 250 per cent in thirty years. (A city census in 1825 reported a population in excess of 58,000, indicating that the annual growth rate had accelerated to 7 per cent.)[8] Although most of those swelling Boston's ranks during this period, unlike what would happen in the 1840s, were native born, the increase, nevertheless, rendered the town's almost familial governing arrangements suddenly obsolete.

Coinciding with this rapid growth, and compounding the resultant depersonalization of public life, was a redistribution of Boston's population. Beginning in the 1790s, hills were cut down and coves filled in, a process which not only provided more usable land but helped destroy the relatively stable residential patterns of the eighteenth-century town.[9] The North End, for example, during the Revolutionary era a mixed neighborhood of the well-to-do and of

[6] James A. Henretta, "Economic Development and Social Structure in Colonial Boston," *William and Mary Quarterly*, XXII (1965), 91-92.

[7] Robert Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven, 1961), 17.

[8] Jesse Chickering, *A Statistical View of the Population of Massachusetts from 1765 to 1840* (Boston, 1846), 12-13.

[9] Walter Muir Whitehill, *Boston: A Topographical History* (2nd ed., Cambridge, 1968), 73-94; Walter Firey, *Land Use in Central Boston* (Cambridge, 1947), 43-45.

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artisans, by the early 1800s was well on the way to becoming a slum. Fort Hill was subject to a similar exodus of wealthy residents, who went to either Beacon Hill or the suburbs. Profits from the War of 1812 and new revenues from manufacturing enterprises widened the economic gap between Boston's rich and poor and underwrote their residential segregation. The result was a discernible loosening of those civic ties that had earlier transcended class differences and bound one member of the community to another.[10]

Another factor contributing to the decline of Boston's cohesiveness was the blurring of town boundaries. As late as 1784, Boston could be approached by land from only the southwest. Physical isolation reinforced the reality of social solidarity. During the following 37 years, however, Boston was connected by bridges to Cambridge, Charlestown, Dorchester, and Roxbury. "Our town resembled a hand," a speaker recalled at the opening of the Western Avenue Bridge in 1821, "but it was a closed one. It is now open and well spread."[11] Whatever benefits Bostonians derived from their greater mobility were purchased at the cost of their earlier common identity.

By 1820, nearly 8,000 people were eligible to participate in the town meeting, a statistic which by itself made unobtainable the ideal of such meetings as deliberative assemblies. "The time is rapidly approaching," one hoarse Bostonian complained in 1821, "when the dictates of reason can find no human voice strong enough to carry them through the whole extent of the assembled citizens and when deliberations will be wholly impossible." Others believed that point had already been reached.[12] If some meetings were crowded and unruly, most were so poorly attended that often a majority of those present were elected officials. The town budget, which by 1820 amounted to $150,000, was regularly approved at meetings attracting fewer than fifty citizens.[13]

[10] For a discussion of distribution of wealth in Boston, see Edward Pessen, "The Equalitarian Myth and American Social Reality: Wealth, Mobility, and Equality in the 'Era of the Common Man,'" *American Historical Review*, LXXVI (1971), 1119-21.

[11] Whitehill, 94.

[12] *Columbian Centinel*, Nov. 10, 1821; [Samuel Alonzo Knapp], *Extract from the Journal of Travels in North America by Ali Bey* (Boston, 1818), 40-41.

[13] Josiah Quincy, *Municipal History of the Town and City of Boston, 1630-1830* (Boston, 1852), 29.

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Another casualty of Boston's rapid growth was its deferential pattern of politics. The presence of so many new voters either unfamiliar with or hostile to the town's governing elite certainly helped to undermine it, as did a growing fragmentation within the elite itself. During the first two decades of the nineteenth century, Boston's upper class was divided religiously into Calvinists and Unitarians, economically into those whose wealth derived from foreign commerce and those whose interests had shifted to manufacturing, and politically into proto-Whigs, those Federalists who joined in the "Era of Good Feelings" after the War of 1812, and the intransigents. No longer able to agree among themselves, the members of the upper class found it increasingly difficult, as one of them delicately phrased it, "to manage that class which is acted upon."[14]

The rebuff Charles Bullfinch suffered at the polls in 1815, after having served the town as chairman of the selectmen for sixteen years, marked the point at which many prominent Bostonians ceased regarding town offices as their prerogative or public service as a responsibility incumbent upon them. Rather than vie with "the wickedly aspiring," they voluntarily withdrew from public life and permitted less disinterested but more politically aggressive Bostonians to gain office by default.[15]

Thus, as the town's problems grew more complex, those elected to deal with them were increasingly less able to do so. Generally inexperienced and often inept, the new officeholders seemed more intent on shirking than on meeting their public responsibilities. Jurisdictional disputes among the various boards became commonplace as each tried to shift the blame for the decline in the quality of municipal services. The board of health, for example, which had performed heroically earlier in the century, by 1816 was a way-station for politicians hoping to become selectmen. Such men were more concerned with their own careers than with keeping the streets clear of animal waste or checking on clogged sewer vaults. Boston, as a result, literally stank.[16]

By 1820 even the most conservative Bostonians acknowledged

[14] Letter from Harrison Gray Otis to William Sullivan, Jan. 19, 1822, Harrison Gray Otis Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society [MHS], Boston.

[15] Harold and James Kirker, *Bulfinch's Boston 1787-1817* (New York, 1964), 268-70. For the predisposition to withdrawal among Federalists, see David Hackett Fischer, *The Revolution of American Conservatism* (New York, 1965), 1-28.

[16] *Columbian Centinel*, Dec. 12, 1821.

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the shortcomings of the governmental arrangements they had inherited and agreed with Lemuel Shaw that they should be replaced by a system "more suited to the needs of a numerous people."[17] That same year the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention, in clarifying the provisions relating to incorporation, cleared the way for reform. On December 21, 1821, after rejecting an earlier plan "for not going far enough," the Boston Town Meeting elected a committee to devise a new system of government.[18]

The committee's report, presented eight days later, called for sweeping changes, including replacing the "Town of Boston" with the "City of Boston." During the ensuing three-day session, the meeting discussed and accepted the committee's proposed charter, which contained provisions for a popularly elected mayor with broad if ill-defined powers, an 8-man board of aldermen elected at large, and a common council composed of 48 members, 4 from each of the 12 wards. On January 7, 1822, Boston voters by a seven-to-five margin approved the charter and directed that it be sent to the General Court for its endorsement. An era, begun 192 years earlier, had ended.[19]

II

Determined to have a city, Bostonians needed a mayor. Initially it appeared that the customary procedures would prevail: selection by the Federalist Central Committee, endorsement by a public party caucus, election by balloting at Faneuil Hall. Even before the charter was submitted to the General Court, William Sullivan, a leading Boston Federalist, wrote to the head of the state Federalist party, U.S. Senator Harrison Gray Otis, that "if we should arrive at the point of having the right to choose a mayor, you are that one of my fellow citizens, whom I expect to see engaged in the labor of putting the executive machinery in action." Another Bostonian, Thomas Handasyd Perkins, wrote to Otis in a similar vein, assuring him of the backing of "Webster, Lowell, Tudor, all the Judges and those whom I know you feel a high respect for."[20]

[17] *Journal of the Debates and Proceedings in the Convention of Delegates Chosen to Revise the Constitution, 1820-1821* (Boston, 1821), 615.

[18] *Boston Town Records, 1814-1822*, 254-55.

[19] *Columbian Centinel*, Jan. 9, 1822.

[20] William Sullivan to H. G. Otis, Jan. 6, 1822; Thomas S. Perkins to H. G. Otis, Apr. 5, 1822, Otis Papers.

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The offer caught Otis in a receptive mood. Four frustrating years in Washington had been enough; he had already decided to return to Boston, he told his wife, "where I can help train the young leaders of my breed." Why not do so as mayor? The office had the additional attraction of providing a respectable position while he waited for Governor Brooks to retire. Once consenting to "the solicitation of my friends," Otis left it to Sullivan and Perkins to secure for him the party's nomination and the election.[21] At this point few difficulties were anticipated.

Federalist confidence was shaken, however, when the General Court failed to delete from the proposed city charter a provision for ward-voting for all city offices. Such an innovation had long been opposed by the Federalists since much of their success in Boston was attributable to "the influence and example" they were able to exert on those who appeared at Faneuil Hall on election day. If balloting was to be permitted in each of the wards, Otis had warned earlier, that influence would be dissipated and "the town will be revolutionized to a certainty."[22]

The very possibility of dissipating Federalist influence had prompted Boston Democrats to back incorporation in 1822 after having condemned it seven years earlier as a Federalist plot. Ward-voting was the price they exacted for supporting the charter. They hoped it would eliminate not only the coercive practices at Faneuil Hall but the advantage Federalist candidates traditionally enjoyed by virtue of their greater townwide prominence. Decentralizing the electoral procedures would have the further effect of consolidating growing Democratic strength in particular neighborhoods, most notably the North End. When ward-voting carried in the March 4 referendum by a majority greater than that of all other provisions of the city charter, Democrats and political independents correctly sensed that Boston's days as a Federalist rotten borough were over.[23]

"The chief reason for our friendship towards the city bill," the Democratic *Independent Chronicle* announced two days before the referendum, "is that it will introduce into power the *Middling In-*

[21] Otis to Sullivan, Jan. 8, 19, 1822, Otis Papers.

[22] Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis* (Boston, 1913), II, 207-18, 234-37.

[23] For Democrats' reversal, see *Independent Chronicle*, Mar. 2, 1822.

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terest, an interest among our citizens, which if it had assumed to its due weight, would long ago have swayed the government of our town."[24] The principal leaders of the Middling Interest were, in fact, not Democrats but disaffected rank-and-file Federalists, political mavericks like William Sturgis, and newcomers to Boston like the Baptist minister Francis Wayland. Repudiating the insinuation that the group was "an array of the POOR against the RICH," they insisted the Middling Interest represented "men of property and men of business."[25]

Young Ralph Waldo Emerson dismissed it as "a band of murmurers, a parcel of demagogues . . . hoping for places as partisans which they could not achieve as citizens,"[26] but Federalist party officials watched with growing alarm the growth of the Middling Interest. During the winter of 1821-22 many small businessmen joined its ranks to protest the enforcement of a town ordinance prohibiting the construction of wooden buildings. Defended by the selectmen as a fire-prevention measure, the ordinance was seen by the town's undercapitalized shopkeepers as part of a conspiracy to thwart their legitimate aspirations perpetrated by the commercial establishment. On March 7, the ordinance was brought before the town and repudiated by a margin of better than five-to-one. Coming on the heels of the ward-voting victory, this impressive show of strength prompted the *Independent Chronicle* to declare that "Aristocracy is in a tremble."[27]

"Aristocracy" soon had more cause for concern. Ten days before the city elections, the politically independent but pro-Middling Interest *New England Galaxy* offered a critical assessment of those being publicly considered for the mayor's office. Conceding that Otis —already endorsed by the *Daily Advertiser*—John Phillips, and William Tudor were all reasonably "fit," the *Galaxy* went on to conclude that none of them was as "preeminently entitled to be the

[24] *Independent Chronicle*, Mar. 22, 1822.

[25] On the Middling Interest, see *An Exposition of the Principles and Views of the Middling Interest in the City of Boston* (Boston, 1822); *Defense of the Middling Interest* (Boston, 1822); *Daily Advertiser*, Mar. 6, 16, 30, 1822; *Boston Patriot*, Mar. 9, 1822.

[26] Ralph Waldo Emerson to John Boynton Hill, Mar. 11, 1822, reprinted in Ralph L. Rusk, ed., *Letters of Ralph Waldo Emerson* (New York, 1934), I, 110-12.

[27] *Independent Chronicle*, Mar. 29, 1822.

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first mayor of Boston" as someone not previously mentioned, Josiah Quincy.[28] The Middling Interest had found a candidate—at first glance a most improbable one.

A member of one of Boston's oldest and most distinguished families, Quincy had already served four terms as a Federalist congressman (1805-13), seven years in the Massachusetts Senate (1813-20), and had just announced his resignation from the Massachusetts House to become judge of the Boston Municipal Court. Long hated by Boston's Democratic-Republicans for his intemperate attacks on Jefferson and his violent opposition to the War of 1812, he had not been particularly popular among his fellow Federalists since his return to Boston in 1813. Otis and other party leaders anxious to present themselves in a conciliatory light after the debacle of the Hartford Convention were frequently embarrassed by his ideological intransigence and unwillingness to submit to party discipline. In 1820 they unceremoniously dumped him from the Federalist slate for the State Senate. Only his humbling shift to the lower house had staved off political oblivion. Moreover, Quincy was known to be hostile toward the city charter. As a member of the 1815 and 1821 town committees investigating the subject, he had opposed incorporation. Indeed, when first approached by the Middling Interest, he warned them that nominating him "would be like nominating Guy Fawkes for Mayor, for he had done all in his power to blow up their city."[29]

The choice of Quincy, however, showed considerable astuteness. To add to the respectability of the cause, the Middling Interest required a candidate with a public reputation and wide officeholding experience. But if the first requirements made almost unavoidable the selection of a Federalist, the second was that his ties with the party be tenuous enough to be easily severed. Quincy was qualified on all counts. Dependent upon public responsibilities to give his life substance, he found, at 51, his life-long connection with the Federalist party could no longer be counted on to provide him with offices in which he might have such responsibilities. Furthermore, he had a well developed interest in municipal affairs stemming from his researches as a state representative into the social problems

[28] *New England Galaxy*, Mar. 29, 1822.

[29] Letter from Eliza Susan Quincy to Robert C. Winthrop, Oct. 29, 1879, Robert C. Winthrop Papers, MHS.

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attending industrialization in Massachusetts. Thus, when offered the nomination as mayor by the Middling Interest, neither party loyalties nor personal scruples prevented him from accepting.

When the Federalists held their public caucus the Middling Interest came within five votes of denying the party's nomination to Otis and winning it for Quincy, which prompted Daniel Webster to concede, "We are in a deplorable state here. Nothing seems practicable but to go forward and support Mr. O. and probably be beaten."[30] Perkins voiced the betrayal he and many of his class felt at one of their own "having thrown himself into the hands of the 'Middling or Meddling Interest.' Quincy has done himself up, by the course he has pursued," he assured Otis, before adding prophetically, "He will have the high gratification of having split up the federal party."[31]

As events had it, neither Quincy nor Otis became Boston's first mayor. Although the Democratic press supported Quincy, a sufficient number of North Enders refused to vote for a candidate "whose whole political life," one of them later explained "has rendered him obnoxious."[32] Although Quincy outpolled Otis (1,736 to 1,384), Democratic-Republican scattering left Quincy 62 votes short of a needed majority. When the results were announced, Otis's name was withdrawn. Two days later Quincy followed suit, declaring that the mayor's office "is a station, which I never sought, or coveted." His daughter remembered his sentiments at the time somewhat differently: "He rejoiced at his own defeat—as he feared going in by a small majority."[33]

On April 13, 1822, standing unopposed, John Phillips, an ideal compromise, was elected mayor. Phillips proved to be only a temporary solution to Boston's executive needs; halfway through his first term he fell seriously ill and announced that he would not stand for reelection.

By the spring of 1823 most party leaders accepted the fact that, with Phillips unavailable and Otis committed to a try for the gov-

[30] Daniel Webster to Joseph Story, Apr. 5, 1822, reprinted in *Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster* (National Ed., Boston, 1903), XVI, 68.

[31] Thomas H. Perkins to H. G. Otis, Apr. 5, 1822, Otis Papers.

[32] *Independent Chronicle*, Apr. 10, 1822.

[33] *Columbian Centinel*, Apr. 10, 1822; Eliza S. Quincy to Robert C. Winthrop, Oct. 29, 1879, Winthrop Papers.

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ernorship, the only alternative to the perpetrator of "the memorable treachery of March last" was a Democratic mayor. It took John Lowell, however, to convince Otis that unless all Federalist office seekers, those of "a higher and better class" as well as "the milk and water" variety, joined together, "they will never again be heard of —they will eat no more Corporation dinners, nor be regaled any longer with the odoriferous praises upon which they have subsisted heretofore."[34] Grudgingly, Otis gave Quincy the Federalist party's endorsement.

None of the men of that "higher and better class" were active in Quincy's election, but he made do without them. On April 14, 1823, with the support of the already disintegrating Middling Interest, he secured a majority of 121 votes out of 4,766 cast to defeat the Democrat George Blake. It was hardly an overwhelming mandate. With only the most tentative political backing and with only the outmoded precedents of town government as a guide, Quincy was now obliged to confront the long-neglected problems of a growing city of 50,000.

III

"Their labors have been, in a measure, unobtrusive," politely commented Boston's second mayor on his predecessor's administration. Temperamentally disinclined to assert the powers of his office or divest the old town boards of theirs, Phillips had done little to alter municipal arrangements. Rather than take personal responsibility for the city's public health, for example, he reconstituted the defunct board of health and delegated to it all its old powers. Similarly, the overseers of the poor and the firewards carried on much as before, that is, without effective executive supervision.

Conceding the possible wisdom of shaping the first city administration "by the spirit of the long-experienced constitution of the town, than by that of the unsettled charter of the city," Quincy immediately made clear that such caution would not characterize the second. He pledged instead to end "the division of the executive power among many." He also expressed the hope that his exertions would find favor among the voters, but acknowledged the greater

[34] John Lowell to H. G. Otis, Feb. 25, 1823, Otis Papers.

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likelihood that they would "be followed by loss of confidence."[35] Quincy's determination to provide Boston with effective government and his skepticism about the political possibilities of doing so would serve him well during his six years as mayor.

The inaugural ceremonies over, the city council was called into session to hear a report from the mayor "on the state of the streets" and an accompanying plan "for making and keeping them clean." The town had divided responsibility for the streets between the board of health and the selectmen acting as the surveyors of highways. Phillips had sought unsuccessfully by way of a referendum to place the entire responsibility in his office; Quincy simply assumed the power as part of his overall responsibility for the city's welfare. Rather than rely on scavengers, he hired teams of laborers to clean the clogged streets. Certainly one of the more impressive statistics of his first year as mayor was the amount of street dirt collected—six thousand tons.

The mayor's efforts in this area intentionally encroached upon the domain of Phillips's board of health. Rather than continue the board, Quincy wanted the public health of the city placed in the hands of a full-time professional, appointed by and answerable to the mayor alone. Less than two weeks after taking office, Quincy appointed as "Marshall of the City," Benjamin Pollard, a Harvard graduate and lawyer. This position made Pollard not only Boston's police chief but its health officer as well. What would prove to be Quincy's favorite remedy for urban ills was being prescribed: centralization of power in the mayor's office plus professionalization of the administration of municipal services.

The mayor and his marshall succeeded where the board had not. Streets were cleaned regularly, sewers were brought under public control, and the unsanitary practice of church-vault burials was finally halted. During Quincy's tenure, Boston acquired a reputation as the healthiest city in the United States. Indeed, so zealous was the mayor about cleaning the streets that some Bostonians thought it was done "to a needless and pernicious extreme."[36] Not since

[35] Josiah Quincy, "Inaugural Address, May 1, 1823," reprinted in *Municipal History*, 376-78.

[36] Complaint repeated in Harrison Gray Otis, "Report to the Common Council, January 4, 1830," in Quincy, *Municipal History*, 304.

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Quincy has anyone had cause to complain on this score.

Whereas Quincy had moved quickly and with impunity to assume the powers of the board of health, discretion obliged him to proceed more cautiously with respect to the firewards and overseers of the poor. If less socially prestigious than their eighteenth-century counterparts, members of both boards remained, under the city charter, a potent force in Boston's political life. They were also, as anyone intent upon reforming Boston's antiquated firefighting procedures and provisions for public relief soon discovered, bastions of traditionalism.

Equally committed to the status quo were the four hundred members of Boston's sixteen volunteer engine companies. These politically active companies possessed an esprit de corps unmatched by any other civic organizations. Enginemen apparently received considerable personal gratification from the conspicuousness of their public labors. Consequently, convinced that "the nearer the fire the greater the honor," they adamantly opposed the use of hoses that were, by 1820, standard equipment on New York and Philadelphia engines.[37]

Quincy's first clash with the firefighting establishment involved the cash bonus traditionally paid to the first engine company at a fire. Phillips had agreed to fifteen dollars, but six weeks after the new mayor took office, the enginemen presented a demand for fifty dollars on the threat that they would all quit. Quincy turned to the firewards and asked them to act as mediators, only to discover that they supported the enginemen. He formally rejected the demand and a week later the enginemen made good their threat. Fortunately, replacements were secured before any need for them arose. There remained, however, the basic problem of a firefighting system resisting the mayor's efforts to modernize it.

In the spring of 1825 fate intervened on the side of reform in the guise of a $1,000,000 fire begun in a chowder pot. Before burning itself out, the blaze consumed fifty establishments along State and Broad Streets. Efforts to contain it were totally unsuccessful, at times ludicrous. In May, seeking to capitalize on the public's distress, Quincy brought forward a comprehensive plan for a fire de-

[37] Arthur W. Brayley, *A Complete History of the Boston Fire Department* (Boston, 1889), 148-49; Quincy, *Municipal History*, 153-56.

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partment modeled after that of New York City. Although the engines would continue to be staffed with volunteers, each company was to have a chief engineer appointed by the mayor, reservoirs were to be constructed throughout the city, hoses were to be introduced immediately, and, finally, the board of firewards was to be abolished.

In the ensuing controversy Quincy defended the plan in a *Public Letter* insisting that a change was needed because Boston had changed. "Our present system," the mayor argued, "presupposes either *a will* in the surrounding multitude at fires, to aid in forming lanes to pass water to the engines, or *a power* in the firewards to compel them to form such lanes." When both assumptions were warranted, he acknowledged, Boston's traditional system had been effective as well as a source of civic pride. But neither operated now, he argued. For a fireward to point out a lagger no longer sufficed; social obloquy carries force only in a community where everyone knows everyone else and where each individual feels his personal contribution to a collective effort could be crucial. Bostonians, Quincy reminded them, and not without a trace of sadness, had long ago passed from that primitive state.

Furthermore, the mayor cited growing class differences and the introduction of fire insurance, which caused a fire to be viewed by onlookers as a private concern rather than a public calamity. The *Public Letter* quotes one Bostonian's explanation for his refusal to join in a bucket brigade, "I ask no protection from others, and I mean not to incur the risk of health and life in protecting them." However much he personally deplored "such cold, selfish, calculating language," the mayor insisted that he had to reckon with its implications. "In all cities, after they have obtained a certain amount of greatness," Quincy concluded his *Letter*, "the system of depending on the aid of all the citizens has been abandoned, and a system, self-dependent and which so far from requiring the aid of all citizens, excluded that aid, has been adopted."[38] This was but one of the unlovely facts of urban life that the mayor was calling on Bostonians of the 1820s to accept.

Quincy got his fire department, though barely. Of the more than 2,500 votes cast in a city referendum, his plan won by a majority of

[38] Quincy's *Public Letter* reprinted in Brayley, 154-57.

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less than 200. Nevertheless, his reforms were quickly instituted, and over the next three years Boston fire insurance rates dropped 20 per cent.[39]

Nowhere was the disparity greater between the magnitude of a social problem confronting city government in the 1820s and the inherited mechanism for dealing with it than in the area of public relief. Responsibility for the town's poor was vested in elected overseers of the poor, a provision retained by the city charter. The overseers clearly were unequal, however, to coping with Boston's swelling population of poor and dependent. No one knew this better than Quincy, who had criticized the overseers while a state legislator examining pauper laws, a municipal judge obliged to deal with the poor as well as the criminal, and chairman of the town committee to establish a House of Industry. The promiscuous use of the almshouse particularly offended him. He complained to the city council that the overseers indiscriminately crammed nearly four hundred persons into the 32-room Leverett Street facility: "In this collection are to be found all ages and colors; every state of poverty and disease whether produced by misfortune or vice." He further deplored the overseers' principal reliance on "outdoor" relief, that is, boarding the poor "on the town" and allowing them to remain part of the community, on the grounds that this cost more than institutionalization and indulged the poor by exacting no work of them.[40]

One of Quincy's first acts upon becoming mayor was to direct the overseers to transfer all able-bodied poor on outdoor relief or in the almshouse to the newly opened House of Industry in South Boston. The overseers refused, agreeing only to send those poor who specifically requested transfer to what was already being called the mayor's "Botany Bay." None did, and the dispute continued through Quincy's first year in office, while the $35,000 facility remained unoccupied.[41]

[39] Quincy, "Address on Taking Final Leave of Office," *Municipal History*, 263-65.

[40] *Boston Town Records, 1814-1822*, 267-72; Records of the City of Boston, Mayor and Aldermen, Dec. 12, 1822, ms. copy in the City Clerk's Office, Boston City Hall.

[41] Records of the City of Boston, July 28, September 29, October 6, 1823; Quincy, *Report of the Committee of City Council on Relations with Overseers of the Poor* (Boston, 1824), copy in Massachusetts State House Library.

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In the fall of 1824 the mayor attempted to break the deadlock and to arouse public sympathy for his reform proposals by directing the overseers to make an accounting of their expenditures for outdoor relief. When they refused, Quincy announced a city referendum to decide whether the overseers ought to be placed under the mayor's control, a proposal the voters rejected.

The mayor resorted to other means to accomplish the same end. In March 1825, he sold the almshouse. The following month the city council, miffed by the overseers' assertion of complete autonomy, enjoined them against extending any more outdoor relief. By 1828, most of the city's poor were out in South Boston, "hammering stone and like material."[42] Quincy did not eliminate poverty in Boston, nor had he attempted to. "The poor," he wrote in 1821, like "the vicious, and the criminal are necessary parts of the social system." But by separating what he called "the respectable and honest poor" from "the idle and vicious" and by providing the latter with "coercive restraint and employment" rather than permitting them to obtain relief without institutionalization, he established a new procedure for dealing with an old problem.[43] In so doing, he made yet another decisive break with Boston's past.

IV

"It is a general time of health and prosperity in the city," Dr. George Shattuck wrote to his son in 1825. "I could send you a map of the progress of Mr. Quincy's new improvements."[44] But if Shattuck gloried in the "paternal government . . . watching over his comfort and convenience" that Quincy had provided,[45] others had begun critically to assess its cost. Reforms did not come cheaply. Street-cleaning and -widening between 1823 and 1826, for example, cost $250,000, more than the total expenditure of town government in

[42] Records of the City of Boston, Apr. 25, 1825; Quincy, "Address Upon Taking Final Leave of Office," 271.

[43] Quincy, *Remarks . . . Affecting Poverty, Vice, and Crime* (Boston, 1822), 2. On the long-range implications of Quincy's reforms in this area, see David J. Rothman, *The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic* (Boston, 1971).

[44] Dr. George C. Shattuck to his son, Aug. 24, 1825, George C. Shattuck Papers, MHS.

[45] Quincy, "Inaugural Address, May 1, 1823," 378.

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1821. The new fire department cost an additional $50,000. The South Boston complex, which by 1826 consisted of Houses of Industry, Correction, and Juvenile Reform, required $100,000 to build and maintain. But it was the New Faneuil Hall Market project, a mammoth urban renewal undertaking completed in 1826, which ran the city debt to $1,000,000 and evoked "the most prodigious outcry."[46]

The mayor initially dismissed criticism of his spending as uninformed. "Abstractedly, a debt is no more an object of terror than a sword," he lectured in his second inaugural address in 1824. "Both are very dangerous in the hands of fools or madmen. Both are very safe, innocent, and useful in the hands of the wise and prudent." In 1826, after demonstrating that his reforms were being funded not by increased taxes but rising property values, Quincy called upon his increasingly tight-fisted constituents to undertake a water works project that would cost $2,500,000.[47]

The project was never mentioned again, and in his 1827 inaugural address he announced that "our chief duty will be to finish what we have begun . . . and the gradual extinction of the city debt."[48] The sudden turnabout may have been prompted, as the mayor insisted, by fiscal considerations, but it appears more likely that politics was the crucial factor. Criticism of his spending had been particularly vehement in the Democratic press during the 1826 mayoral campaign. The decision to cut spending did him little political good, however, as his subsequent problems with the Boston school committee would reveal. Quincy's battle over the schools only pointed up the ultimate futility of trying to satisfy all the contradictory demands of an urban electorate.

Compared with other contemporary American cities, Boston had an exemplary public school system. In 1826, over 7,000 students were enrolled in the city's 74 schools at an annual cost to the tax-

[46] *Independent Chronicle*, Dec. 9, 1826; Quincy, "Inaugural Address, 1826," *Municipal History*, 391-95; Records of the City of Boston, May 29, 1824; *Boston Newsletter and City Record*, Oct. 28, 1826.

[47] Quincy, "Inaugural Address, 1824," "Inaugural Address, 1826," 383, 393-96.

[48] Quincy, "Inaugural Address, 1827," *Municipal History*, 399-405; *Independent Chronicle*, Dec. 9, 1826. For evidence that Quincy's reforms were within Boston's financial means, see Charles Phillips Huse, *The Financial History of Boston, 1822-1909* (Cambridge, 1916), 49-51.

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payers of $54,000. In addition to 51 primary and 19 grammar schools, a school for blacks, and two boys' high schools, the system included the country's first High School for Girls, just completing its first year of operation. It was over the seemingly insignificant question of whether to continue the girls' high school that the mayor's previously cordial relations with the school committee were shattered and his political future put in jeopardy.

Ironically, Quincy had not anticipated, much less wanted, this particular fight. Of all the old town boards, he had managed to work best with the school committee. Though he and his seven children had attended private schools, he was not hostile to the idea of publicly supported schools. In the 1790s, he had served five years as a school committeeman; later, he had not joined with Harrison Gray Otis and other Federalists in an attack on the primary schools. But neither did he share the Jeffersonian vision of public schools as nurseries of "a natural aristocracy" nor the later Whig notion of public schools as instruments of social control. The girls' high school had been a popular success, but when it was moved at a meeting of the school committee that it be continued and enlarged, the mayor blocked the motion, announced the formation of a special subcommittee, which he would chair, to examine the subject and adjourned the meeting.

For Quincy this was not an ideological issue nor even a jurisdictional power struggle between the mayor's office and an elected board, but merely an opportunity to prove his fiscal prudence.[49] The school's popularity was his most compelling reason for wanting it discontinued. He had supported the experiment when first discussed in 1825 in the belief that it would provide student monitors for the lower schools and thereby reduce the need for full-time teachers. By the fall of 1826, however, it was clear that the girls' high school actually drained from the lower schools the brightest girls at a lower age than before and thus made the introduction of a monitorial system all the less likely. Its success also, as one of the lower-school headmasters ingenuously informed the mayor, had

[49] Joseph M. Wightman, *Annals of the Boston Primary School Committee* (Boston, 1860), 14-35; Quincy, "Address Upon Taking Final Leave of Office," 271; [Josiah Quincy], Report of the Subcommittee on the High School for Girls, Nov. 17, 1826, Boston School Committee Records, Rare Book Room, Boston Public Library.

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convinced many Boston parents who previously sent their daughters to private schools that they might now have them "fitted at the publick expense."[50] However much public educators might have welcomed the prospect of the 3,000 girls attending private schools in Boston transferring to the city schools, Quincy was appalled.[51]

The number of applications for admission was so great that competitive examinations had been established to determine admission, a practice that the mayor warned would "provoke the inevitable discontent of the citizenry."[52] Yest most Bostonians had the opposite reaction; rather than condemn the school for being selective and demand its closing, they called for the universalization of its benefits. In January 1827, the school committee received a petition calling for "the Establishment of a High School for the Education of Children of the Colored Citizens." Six weeks later a group of merchants petitioned the committee "to provide French, Spanish and German Instruction in the Public Schools . . . to qualify our children for the pursuits of active life [and] equalize the advantages of our schools among all classes of citizens."[53] To Quincy it was clear that if Boston were not to bankrupt itself, the girls' high school had to go.

Caught in a classic squeeze between demands to economize and demands to expand public facilities, Quincy tried to wiggle out by attacking the girls' high school as discriminatory. He did not point out that the school's selectivity was made necessary by the city's refusal to expand its facilities to meet the demand for them. Nevertheless, this bit of demagoguery sealed the school's fate. On February 26, 1828, despite considerable grumbling from some members, the school committee bowed to the mayor's wishes and announced that the High School for Girls would not reopen in the fall. Thus a potentially gaping hole in Boston's fiscal dike was closed, but only at the cost of ending the city's pioneering effort to public-

[50] Andrew Andrews, Headmaster of Bowdoin School, to School Committee, Oct. 21, 1826, School Committee Records.

[51] Report of Subcommittee on High School for Girls, Nov. 17, 1826.

[52] *Ibid.*

[53] Petition Regarding the Establishment of a High School for the Education of Children of the Colored Citizens, Jan. 12, 1827; David French, Memorial for French, Spanish and German Instruction in Boston Public Schools, Feb. 22, 1827, School Committee Records.

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ly "provide fit wives for well-educated men"—and at considerable political cost to the mayor.

Prior to 1828, Quincy's majorities had grown each year until, on December 10, 1827, he was returned to a fifth term by a six-to-one margin. Yet his appeal to the Boston electorate ought not be exaggerated. Opposition surfaced early in his tenure. The rapid turnover of aldermen and frequent complaints from common councilmen about being left uninformed were symptomatic of the misgivings many had about his centralization policies. Certainly the abolished firewards and evicted overseers of the poor felt no more loyalty to him than the "lazy poor" cutting stone in South Boston.

Much of the latent opposition can be attributed to Quincy's autocratic style. No one denied his devotion or doubted his integrity, but many came to feel he took too proprietary an interest in what was also their city. John Pray, upon receipt of the following letter, must have been counted among them:

March 1, 1826

Sir -

I hereby give you notice that the Mayor and Aldermen intend to continue the widening of Hanover Street through the building you are altering. . . . You may govern yourself accordingly.

Josiah Quincy
Mayor of Boston[54]

The decision to close the High School for Girls provided an issue around which anti-Quincy sentiment could finally coalesce. Only the *Columbian Centinel*, the most conservative and debt-conscious of Boston's newspapers, had endorsed the decision; the papers earlier aligned with the Middling Interest condemned it. When the mayor tried to explain his reasons in a *Report on the Subject of the Schools*, he drew a strong rejoinder from the high school's ex-headmaster, Ebenezer Bailey. Attributing Quincy's enthusiasm for the monitorial system to his desire to eliminate "half the present teachers," Bailey went on to quote the mayor as saying that "public schools should be merely eleemosynary establishments where nothing but the lowest elements of learning should be doled out to the

[54] Quincy to John Pray, Mar. 1, 1826, Miscellaneous Manuscripts, Rare Book Room, Boston Public Library.

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children of poverty."[55] The quote was promptly snapped up by the Democratic press, already engaged in an aristocracy-baiting campaign on behalf of the presidential candidacy of Andrew Jackson.

The fact that municipal balloting in 1828 followed the national elections by only five days meant that Quincy's Democratic-Republican critics found themselves better organized than usual. "Fragments of the party feelings generated in the late national election," the *Columbian Centinel* noted, were being "hashed up in a new dish for city aliment."[56] An election-day broadside widely distributed by the Democrats reflected the intrusion of national politics into the mayoral contest when it charged Quincy with increasing the city debt so as "to furnish a safe and convenient investment for a few rich individuals . . . very agreeable to them as the United States debt was to be paid off." It used the girls' high school issue to make an even more direct appeal to the animus of the Jacksonian voter, quoting the mayor as saying: " 'If this School is continued, by and by, the education of our servant girls will be equal to that of our daughters, and perhaps enable them to form connections with our sons!' "[57]

Unable to agree upon a candidate of their own, a fact which underlines the negative impulse of the anti-Quincy campaign, critics of the mayor called upon the voters to "support any opposing candidate, with the fullest assurance, that almost any change will advance the best interests of the city."[58] At two separate election-morning caucuses, the names of Thomas C. Amory and Charles Welles were placed in nomination. Between them they managed to win enough support to leave Quincy 83 votes short of a majority. Hailing the vote, the *Boston Patriot* credited the mayor's rebuff to "the laboring class vote . . . who suffer most by his extravagance."[59]

Supporters assured the mayor that the necessary additional votes would be forthcoming in the December 15 reballoting. The *Columbian Centinel* and *Daily Advertiser*, silent before the first balloting,

[55] Ebenezer Bailey, *Review of the Mayor's Report on the Subject of the Schools so Far as it Relates to the High School for Girls* (Boston, 1828), 6-11.

[56] *Columbian Centinel*, Dec. 12, 1828.

[57] *Look to Your Interest!*, Broadsides Collection, Rare Book Room, Boston Public Library.

[58] *Ibid.*; see also *Independent Chronicle*, Dec. 8, 1828.

[59] *Boston Patriot*, Dec. 10, 1828.

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now called for his reelection. Yet little enthusiasm was to be found among what the *Patriot* called "that little knot of men in State Street who, through their influence, kept Mr. Quincy in office."[60] Clearly, Democrats were not the only Bostonians who believed that "this poor exhausted body politic" needed nothing so much as a respite from "the empiricism of a reckless Quack who fears nothing because he knows nothing."[61] For many wealthy Bostonians good government had already come to mean cheap government, and this Quincy had not provided.

The second balloting duplicated the first, even to the accompanying broadsides. "Look at Mr. Quincy's overbearing and imperious manner, look at his haughty and anti-republican manners to Citizens generally," a Democratic broadside admonished, "and then say whether you will vote for him."[62] Again without a candidate of their own, critics of the mayor once more denied him a majority, this time by 66 votes. Quincy withdrew and a week later, without significant opposition, Harrison Gray Otis was chosen mayor.

The ousted mayor accepted his fate calmly, even graciously. His address upon leaving office pointedly refrained from reflecting "on the fickleness of the popular will."[63] In time his accomplishments were duly acknowledged; long before his death in 1864 he was referred to as Boston's "Great Mayor." Those reforms which he implemented remained the core of the city's municipal structure into the 1880s when a reorganization went further toward centralizing power in the mayor's office. Though Quincy's loyalties remained with the smaller, more coherent town of his childhood, he had accepted the reality of change and tried to alter the city government accordingly. His difficulties and ultimate repudiation, no less than his successes, suggest that the 1820s were not a coda to Boston's communal past but an overture to its urban future.

[60] *Ibid.*

[61] *Boston Patriot*, Dec. 8, 1828.

[62] "*Worse and Worse!*," Broadsides Collection, Rare Book Room, Boston Public Library.

[63] Quincy, "Address Upon Taking Final Leave of Office," 261.

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Will Tactical Nuclear Weapons Ever Be Used?*

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The role of tactical nuclear weapons in warfare is a subject that has generated numerous arguments and much confusion.[1] Both official and unofficial sources have contributed substantially to the debate but ultimately they have only further compounded the confusion. The numerous scenarios beginning "if the Warsaw Pact nations launched a large-scale conventional war in Europe tomorrow what would NATO do?" reveal how far planners and strategists still are from answering that question. One of the principal areas of disagreement in these various scenarios concerns the role of tactical nuclear weapons.

The United States possesses an elaborate and expensive weapons

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[1] This paper concerns itself with only land-based atomic weapons described by the United States, at least, as "tactical." No consideration is given to the problems of sea warfare, where some of the objections raised in this paper would not be relevant. Whether these weapons have a possible use in naval warfare is a question worth pursuing.

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system the proposed use of which, apparently, has not yet been agreed upon by either policymakers or expert observers. Before considering the possible use of these weapons it is necessary to examine the sources of the present confusion, which lie in the origins and nature of the weapons themselves and their relation to the problems of NATO.

The second part of the paper presents a model of foreign policy decisionmaking and applies that model to the question of tactical nuclear weapons. The result of that exercise is to suggest that tactical nuclear weapons will probably not be used in the defense of Europe; since no other credible scenario for their employment can be imagined, the final conclusion is that the weapons have no conceivable role in future ground warfare.

I

If ever a weapons system has been conceived in debate, born in uncertainty, and nurtured in ambiguity, it is the tactical nuclear weapons system.[2] Shortly after the Bikini test in 1946, it became clear to several American atomic scientists, most notably J. Robert Oppenheimer, that the atomic bomb might lend itself to various alterations in size and configuration. Out of this original scientific speculation arose an Atomic Energy Commission proposal to create a variety of nuclear weapons. By 1949, uranium production had increased markedly and many of the atomic production facilities had been streamlined, thus enhancing the possibility of creating an entire family of nuclear weapons. Before such a proposal could be submitted to the president, however, in late August 1949, the Russians exploded their first atomic device. Although the president subsequently authorized the AEC's expansion program, a new element was introduced by the Soviet atomic blast. Various people began suggesting that the most reasonable response to this new Soviet threat was to mobilize resources for a crash hydrogen-bomb program.[3] Although the General Advisory Committee as well as the

[2] For a more detailed discussion of this earlier period see Philip W. Dyer, "The Decision to Make and Deploy Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Case Study in the Foreign Policy Process" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1970.)

[3] Among the more active supporters of the H-bomb were Lewis Strauss of the AEC, Senator Brien McMahon, chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee

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AEC advised against it, such a program was authorized by the president in January 1950. The frantic period from September 1949 to President Truman's H-bomb decision four months later has been examined many times before; only a few relevant remarks will be made here.[4]

The appearance of the H-bomb proposal exacerbated the split in the scientific community between what Robert Gilpin has called the "finite containment" scientists and the "infinite containment" scientists.[5] The former, for a variety of reasons, were opposed to the development of thermonuclear weapons but not necessarily to atomic ones. They supported the production of a "family of weapons" including tactical weapons; that is, they, too, were interested in preparedness but they did not support placing overwhelming emphasis on strategic bombardment. Oppenheimer, one of the leading finite containment scientists, argued that the time had come to "bring the battle back to the battlefield." Rather than considering the merits of each weapon system, the debate over the various weapons assumed more emotional overtones—on one side stressing the danger that the Russians might get the H-bomb first; on the other, the immorality of building the H-bomb. As so often happens when two different weapons systems are proposed, both systems were authorized without sufficient discussion of their respective uses. In the case of the H-bomb, this failing may not have been as significant because the bomb would perform an already understood preexisting function—strategic bombing of the enemy's homeland. In the case of the tactical weapons, this failing was more serious.

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on Atomic Energy, many Air Force generals, including the Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg, and several scientists, such as Edward Teller and Ernest O. Lawrence.

[4] See, for example, Warner R. Schilling, "The H-Bomb Decision: How to Decide without Actually Choosing," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXVI (1961), 24-46; *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript of the Hearings before the Personnel Security Board* (Washington, D.C., 1954), *passim.* (hereinafter cited as *Oppenheimer Hearings*). "The Hidden Struggle over the H-Bomb," *Fortune*, XLVII May 1953, 109 ff.; and James Shepley and Clay Blair, Jr., *The Hydrogen Bomb: The Men, the Menace, the Mechanism* (New York, 1954).

[5] The terms are used by Gilpin to distinguish those scientists who believed that it was technically feasible and politically desirable to limit the nuclear race at some finite point from those scientists who did not see any realistic possibility of limiting the arms race. See Robert Gilpin, *American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy* (Princeton, 1962), 98-107.

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In addition, other than the useful work done by the Weapons System Evaluation Group under General James Gavin, there had been little investigation of the battlefield implications of the weapons prior to the decision to build them.[6] As late as the fall of 1951, two years after approval of the program, Oppenheimer and other scientists were in Europe explaining the effects of the new weapons to General Dwight Eisenhower and other senior NATO officers at SHAPE.[7] The scientists were also suggesting that the generals should lobby more enthusiastically for the development of the weapons. Thus, even at that comparatively late date, senior army officers in crucial assignments were apparently unaware of the potential of the new weapons. The history of this period shows that, on the whole, the army played a minor role in the decision to make the weapons and, indeed, many army generals were not even aware that such a decision had been made. The dominant role was played by the finite-containment scientists whose expertise clearly lay in the area of construction rather than employment. Thus, as a result of the debate involving the H-bomb, which produced an emotion-charged atmosphere, and the absence of a strong army interest at the start in the new weapons, the decision to produce these weapons was made without any systematic analysis of their possible use.

With the growing production of the weapons and their adaption to artillery through the army's 280-millimeter cannon, it became increasingly clear that a more detailed study of their employment would need to be made. Again, much of the initiative was taken by scientists who, in 1951, organized a study group, Project Vista, charged with the investigation of the battlefield use of atomic weapons, with particular emphasis on the NATO area.[8] The findings of this group have never been made public, but the report, apparently, urged NATO to build its defenses around tactical atomic weap-

[6] For a discussion of the formation of this group and its responsibilities, see William R. Kintner, Joseph I. Coffey, and Raymond J. Albright, *Forging a New Sword* (New York, 1958), 99-100.

[7] The other purpose of this trip was to gather information on the ground defense of Europe. See the testimony of J. Robert Oppenheimer and Lee A. DuBridge, *Oppenheimer Hearings*, 48, 521.

[8] The most useful sources on this project have been: *Oppenheimer Hearings, passim;* an article by Hanson Baldwin, "Experts Urge Tactical Air Might; Score Stress on Big Atom Bomber," in the *New York Times*, June 5, 1952, p. 13; and Gilpin, 113-21.

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ons, thus compensating for numerical inferiority with an awesome increase in firepower.

At the time of the Vista project, just two years after the Russians' first atomic explosion, it was perhaps realistic to consider an environment in which only the NATO nations had tactical nuclear weapons. Whether realistic or not, that is what the Project Vista scientists did. By December 1954, when the Vista proposals were formally adopted by NATO, however, the environment had already begun to change, and the Russians soon were to have a significant tactical nuclear capability themselves. Therefore, by the mid-1950s, when NATO was building the defense of Europe around tactical weapons, the Russians were developing a sufficiently large force to make the proposed unilateral use of the weapons unrealistic. This fact, though, took some time to intrude itself on NATO's consciousness. In 1956 during a full-scale NATO war game simulating the use of nuclear weapons, tactical atomic weapons were "used" only by the allied side. Even with this limitation, however, Operation Carte Blanche proved "devastating" to the German people, because of fallout and excessive blast effects. Rather than intimidate the Russians, as it was designed to do, it succeeded in demonstrating to the German people that for them, at least, a tactical nuclear war fought over their territory might be essentially indistinguishable from a strategic nuclear war.[9]

Thus, the early development of tactical nuclear weapons, from the first germ of the idea in 1946 through their simulated use in a NATO war game in 1956, contains the origins of most of the problems associated with the weapons system today. The early initiative in their development came primarily from scientists, not military men. The weapons became involved in the dispute over the H-bomb and the resulting emotional climate inhibited careful analysis of the possible use of tactical atomic weapons. Even after the question of employment was raised in 1951, atomic scientists rather than military men played the major role through Project Vista, and almost immediately the weapons become tied to NATO. It should

[9] See, for instance, Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1957), 293; Gordon C. Craig, "NATO and the New German Army," in *Military Policy and National Security*, ed. William W. Kaufmann (Princeton, 1956), 226.

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be noted, though, that among army men, General James Gavin, at least, was also exploring the implications of their use on the battlefield.[10]

In addition to the problems surrounding their origin, the nature of the weapons themselves raises questions. Since most of the details are still classified, the main problems can be delineated quickly. The seven thousand weapons in Europe at the present time consist of atomic warheads which can be fired from conventional artillery (155 millimeter and 8 inch howitzers) on short-range rockets (Honest John), and on longer-range missiles (Sergeant and Pershing); in addition, some are bombs and others can be emplaced as demolitions. The yields of these various weapons, excluding the bombs, are from well under one kiliton to well over twenty kilitons (Hiroshima and Nagasaki size). Again, excluding the bombs, the ranges vary from several thousand meters to hundreds of miles. The addition of the bombs raises the upper value of both yield and range.

The ground-launched weapons are under the command of army officers at division, corps, or army level and, therefore, men in an entirely different chain of command from the men responsible for America's strategic atomic and thermonuclear strike capacity. Largely because the atomic weapons are ground-based and of relatively short range they have been classified as "tactical," at least by American planners. The distinction between *tactical* and *strategic*, which has never been sufficiently clarified, is not simply a semantic point.[11] Russian leaders seeing a good-sized city hundreds of miles from the front lines hit by a weapon larger than those which destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki might well wonder whether tactical nuclear war was still in effect or whether strategic nuclear war had begun. Briefly, then, one problem posed by the weapons themselves is that distinctions between tactical and strategic on the basis of range and yield are extremely difficult to make. Although there is some validity to the proposition that both sides in a war would have a strong interest in keeping the war limited, the weapons provide ample room for

[10] James M. Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age* (New York, 1958), 113-14.

[11] Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton, 1959), 332 f., raises some of the issues. For an interesting recent discussion of this distinction in a different setting, see Edmund Dews, *A Note on Tactical versus Strategic Air Interdiction* (Santa Monica, 1970).

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misjudgment about the opponent and thus offer the prospect of unlimited escalation.[12]

A second problem is that the destructive capacity of the weapons plus the variety of ranges available ensures that the land area over which a tactical nuclear war might be fought would be a nuclear wasteland of substantial proportions. Although technology has continued to make the weapons "cleaner," any extensive tactical nuclear war fought for a prolonged period of time, especially in a densely populated region such as Europe, would undoubtedly take a fearful toll of the local population.[13]

A third source of problems is a result of the novelty of the weapons. Their role on the battlefield raises basic questions: Can an army function on a nuclear battlefield? Do the weapons help the attacker or defender? Do they require more men or fewer?[14] Thus, the nature of the weapons has contributed problems which cannot be resolved short of actual employment.

The third factor after origin and nature of the weapons is their connection with NATO. Even before they became fully operational, tactical atomic weapons were associated in most observers' minds with NATO. It seemed to make sense to commit the most sophisticated available weapons system to the area of the world of most value to the United States. Unfortunately, the problems of the weapons have become so inextricably bound up with NATO's problems that the analysis of both has suffered. No attempt

[12] Even General Andrew Goodpaster, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, concurs, but he draws different implications from the fact. In a recent speech he said: "No one can be certain that use of tactical nuclear weapons will not lead to escalation to strategic attack, but no one can be certain that it will. It is in part this uncertainty that contributes to the deterrent effect that our tactical nuclear capability exerts upon possible aggressors." See his lecture, "The Defense of Europe" in *The Royal United Service Institutions Journal*, CXVI, March 1971, pp. 31-38, and, especially, p. 36.

[13] Operation Carte Blanche, which "used" tactical nuclear weapons by NATO forces alone, resulted in 1,700,000 "deaths" among German civilians and 3,500,000 "injured."

[14] The great bulk of this discussion occurred in the late 1950s and is summarized in Morton H. Halperin, *Limited War: An Essay on the Development of the Theory and an Annotated Bibliography* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962). The army seems to ignore most of these questions and implies that there are no unusual problems; see U.S. Dept. of the Army, *Staff Officers Field Manual: Nuclear Weapons Employment, Doctrine and Procedures*, Field Manual 101-31-1, (Washington, D.C., February 1968).

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will be made to restate all of the strategic problems confronting the Atlantic Alliance; the literature on NATO is so vast that it could not be reviewed here under any circumstances.[15] At the risk of some simplification, though, we can summarize. The primary issue involved in NATO's military dilemma as it concerns battlefield atomic weapons, that goes to the heart of most of the others, is one of identity. Is NATO simply a commitment by the United States to defend Europe with whatever force is necessary, including strategic nuclear weapons, or is it a military alliance whose purpose is to defend Europe on the ground without recourse to strategic war? The first view has always received greater support from Europeans than from Americans, especially after General Eisenhower, the first Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, announced the minimum force levels needed to carry out the second function, and they exceeded by a factor of three those levels the Europeans were able (or willing) to support. The second view has received stronger American backing especially after the Soviets entered the missile age in the late 1950s.

For years Americans have been trying to devise ways of performing the second function within the established budgetary restrictions. In the early 1950s, since the ground defense of Europe could not be realistically envisioned with the force levels finally agreed upon, the answer clearly seemed to be an increase in firepower. Thus the stage was set for the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons, which seemed to allow the West to make up manpower deficiencies with superior technology, an argument with substantial appeal for many observers.[16] However, in the 1960s, as arguments against the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe appeared more frequently,

[15] A useful guide to much of the current literature is *Nuclear Weapons and NATO*, U.S., Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 50-1 (Washington, D.C., January 1970).

[16] Among the more enthusiastic supporters of this doctrine were Kissinger in *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* and Robert E. Osgood in *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy* (Chicago, 1957). One of the most critical reviews of Kissinger's influential book was by William W. Kaufmann, "The Crisis in Military Affairs," *World Politics*, X (1958), 579-603. Kissinger has, of course, "reappraised" much of his earlier position; see Henry A. Kissinger, "Limited War: Conventional or Nuclear," in *Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security*, ed. Donald G. Brennan (New York, 1961), 144-46. See also Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy* (Garden City, N.Y., 1962), especially chap. III, "Limited War—A Reappraisal."

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pressure mounted for the adoption of a nonnuclear strategy for NATO that would enable it to meet a wide variety of challenges without recourse to tactical (or strategic) nuclear weapons. This policy was officially adopted by NATO in December 1967, but it has not resulted in the expected increase in conventional capability by the NATO nations.[17]

Several variations on this American theme of strengthening NATO have appeared through the years. One of these is an occasional attempt to prod the Europeans, as they have become more affluent, into picking up a larger share of the bill or fielding more troops. The attempt occasionally brings minor improvements, but it has not yet produced the necessary army.[18] A more recent variation is to "recount" the NATO forces and compare them to Warsaw Pact forces in order to show that NATO does, indeed, have the resources to stop an invasion from the East even without battlefield atomic weapons.[19] Despite these efforts, most observers, including NATO officials, believe the Alliance could not stop a full-scale Pact attack without recourse to atomic (and possibly thermonuclear) weapons.[20] At the same time, though, few of the issues raised by

[17] Some idea of the continuing confusion can be seen in a recent issue of *Orbis* devoted to NATO. Opinions run the spectrum from: NATO might be able to stop Warsaw Pact forces by conventional means if it would spruce up a little; NATO must be willing and able to use tactical nuclear weapons to stop the Russians; NATO is so conventionally inferior to the Pact that only the risk of escalation prevents war; finally, NATO must rely mainly upon America's SAC and should therefore simply be a tripwire. For discussion of these four positions respectively, see, Timothy W. Stanley, "A Strategic Doctrine for NATO in the 1970's"; Pasti Nino, "NATO's Defense Strategy"; Denis W. Healey, "NATO, Britain and Soviet Military Policy"; and Alastair Buchan, "NATO and European Security," all in *Orbis*, XIII (1969), 87-99, 111-32, 48-59, and 68-76.

[18] U.S. House, Committee on Armed Services, *Review of the Vietnam Conflict and Its Impact on U.S. Military Commitments Abroad*, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1968, p. 56.

[19] Alain Enthoven is one of the principal exponents of this view; see Alain Enthoven, "Arms and Men: The Military Balance in Europe," *Interplay* 2 (1969), 11-14, and Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, "What Forces for NATO? And from Whom?" *Foreign Affairs* 48 (1969), 80-96.

[20] General Goodpaster has described the problem by distinguishing three different levels of possible conventional capability: (1) full conventional capability that could stop the Pact nations in conventional war; (2) an intermediate capability designed to deal with small-scale attacks or with larger attacks for a limited period; (3) a low capability that could do little more than serve as a tripwire. The first is a low-risk but high-cost option that NATO members

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tactical nuclear weapons have been resolved and NATO planners do not know for sure whether the weapons would or should be used.[21] NATO continues to muddle through without a systematic and logical strategic policy in line with its capabilities. In the process, though, it has prevented the evaluation of tactical nuclear weapons by bogging them down in the NATO debate. As a result, little effort has been expended on a consideration of the merits of the weapons system free from the emotion-charged atmosphere of the defense of Europe.

II

Despite past confusion it is still possible to say something about the future role of these weapons if a different approach, other than a new scenario for war in Europe, is used. Although the policymaking process may not yet be sufficiently understood to predict outcomes, enough has been written on the subject to provide some guidelines. Whether one accepts Schilling's minimal-decision model,[22] Hilsman's consensus-building one,[23] or Simon's satisficing one,[24] there seems to be a basic agreement on certain features of decisionmaking in general and of the policymaking process in particular. They all seem to suggest, with some variations, that there are an important set of conditions under which responsible policymakers will avoid making dramatic or controversial decisions, but will normally make

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have consistently refused to support. The third is a high-risk, low-cost option that he says has been rejected by NATO because it lacks credibility. Therefore, NATO finds itself "in the range of the intermediate option." See Andrew Goodpaster, *The Royal United Service Institution Journal* CXVI (1971), 35-36.

[21] A good recent summary of these problems by a student of limited war is Morton H. Halperin, *Defense Strategies for the Seventies* (Boston, 1971), especially, chap. 9.

[22] Schilling, 24-28. It should be noted that Schilling uses "minimal" to refer to that decision which seems to leave the most options, see, especially, p. 24.

[23] Roger Hilsman, "The Foreign Policy Consensus: An Interim Research Report," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, III (1959), 361-82; and Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (New York, 1964). Of those cited, Hilsman's model is closest to the one presented in this paper.

[24] Among other places see James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York, 1958), 140-41; and a similar discussion in Charles E. Lindblom, *The Policy-Making Process* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968), 24. The word is used usually to distinguish a decision from an optimum one because of the limits of rationality.

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those decisions which are minimally acceptable to the relevant participants. The pressure to make such "minimal" or "consensual" decisions appears to be greatest where expert advice seriously conflicts, relevant elites apply strong and contradictory pressures, or a situation is perceived by the decisionmakers to be one of high risk.

It should be understood that a minimal or consensual decision may not necessarily be the one *to do the least* but the one which *least antagonizes* the various interested elites. For instance, in the debate over developing tactical nuclear weapons and the hydrogen bomb, the consensual decision was to proceed with both weapons since that decision antagonized fewer elites than any other one. Actually, in that case a decision to do nothing would probably have alienated the most people since the great majority of participants were convinced that the Russian atomic explosion required *some* response.

Applying the concept of a consensual decision to a war in Europe, the following points emerge. Just as there is conflicting expert advice now over the advisability of using tactical nuclear weapons so, too, after the beginning of hostilities the advice would undoubtedly continue to conflict. In one of these peculiar chicken-and-egg dilemmas, the advice would not be unanimous until after the weapons were used and they would probably not be employed until the advice was unambiguous.

The second point is less certain. What types of internal and external pressures would policymakers be subject to in the event of conventional war in Europe? On the one hand, it is easy to imagine military men and others insisting on the use of all available firepower, including battlefield atomic weapons. On the other hand, some domestic groups might well be appalled at the thought of using such weapons. Even more confusing is the question of the European allies themselves. Would the political leaders of West Germany and the Benelux nations strongly urge Washington to employ such weapons in the vicinity of their countries? Would they be indifferent and not pressure the United States either way? There is no way of knowing for certain what they would do, but the fact that Europe has survived two conventional wars already in this century, coupled with England's horrified reaction to an American statement that atomic weapons were being "considered" during the Korean war (and Korea is half the world away from Europe), sug-

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gest that our European allies would strongly urge the United States *not* to use the weapons.[25] Thus it would seem that there would be substantial contrary pressures acting on the policymakers.

The third point is much more certain. Almost all participants would identify a large-scale conventional war or even a smaller-scale use of arms in Europe as a situation of exceedingly high risk. The various crises over Berlin have indicated that both sides regard disruption of the status quo in Europe, even when not violent, as a substantial provocation with portentous implications.

Therefore, not just one but all three of the conditions which usually provoke consensual decisions would be present. The pressures for a consensual decision would be enormous. In the context of Europe, though, what would be a consensual decision? There are probably only four conceivable courses of action, each with a spectrum of variations, open to the United States in the event of armed conflict in Europe: (1) The United States could do nothing. American troops in NATO could be withdrawn or told to surrender without resistance. (2) NATO forces could attempt to contain the attack with conventional weapons. (3) Tactical nuclear weapons in various forms could be used. (4) Strategic nuclear weapons could be used. Option 1 would not be the consensual one even though it certainly represents the absolute least that could be done. For such a policy would antagonize so many domestic elites that a decisionmaker would avoid it. The same is true, for different reasons, of option 4. The prior discussion has already alluded to the concerned elites that would be alienated by option 3, not the least among which would be the European countries themselves. Therefore, the consensual decision in this setting would be 2, which would certainly dismay the military forces, but they would, of course, abide by the decision. Even if the NATO forces were to eventually lose the continent, option 2 would remain the consensual one for the same reasons.

One parenthetical point needs to be made. The discussion rests on the assumption that the ultimate decision to employ these weapons will be made by the president, not by field commanders. While information is very hard to uncover, the evidence seems to be that the "fail safe" system for tactical nuclear weapons, sometimes referred to as Permissive Action Link (PAL), is at least as effective as

[25] Bernard Brodie discusses the implications of this behavior by the British in *Escalation and the Nuclear Option* (Princeton, 1966), 104-05.

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it is for strategic weapons.[26] Thus, at the present time, it is unlikely that a field commander on his own initiative could overrule the president's decision. One further assumption underlying this discussion is that there will be a certain degree of rationality exercised by decisionmakers even after hostilities start. Thus while officials may not calmly sit down and evaluate each of these four options in the heat of battle, the issues are such that they can be, and hopefully have been, analyzed in the less harried atmosphere of peace. Surely, then, the decision arrived at in peacetime would not become untenable simply because war had begun.

If this analysis is correct, the next step is to identify the conditions under which either (a) the use of tactical nuclear weapons could become the consensual decision or (b) conditions where the necessity of a consensual decision would not be present. Condition *a* is difficult to imagine. Compared to what use of force would tactical nuclear weapons appear to be the less fearful alternative? Probably strategic nuclear bombardment would be the only such condition. Clearly, though, in such a war the United States would not respond with tactical nuclear weapons. Even a war in Europe in which the Soviets initiate the use of tactical atomic weapons (for what reason it is difficult to say) would still present American policymakers with most of the same problems discussed here.

It might be more productive, then, to examine the second alternative and try to determine under what circumstances a consensual decision would not be required. Expert opinion on tactical nuclear weapons is divided on three major points: the possibility of escalation, the question of targeting, and the question of the military value and political wisdom of committing the weapons when the adversary also has them and the countries over which they are exploding are densely populated, friendly ones (Western Europe) or potentially friendly ones (Eastern Europe). The debate on these three issues has not been resolved despite substantial effort and, what is more, since it is a logical debate over essentially empirical issues, it never will be resolved short of empirical testing. Therefore, the con-

[26] This issue became something of a minor cause célèbre in the 1964 presidential campaign. See, especially, "The Battlefield A-Bomb—Should Generals Control It?" in *U.S. News and World Report*, Aug. 24, 1964, 44 f.; and the remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and President Johnson in *U.S. News and World Report*, Oct. 19, 1964, p. 48.

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ditions in which one would expect the least amount of expert disagreement would be: (1A) Where the opponent did not have either tactical or strategic nuclear weapons and was not closely allied with a country, such as another superpower, that did. (1B) Where the bulk of the explosions would occur over sparsely populated territory inhabited by people clearly perceived to be antagonists.[27] (1C) Where there were sufficient lucrative and unambiguous targets warranting the use of weapons. Massed offensive and defensive formations, bridges, supply points, opposing artillery, and field headquarters would all satisfy most observers' criteria for acceptable tactical nuclear targets. It should be clear that this condition and the previous one effectively rule out guerilla war as an appropriate setting for the employment of tactical nuclear weapons.[28]

Under what conditions would the pressures from interested elites against the use of tactical nuclear weapons be reduced? Recognizing that contrary influences would never be eliminated entirely, the following circumstances would help to reduce them: (2A) Where substantial numbers of American troops were in danger of being wiped out despite all available conventional firepower. This, of course, would be the primary reason for even considering the use of such weapons. (2B) Where the war in which the United States was fighting had substantial popular support at home. Admittedly, "the people" are not usually considered one of the interested elites, but the experience of Vietnam has demonstrated to what degree pressures can be exerted upon policymakers by the populace. Since the use of battlefield atomic weapons will probably generate considerable public dismay under any circumstances, it is necessary that the war in which they are used not be in itself unpopular. It is likely that public support for a war would be forthcoming in only two situations: (a) in defense of the American homeland or an area deemed critical to the United States, such as Europe, and (b) in defense of a "popular" country like Israel which had been unambiguously attacked. Since prerequisite *a* is not appropriate because there can be no conventional attack on the American homeland and a war in Europe would violate several of the other conditions, then *b* is

[27] See n. 1.

[28] Their use in Vietnam was apparently contemplated by Secretary of State Dean Rusk according to the secret *Pentagon Papers;* see *Chicago Sun-Times,* July 1, 1971, p. 5.

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the only one such situation conceivable. (2C) Where the explosions from the use of the weapons would not take place over territory containing concentrations of friendly populations. This would reduce the negative pressure from our allies.

Up to this point, the argument shows that the setting in which policymakers would be less constrained to make consensual decisions and, thus, more likely to employ tactical nuclear weapons would be a conventional (nonguerilla) war between two nonnuclear powers without strong alliance ties with nuclear powers in an area which was not of crucial concern to both superpowers. In addition, it would have to be a war which the United States had entered with considerable domestic support and in which numerically inferior American troops were being overrun despite all available conventional firepower. There has been at least one historical precedent that was somewhat similar to this imaginary war, the Korean conflict. The Korean war, however, was probably not "popular," especially as it dragged on over the years. Additionally, once China entered it, American policymakers became increasingly concerned about Sino-Soviet ties. Finally—a condition no longer at issue—the stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons was not great and the capabilities of the weapons not sufficiently appreciated by military planners. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that this country did not use the few tactical nuclear weapons it had when suffering a substantial defeat in the retreat from the Yalu. Thus, the one example from history satisfying most of the necessary conditions listed here did not provoke the use of battlefield atomic weapons.

A war like the Korean one is probably not inconceivable today. A massive Arab invasion of Israel which that state could not contain for some reason might possibly elicit United States military support for the state of Israel. The ensuing war would satisfy most of the conditions listed here. The major uncertainty would probably be how strongly Russia would assist Egypt, and this is not known with precision. To develop the argument, though, let us assume that the Egyptians do not receive Soviet nuclear support. With the American and Israeli air forces engaged in desert warfare, it is difficult to imagine the Arabs furnishing enough manpower to overrun any but the very smallest contingent of American troops. Presumably, if the United States decided to go into such a war it would commit sufficient troops and continue their buildup of conventional weapons so that they would not be overrun. What is true of the Arabs in

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this particular setting is also true in general. What third-world or nonaligned country has the resources and manpower to fight a conventional, nonguerilla war against United States firepower even when that force is applied in only a limited way as in Korea? China's experience there suggests that such an effort takes a fearsome toll. And what third-world country today would be able to field an army comparable to China's in 1950? This argument would seem to suggest that a situation where American troops were in danger of annihilation despite their conventional firepower while facing an opponent who lacked nuclear weapons itself and allies that had them is unlikely to prevail in the real world.

One further factor that has not been taken into consideration is the popular moral revulsion which would undoubtedly be generated even by the suggestion of using the weapons against a third-world power. While this influence would be real enough we can see from the previous argument that it is not necessary even to consider this more intangible ingredient.

Therefore, if the circumstances listed above are the ones which must exist before policymakers could possibly decide to use tactical nuclear weapons, and if it is highly unlikely that all of these conditions can exist in the real world simultaneously, the conclusion seems to be that it is equally unlikely that the United States would employ tactical nuclear weapons in future land wars. Since, further, the arguments presented here for this country are largely applicable to the Soviet Union, the same conclusion is valid for that country, too. Finally, whatever else has been said about deterrence, and much has, it seems clear that for a threat of any kind to be effective it must be perceived as credible by the opponent.[29] Since there is no real world situation when American policymakers would employ tactical nuclear weapons in ground combat, the deterrent effect of these weapons is negligible. Certainly a start could be made toward nuclear disarmament by eliminating these weapons without suffering any appreciable diminution in effective power. To be effective, even as a deterrent, a weapon must have a recognizable role in a conceivable future conflict. Tactical nuclear weapons have no such role.

[29] For instance, one should note the discussion by Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York, 1963), *passim*. It is interesting that General Goodpaster draws a different, and in this author's view a questionable, conclusion; see n. 12.

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The Southern Tenant Farmers Union and Depression Politics

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A small group of white and black men from near Tyronza, Arkansas, formed the pioneer local of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union in July 1934. The original purpose was to protest the treatment of sharecroppers on the plantation of Hiram Norcross. The organization grew, however, and began to spread, first throughout the rich delta land of eastern Arkansas and then to neighboring states, bringing broad objections against the often near inhuman treatment of small tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and farm laborers. Members of the STFU were particularly incensed at the effect of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, which seemed not only to be bringing them no benefits but to be driving large numbers of them from the land.[1]

The union soon aroused the enmity of planters and businessmen. Local officials harassed organizers, and when this tactic failed, a campaign of violence followed. The organization might well have collapsed except for the moral and financial support of the Socialist party. Norman Thomas served almost as a patron of the STFU from

[1] David Eugene Conrad, *The Forgotten Farmers: The Story of Sharecroppers in the New Deal* (Urbana, 1965), 84-86; Stuart Jamieson, *Labor Unionism in American Agriculture*, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin No. 836 (Washington, 1945), 307-08.

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its inception, and he helped focus nationwide attention on the crude attempts to crush it.[2]

After a year's existence, the union's membership had grown to 15,000. In September 1935, it staged a strike in northeastern Arkansas to demand payment of 65 cents a hundredweight for picking cotton—about twice the going rate. The strikers gained little, other than a lukewarm endorsement from the American Federation of Labor. A cotton choppers' strike followed in May 1936; this strike caught the nation's fancy when cameras of the popular *March of Time* newsreel captured the drama of the "marching picket lines" —groups of one hundred or more workers, tramping through the fields and pleading with nonstrikers to join them. By early the following year, the union had spread to Texas, Mississippi, Tennessee, Oklahoma, and Missouri and claimed over 30,000 members.[3]

Much of the union's fervor came from its executive secretary, H. L. Mitchell, who held the organization together on a tiny budget. A raw-boned former sharecropper turned dry cleaner, Mitchell had joined the Socialist party early in the Depression, but he always insisted that the STFU was nonpartisan and nonpolitical—probably good policy in the heavily Democratic South.[4] On the other hand, Mitchell made little secret of his belief that capitalism was dying.[5]

As the union began to arouse national attention, it also attracted the interest of the Communist party. The record of the Communists in regard to sharecroppers was a mixed one. Lenin himself had written of their condition in his lengthy prerevolution analysis of American agriculture. Later, in preparing for the second congress of the Third International, he had insisted that Communists must win the support of the exploited rural masses, including sharecroppers.[6] American Communists, however, had almost completely ignored farm workers and sharecroppers during the 1920s when

[2] Jerold S. Auerbach, "Southern Tenant Farmers: Socialist Critics of the New Deal," *Labor History*, VII (1966), 5-13.

[3] Jamieson, 307-14; Donald H. Grubbs, *Cry from the Cotton: The Southern Tenant Farmers Union and the New Deal* (Chapel Hill, 1971), 86-87.

[4] See, *e.g.*, H. L. Mitchell to Chester Hunt, Mar. 24, 1936; Mitchell to A. S. Bayne, Apr. 7, 1936, Southern Tenant Farmers Union Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill. Auerbach, on the other hand, strongly emphasizes a Socialist orientation.

[5] H. L. Mitchell to A. S. Bayne, Apr. 7, 1936; Mitchell to Clyde Johnson, Apr. 20, 1936, STFU Papers.

[6] V. I. Lenin, "Capitalism and Agriculture in the United States of America,"

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the party was attempting to win recruits among small farmers in the Midwest and West.[7]

In the early 1930s, the party took a new tack. Stalin had decreed that postwar capitalism had entered a crucial "Third Period"—a time of economic decay and social collapse. Communists had to provide leadership for the revolutionary era, rejecting alliances with such trimmers and compromisers as liberals or Socialists.[8] Southern organizers, operating from the industrial city of Birmingham, moved in to establish the Share Croppers Union in the rich cotton counties of Alabama where they found desperate black men willing to accept their guidance. Confrontations with plantation owners at Camp Hill in 1931 and Reeltown in 1932 left several blacks wounded and at least two dead. The group persisted, however, and by 1934 claimed 10,000 members—probably a greatly exaggerated figure.[9]

Sharecroppers were an anomaly for party leadership. Were they to be counted as "toiling farmers" or as agricultural proletarians? The Communists were never quite sure. On the one hand, a black sharecropper attended the fifth conference of the Red International of Labor Unions in Moscow, but, on the other, a white organizer of the SCU, Al Murphy, became a vice president of the party's United Farmers League.[10]

If the poor croppers of Arkansas had organized a year or two earlier, the Communists would undoubtedly have condemned their Southern Tenant Farmers Union as "social fascist"—the term freely applied to Norman Thomas and his ilk. By early 1934, however, a new trend was evolving in the party line. The seventh congress of the Third International, in midsummer 1935, abandoned the hard

Selected Works, Vol. XII (New York, 1943), 198-206; Lenin, "Preliminary Draft of Theses on the Agrarian Question," *Selected Works*, Vol. X: *The Communist International*, ed. J. Fineberg (New York, 1938), 219-20.

[7] Lowell K. Dyson, "The Red Peasant International in America," *Journal of American History*, LVIII (1972), 958-73.

[8] Kermit E. McKenzie, *Comintern and World Revolution, 1928-1943: The Shaping of Doctrine* (New York, 1964), 131-35. Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, *The American Communist Party: A Critical History* (New York, 1962), 178-83.

[9] "Negro Share Croppers Building Their Union," *Party Organizer*, VI (1933), 14-16. John Beecher, "The Share Croppers' Union in Alabama," *Social Forces*, XIII (1934), 124-32. *Farmers National Weekly*, Nov. 16, 1934.

[10] *Labor Unity*, June 25, 1930. *Farmers National Weekly*, July 6, 1934.

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line of the Third Period and instructed Communists to seek a "Popular Front" against fascism in alliance with Socialists and progressives.[11] The alert young leaders of the American party's farm movement had foreshadowed the shift by half a year. In September 1934 they had begun to call for unity of action with the Farm Holiday Association and the National Farmers Union although these radical groups had been the targets of their sharpest barbs only a few months earlier.[12]

As a result of this change, the STFU found welcome as a potential Popular Front ally. The Communist farm paper, *Farmers National Weekly*, gave H.L. Mitchell space to tout his newborn organization and to protest its persecution. A conference of the Share Croppers Union, late in October 1934, called for class unity between the two groups to fight terroristic planters and the New Deal.[13] The education of the STFU in the tactics of the left wing had begun.

One of the union's greatest problems was its abject poverty. Mitchell and the other officers received no salaries, and the search for life's necessities took its toll. One organizer pleaded with Mitchell, "If you know any Commie sources to appeal to for my support, for Gawd's sake do it."[14] Although STFU had no Moscow gold, a few red nuggets had washed ashore elsewhere. Harold Ware, the Communist party's agricultural expert, had arranged for the transfer of several thousand dollars from the Soviet government to the American Fund for Public Service, which then granted $5,000 to Communist farm groups. The Share Croppers Union received a paltry $200, but the brand new Organization of Agricultural Workers received $2,200.[15]

The OAW, later renamed the National Committee for Unity of Agricultural and Rural Workers, aimed at unionizing the estimated three million agricultural laborers. Its leader was Donald Henderson, a one-time doctoral candidate and economics instructor

[11] McKenzie, 151-55.

[12] *Farmers National Weekly*, Sept.-Nov. 1934, *passim*.

[13] *Ibid.*, Sept. 7, Nov. 16, Dec. 14, 1934, *Southern Worker*, Dec. 1934.

[14] "Bob" to H. L. Mitchell, Apr. 4, 1935, STFU Papers.

[15] Lem Harris to Roger Baldwin, Feb. 22, 1934; Lem Harris and Harold M. Ware to Roger Baldwin, July 20, 1934, American Fund for Public Service (AFPS) Papers, New York City Public Library.

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fired by Columbia University in 1933.[16] In the second week of January 1935, Henderson assembled a conference in Washington to unite the various organizations of rural workers. He carefully solicited the support of the STFU even though the official proclamation of the Popular Front line was several months in the future. Mitchell and three other delegates took part in the meeting. Henderson picked E.B. McKinney, the eloquent black vice-president of the STFU, as a member of the temporary executive body of the National Committee for Unity.[17]

The STFU was ready to welcome almost any friend it could find. Its members were the poorest and most depressed workers, and regardless of race—although, surprisingly, for the South of that era, it included fairly even numbers of both races—they were usually disfranchised and thus politically powerless. Plantation owners and riding bosses did not take kindly to any challenges to their rule. In mid-January 1935, the authorities at Marked Tree, Arkansas broke up a STFU meeting and arrested its organizer, Ward Rodgers, a young graduate of Vanderbilt Theological Seminary. The local jury quickly convicted him of criminal anarchy, and the judge sentenced him to six months in jail and a stiff fine.[18] The Communists immediately began a campaign for Rodgers' defense. Their Farmers National Committee for Action circulated a plea for funds to be sent to STFU headquarters. International Labor Defense made Rodgers's cause a Popular Front battle.

Perhaps more portentious in the long run was the unity pact made by students and faculty at Commonwealth College pledging to support Rodgers and the union cause.[19] Commonwealth, a labor school organized in 1923, had its campus near Mena, Arkansas, across the state from the Delta heartland of STFU. It had taken a decided left-wing turn in 1931, and although the Communist party did not dominate the institution, there was a strong Communist faction both among students and faculty. The school's young di-

[16] James A. Wechsler, *The Age of Suspicion* (New York, 1953), 43-53. Bernard Sternsher, *Rexford Tugwell and the New Deal* (New Brunswick, 1964), 365-66.

[17] National Conference Agricultural, Lumber, Rural Workers, *Program and Resolutions* (Washington, 1935), 1-5.

[18] Grubbs, 70-71.

[19] Lem Harris, circular letter (mimeo.), Jan. 28, 1935, STFU Papers. *Labor Defender*, Mar. 1935, p. 7. Commonwealth College press release, Jan. 24, 1935, Socialist Party Papers, Mss. Division, Duke University Library, Durham, N. C.

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rector, Lucien Koch, had traveled through STFU territory in the late summer of 1934 and had been outspoken in denouncing the oppression he had seen.[20] The Rodgers case brought Koch and several of his students back to eastern Arkansas.

Prominent in the Commonwealth group was Bob Reed, organizer for the Young Communist League. Reed seized the opportunity to spread party literature, and at one point tried to lead the sharecroppers in singing the "Internationale." It was not a very wise move since local officials had already accused Rodgers of being an agent of Moscow, but Mitchell tolerated Reed's activities until a white union leader protested the circulation of maps detailing the party's proposed black soviet republic in the South. After conferring with his close adviser, Howard "Buck" Kester, a classmate of Rodgers at Vanderbilt Seminary, Mitchell ousted the Commonwealth delegation. He had been disturbed also by the glimpse he had had of a letter to Reed asking when the party should take over. As he laconically wrote sometime later: "I begun to distrust them. . . ."[21]

While Commonwealth was close enough for Mitchell to gauge its importance, the Share Croppers Union off in Alabama provided more of a dilemma. It was three years senior to the STFU; it already had its dead martyrs; and it claimed thousands of members. On May Day 1935 the SCU called a strike of cotton choppers, demanding a one-dollar wage for a ten-hour day. It claimed a victory despite a wave of violence by planters. The STFU leaders paid tribute to the fight of their Alabama counterparts and joined them in proclaiming July 17 a memorial day for Ralph Gray, a SCU leader murdered in 1931.[22]

Because of the publicized strength of the Share Croppers Union, Mitchell was probably somewhat startled when two of its representatives arrived at STFU headquarters in Memphis early in August 1935 to propose merging its supposed 12,000 members into his

[20] William H. Cobb and Donald H. Grubbs, "Arkansas' Commonwealth College and the Southern Tenant Farmers Union," *Arkansas Historical Quarterly*, XXV (1966), 294-95.

[21] H. L. Mitchell Memoir, Columbia Oral History Collection, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York, 42-43, 71 (hereafter referred to as COHC). Mitchell to Gardner Jackson, Sept. 3, 1936, STFU Papers.

[22] *Southern Worker*, Mar./Apr., June 1935. *Sharecroppers' Voice*, July 1935; *Labor Defender*, Aug. 1935, p. 21.

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younger and slightly smaller organization.[23] A trip to Montgomery to confer with Tom Burke of the SCU gave him an eye opener, however. He found Burke dramatically playing the role of an underground leader. Mitchell characteristically showed his disgust by stalking around the city with an unfurled copy of the *Daily Worker*. A visit to a small meeting of blacks in Lowndes County led him to question whether the SCU actually existed other than as a part of the Communist party structure. After he returned to Memphis, he continued publicly to give the SCU restrained praise, but privately he advised strongly against any merger.[24]

However much Mitchell distrusted the Communists, he knew that the STFU desperately needed allies. The persecution of the union had aroused sympathy in many liberal and radical circles, but the important truth remained that Chester Davis, head of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and Cully Cobb, his chief of the cotton section, favored plantation owners and looked upon sharecroppers as so much human garbage. Mitchell, therefore, followed a policy of cautious friendship with the party well into 1936. Donald Henderson began to publish a monthly paper, the *Rural Worker*, in August 1935, and he solicited articles from the STFU. Lem Harris of the Farmers National Committee for Action pledged solidarity with Mitchell and sent a small contribution to the union.[25]

Henderson continued his courtship. Shortly before the second convention of the STFU in January 1936, Mitchell wrote Gardner "Pat" Jackson, a Washington sympathizer, that he hoped both Henderson and Burke would attend. The STFU had no desire to amalgamate with their organizations, he said, but he thought that the two were honest, and he wanted to cooperate with them.[26] The convention itself endorsed both the *Rural Worker* and Henderson's group, finally renamed the National Committee on Agricultural and Rural Workers. Some of Henderson's friends treated the delegates to a movie on cooperative farming in the Soviet Union. When

[23] *Sharecroppers' Voice*, Aug. 1935.

[24] Mitchell to Gardner Jackson, Sept. 3, 1936, STFU Papers. *Sharecroppers' Voice*, strike issue, n.d. [c., Sept. 1935].

[25] Donald Henderson to J. H. Butler, July 12, 1935; Lem Harris to *Sharecroppers' Voice*, Dec. 26, 1935, STFU Papers.

[26] Mitchell to Gardner Jackson, Dec. 26, 1935, STFU Papers.

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they later suggested that Mitchell circulate it among his locals, he politely declined.[27]

The Communists, for their part, were in a period of redefining their goals in the countryside in accordance with the Popular Front line. They had not clarified their own attitude toward sharecroppers and the STFU. In May 1935, at a meeting of the central committee of the party, Henderson delivered a speech, "The Rural Masses and the Work of Our Party," in which he quoted Lenin but with important excisions. He omitted the master's reference to "yellow 'Socialists' " and had apparent problems fitting Lenin's six-tiered structuring of rural classes to the American situation.[28] The party began to clarify its position early in 1936. All "toiling farmers" should join the National Farmers Union or the Farm Holiday Association. This class included all owners and tenants who were not exploiters of the labor of others. Agricultural wage workers, on the other hand, should affiliate with the American Federation of Labor and seek a national charter.[29]

The thought of disbanding the STFU because of some "new line" appalled Mitchell. Tom Burke wrote him in glowing terms about bringing white Mississippi tenants into the Farmers Union and Tennessee peach pickers into the AFL, but Mitchell's response dripped acid. He wrote that sharecroppers crossed the line back and forth between tenant and wage worker so regularly that any attempt to follow Burke's ideas would destroy the STFU. The AFL was distant and aloof, and the Farmers Union in the past had been a politician's springboard in Arkansas. The disclosure that "Tom Burke" was the underground name of Clyde Johnson, a one-time University of Minnesota student, irked Mitchell further.[30]

The Communists soon demonstrated their determination to build separate organizations for farmers and agricultural workers.

[27] STFU, *Convention Proceedings: 2nd Annual Convention* (Memphis, 1936). Herbert Goldfrank to Mitchell, Jan. 17, 1936; Mitchell to Goldfrank, Jan. 20, 1936, STFU Papers.

[28] *The Communist*, XIV (1935), 866-80. Compare Henderson's quotation, p. 868, with the full translation in Lenin, *Selected Works*, X, 219-25.

[29] *Southern Farm Leader*, May 1936.

[30] *Sharecroppers' Voice*, July 1936. Tom Burke to Mitchell, Mar. 2, 1936; Mitchell to Burke, Mar. 9, 1936; Clyde Johnson to Mitchell, n.d. [*c.*, Apr. 15, 1936]; Mitchell to Johnson, Apr. 20, 1936, STFU Papers.

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A colorful and mercuric character named Odis Sweeden, who was part Cherokee Indian, had formed a branch of the STFU in Oklahoma. A majority of his followers were field workers and not sharecroppers. Henderson decided that these seasonal laborers belonged in the AFL. He brought Sweeden to his New York headquarters and, from the figurative mountaintop, offered substantial monetary support if the Oklahoman would transfer his allegiance. Although Sweeden resisted the temptation, Mitchell was irate. Henderson self-righteously defended his action, claiming that his genuine desire to help was always unjustly suspected because of his "political character."[31]

The Sweeden affair blew over for a while, but Mitchell soon had a more personal complaint. While on his way from Memphis to a meeting in Oklahoma, he stopped off at Commonwealth College to confer with J.R. Butler, the president of the STFU. Butler, a mild, Lincolnesque-appearing former sharecropper, had been teaching at Commonwealth since 1935 over Mitchell's objections. Mitchell soon learned that several of the faculty had accused him of selling out in a recent cotton choppers' strike, but on the whole he thought he was in safe territory. He told his bodyguard to relax while he stopped to chat with a STFU organizer who lived on campus. They talked amiably for a few minutes; then the organizer stepped into the next room, reappeared with a revolver, and fired several shots at Mitchell. The fusillade missed, and the amazed secretary ran for safety.[32]

The assassination attempt shocked Mitchell. He became convinced that Communists at the college had played on the emotions of the poor sharecropper, making him believe that Mitchell was a traitor to the union. Don Henderson's vehement protestations of his own innocence in the affair only angered Mitchell further. He decided, with Howard Kester's concurrence, to bar party members from STFU meetings. His resolution was probably bolstered by

[31] Jamieson, 268-69. Mitchell to Norman Thomas, Apr. 27, 1936; Thomas to Mitchell, May 4, May 14, 1936; Henderson to Thomas, May 7, 1936; Henderson to Mitchell, June 10, 1936, STFU Papers.

[32] Mitchell to Butler, Jan. 31, 1936; Edwin "Little Boy" Mitchell to H. L. Mitchell, May 6 and n.d., 1936, STFU Papers. The only direct mention of the shooting incident is in Mitchell Memoir, COHC, 59-62.

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the complaint from his Texas organizer about two left wingers in that region: "They always talk bourgesis and Proletariot when people don't even know what that means. . . ."[33]

The continuing insistence on the part of the Communists that farmers and laborers should be in separate organizations won few adherents among STFU members, who saw in the suggestion only the death of their proud brotherhood. Clyde Johnson tried to modify the party's line slightly when the Share Croppers Union held its first—and only—convention in New Orleans late in July 1936. The meeting proposed that the SCU continue to build on its supposed strength in Alabama and that the STFU should do the same in its own area. Elsewhere in the South, however, the delegates resolved, the two groups should enthusiastically support the AFL and the National Farmers Union. As a token, the SCU would cede its Louisiana locals to the NFU immediately. Johnson was sure that after a few years the various unions could meet to sort their members into the proper categories.[34] The proposal might have pacified the skeptical Mitchell for a time, but, in fact, Johnson had apparently exceeded his authority, and in an abrupt turnabout, the SCU soon merged into the Alabama unit of the NFU. One of its last activities was to publicize new words for an old spiritual:

> Give me that old Communist spirit,
> Give me that old Communist spirit,
> It was good enough for Ralph Gray,
> And it's good enough for me.[35]

Unlike Johnson, Don Henderson never deviated from the official party position. He used the columns of the *Rural Worker* to continue his calls for "unity." It seemed a strange kind of unity to Mitchell, which, he believed, would bring craft unionism to the cotton fields, break up the alliance of white and black workers, and degenerate into jurisdictional conflicts. When the executive council of the STFU met early in October 1936, it voted to withdraw endorsement from the *Rural Worker* and, on a motion by Odis Swee-

[33] Mitchell Memoir, COHC, 61-62. Unsigned [Fred Mathews?] to Mitchell, n.d. [c., Feb. 1936], STFU Papers, original spelling.
[34] *Southern Farm Leader*, July, Aug. 1936.
[35] *Ibid.*, Nov. 1936; *Southern Worker*, July 1936.

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den, to rebuff the earlier proposal from the Share Croppers Union for joint activities.[36]

The STFU council had a more vital complaint against Henderson which it did not raise publicly. The union had always had money problems. It existed on the tiny dues of its membership, on the pittances contributed by Socialist friends, and on whatever other funds could be raised. Since 1935 the STFU had received the sympathetic attention of Gardner Jackson who had been appointed its Washington representative. Pat Jackson—railroad heir, journalist, defender of Sacco and Vanzetti, discharged Agriculture Department "radical"—was in the mid-period of his true vocation—left-wing ingenue. He organized the Washington Committee to Aid Agricultural Workers in 1936 to raise money among his liberal friends who were horrified by the unfolding tales of sharecropper oppression.

The Washington committee was to be the first of a network of similar groups around the nation. The only problem, as far as the STFU was concerned, was that although the union provided the rationale for cocktail parties and other fund-raising festivities, it received only a small portion of the collections. Jackson's committee took fifteen dollars a month from its total receipts to support the *Rural Worker*. Only one-third of the remainder went to the STFU. The bulk was split between the Share Croppers Union and the South Jersey Agricultural Workers Union headed by Leif Dahl, a devoted lieutenant of Henderson. "Pat's friends are again taking him for a ride so it seems," Mitchell wrote to Norman Thomas. Still, the situation could have been worse. When a similar committee formed in New York, it contributed nothing to STFU.[37]

The executive council of STFU had accumulated enough complaints to have justified in their own minds breaking relations with Henderson and the Communists. And yet they did not. Mitchell

[36] Mitchell to Henderson, Aug. 12, Oct. 8, 1936; minutes, STFU executive council, Oct. 4, 1936, STFU Papers.

[37] Mitchell to Sidney Hertzberg and A.S. Gilmartin, Aug. 30, 1936; James Myers to Howard Kester, Nov. 4, 1936; Walter White to Kester, Dec. 3, 1936; Mitchell to Thomas, Sept. 3, 1936, STFU Papers. Years later Jackson called himself "a guileless instrument of a Commie operation"; Jackson Memoir, COHC, 657. After the Share Croppers Union ceased operations, the Washington committee sent its $45 a month to the Agricultural Workers Union of Alabama with 150 members and the same amount to STFU with 35,000 members; M. W. Martin to Roger Baldwin, Jan. 7, 1937, AFPS Papers.

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wrote Jackson that he was willing to continue working with them if they kept hands off union policies. Norman Thomas recommended "maximum cooperation"—and unsleeping caution.[38] The key to the situation was probably STFU's yearning for affiliation with a major labor confederation.

The STFU had courted both the AFL and the fledgling CIO but with few results.[39] Henderson, on the other hand, seemed able to gain a sympathetic ear despite his denunciations of non-Communist unions a few years earlier. He won a good deal of publicity in sponsoring the National Conference on Rural Social Planning late in March 1936.[40] The *American Federationist* published his articles and encouraged him in founding citrus, truck-garden, and sugar beet unions in Florida, New Jersey, and the West. By November 1936, Henderson was boasting that he represented 72 locals affiliated with the AFL.[41]

Henderson's relationship with the federation was unsatisfactory, however. His committee had no official standing with the AFL, and each local union had to deal individually with president William Green and his conservative staff. These "federal unions," as they were known, tried to win an international charter at the Tampa convention of the AFL in November 1936, but Green cautiously sidetracked them.[42]

The pleas of the agricultural unionists were a minor issue at Tampa. The main feature was the final split between the AFL and the CIO over the issue of industrial unionism. John L. Lewis, leader of the new group, had already undertaken a vast campaign to organize workers in steel, autos, rubber, and other mass industries,

[38] Mitchell to Jackson, Sept. 14, 1936; Thomas to Kester and Mitchell, Dec. 7, 1936, STFU Papers.

[39] Grubbs, 86-87. John Brophy to Mitchell, Mar. 24, 1936, STFU Papers.

[40] A decade and one-half later, Gardner Jackson, by then an anti-Communist warrior, described the dramatic unmasking of some party fakery. A transcript indicates—to put it in the kindest light—that his memory had failed; Jackson Memoir, COHC, 702, and "Typescript of National Conference on Rural Social Planning, Washington D. C., March 27-28, 1936," Farm Research Inc. Papers (New York City).

[41] Donald Henderson, "Agricultural Workers," *American Federationist*, XLIII (1936), 488-93; Henderson, "Unions of Agricultural Workers," *ibid.*, XLIII (1936) 632-33. Leif Dahl, "Agricultural Labor and Social Legislation," *ibid.*, XLIV (1937), 137-45. *Rural Worker*, Nov. 1936.

[42] Jamieson, 25. American unions are generally known as "internationals" because they have Canadian branches.

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which would provide him with powerful legions of dues-paying followers. The sharecroppers, farm hands, and migratory workers looked like a pretty poor harvest in comparison—until his interest was piqued by a grand scheme proposed by Harry Bridges, who was bidding to become Lewis's West Coast satrap. Bridges, who had first won fame as leader of the massive San Francisco port strike in 1934, was engaged in a struggle to unionize the Pacific slope for the CIO. Late in the spring of 1937, he convinced Lewis that the tens of thousands of agricultural workers could spearhead this drive and that they would also put $3,600 in dues into the CIO coffers every month. This argument convinced Lewis and won from him his endorsement of Don Henderson, Bridges's chosen candidate for leader. According to Gardner Jackson, Lewis had never before heard of Henderson.[43]

The prospect of an agricultural union chartered by Lewis, the recent victor over mighty U.S. Steel and current darling of radicals, brought elation to the hearts of the champions of the cause of thousands of sharecroppers, Okies, Chicanos, and other rural workers. The relationship of the new organization with the older STFU brought a measure of perplexity to both sides, however. Henderson may well have favored excluding the tenant group from the founding convention held in Denver early in July 1937 because of the evidence he already had of its independence, pride, and sometimes cantakerous leadership.[44] On the other hand, Gardner Jackson, now a close adviser of Lewis, insisted on the inclusion of STFU. Moreover, Henderson would have been hard put to have explained his ignoring a bloc of 35,000 rural workers while favoring only his pet locals, many of which seem to have existed only on paper.[45]

The decision faced by STFU was only somewhat less difficult. It had increased its numbers during its three years of life, but its strikes and boycotts had not been practical successes. It had won sympathy and support from liberals throughout the nation, but it had failed to halt the transformation of sharecroppers—who could claim AAA benefits—into day laborers—who could not. Mitchell

[43] Jackson to Mitchell, June 5, 1937, STFU Papers. *The [Farm] Worker* (Berkeley, Calif.), Feb. 25, 1938.

[44] Mitchell Memoir, COHC, 85. *The [Farm] Worker*, Feb. 25, 1938.

[45] Henderson to Butler, June 27, 1937, STFU Papers, indicates Henderson's lack of enthusiasm for STFU participation.

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concluded that the only solution was to join with John L. Lewis's organization, and with Henderson.[46]

Strong circumstances impelled the STFU toward participation in the Denver convention, despite its continuing suspicion of Henderson. Socialist friends, who were vehemently anti-Communist, encouraged Mitchell to play a prominent role at the meeting.[47] The *sine qua non* for the STFU, however, was a guarantee of autonomy and jurisdiction over cotton workers within its own territory. A press release emphasizing these demands angered Henderson.[48]

Henderson and his associates firmly controlled the founding convention of the new union. They cumbersomely christened it the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied Workers of America, but it was generally known by the acronym, UCAPAWA. Gardner Jackson later complained that his mail had been opened and read by the Communists at Denver, but if he grumbled at the time it was very quietly.[49] The invited outside speakers included party liners Harry Bridges and Reid Robinson of the Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers and the non-Communist Popular Fronter, John H. Bosch, president of the Farm Holiday Association.[50] The STFU delegates participated in a move by Mary Heaton Vorse, the radical author, to put Leif Dahl at the head of UCAPAWA, but Dahl, according to Gardner Jackson, dissolved in tears at the thought. The convention finally awarded J.R. Butler the honorific —and powerless—title of vice-president, while packing the executive board with Henderson's men.[51]

The STFU representatives returned to Memphis with the belief that they had won their goal of autonomy as District IV of UCAPAWA. A special convention met, September 24-26, to ratify the affiliation and elect regional officers. Whatever Mitchell's private doubts about Henderson, the CIO seemed the wave of the future, and the delegates hardly debated joining. They chose the old STFU officials as leaders of the new district—Butler as president, E.B. McKinney as vice-president, and Mitchell as secretary-treas-

[46] Mitchell to Gordon McIntyre, Sept. 8, 1937, STFU Papers.

[47] Frank N. Traeger to Butler, June 17, 1937, STFU Papers.

[48] STFU press release, June 23, 1937; Henderson to Butler, June 27, 1937, STFU Papers.

[49] Jackson Memoir, COHC, 710.

[50] *Daily Worker*, July 10, 1937.

[51] Jackson Memoir, COHC, 712-13. Grubbs, 167. *Daily Worker*, July 13, 1937.

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urer. Not everything went off smoothly, however. One eloquent speaker, Claude Williams, charged that any doubts about affiliation were motivated purely by racism, and he tried to defeat Mitchell with his own hand-picked black candidate.[52]

Williams, who had been on the fringes of the STFU since its formation, now began emerging as a storm center as he sought power in the union. The Reverend Claude, a poor hill boy from Tennessee who had become a friend of Howard Kester at Vanderbilt Seminary, had swung away from his early fundamentalism to religious radicalism. His Presbyterian church in Paris, Arkansas had dismissed him in 1934 for disturbing the orthodoxy of the elders. Two years later he won national attention when a group of white men brutally beat him after an STFU meeting. Somewhere along the line Williams had decided that the Communist party had the answer to the problems of injustice which he saw all around him, and he joined under the name "John Gayley" or "Galey." He dropped formal membership when he became director of the faltering Commonwealth College in August 1937 after taking a pledge of nonpartisanship. He had already won appointment to the executive council of the STFU two months earlier. Ralph Lord Roy, who has studied Williams's subsequent career, concludes that he seldom deviated from the party line whatever his formal status.[53]

Mitchell feared that Williams's emotional appeals would split the STFU along racial lines. The problem was doubly dangerous because E.B. McKinney was edging toward black nationalism. Mitchell wrote Jackson that he considered Williams a "serious menace," and he finally appealed to Henderson to have the preacher confine his activities to Commonwealth.[54]

With the ebullient Claude out of the way for a while, the STFU leaders began to try to make sense of their puzzling position within

[52] Mitchell to Henderson, Sept. 30, 1937; memorandum, Gardner Jackson to John L. Lewis, John Brophy, Ralph Hetzel, and Donald Henderson, Oct. 1, 1937; STFU press release, Sept. 30, 1937, STFU Papers.

[53] Ralph Lord Ray, *Communism and the Churches* (New York, 1960), 271-80; Grubbs, 111-13, 173. Cobb and Grubbs, 304. Mitchell Memoir, COHC, 87-88. There are two editions of a sympathetic biography of Williams by Cedric Belfrage, *South of God* (New York, 1941) and *A Faith to Free the People* (New York, 1944).

[54] Mitchell to Jackson, July 9 [Oct. 9?], 1937; Mitchell to Henderson, Sept. 30, 1937, STFU Papers.

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UCAPAWA. They stoutly maintained the right to keep their original name, their constitution, and regional autonomy. Beyond this, much was unclear to them. Their new district status gave them authority over areas which they had not organized. What did they know, for instance, of the problems of strawberry pickers in Louisiana or pecan shellers in the Rio Grande valley? Nor were they quite certain about the relationship with their own state units. Mitchell told Odis Sweeden to communicate directly with Henderson's office because he simply could not figure out the status of the Oklahoma locals. The STFU secretary, putting aside his suspicions for the moment, wrote a long conciliatory letter to Henderson, patiently explaining his organization's present position and future prospects.[55]

Henderson's own problems were immense. He was trying to organize a great mass of poor, undereducated, often rootless, generally despised, and economically powerless workers in a field specifically excluded from the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. He claimed over 100,000 members for UCAPAWA, but he had no true base of strength. In California, where Harry Bridges had hoped to "march inland" from his maritime bastion by organizing cannery and agricultural workers, the movement began to collapse almost at once in face of powerful opposition from the AFL Teamsters who controlled warehousing and highway transportation.[56] John L. Lewis, according to labor gossip, had given Henderson $50,000 to get his union under way. Lewis, however, was no open-handed philanthropist. He wanted dues-paying members, and when UCAPAWA showed signs of sagging, the pressure was on Henderson to economize. In January 1938, he fired 26 of his 28 organizers and stripped Butler of his vice-presidential salary of $200 a month.[57]

Prior to the foundation of UCAPAWA, Henderson had had the luxury of being a theorist and an ideologue. He had been able to lecture Mitchell and Butler about rural class distinctions until they wearily told him to mind his own business. After becoming presi-

[55] Mitchell to Henderson, Oct. 6, 1937, STFU Papers.

[56] Jamieson, 149-92.

[57] Benjamin Stolberg, "Communist Wreckers in American Labor," *Saturday Evening Post*, CCXII (Sept. 2, 1939), 169. Mitchell to Butler, Jan. 4, 1938, STFU Papers. Mitchell Memoir, COHC, 88. Grubbs, 169.

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dent of UCAPAWA, he faced the day-to-day problems of administration and organization—and always the nagging burden of finding adequate funds. Although Mitchell continued to suspect to the end that Henderson wanted to divide up STFU along class lines, the issue was in the background.[58] Henderson no doubt wanted to build UCAPAWA to be a pillar of an eventual Communist revolution, but his immediate aims were those of any practical unionist—of a Walter Reuther or a Jim Carey.

Henderson's California difficulties may well have focused his attention more clearly on the STFU. Here, after all, was a body with 35,000 members. At fifty cents a month per member, it meant a potential $210,000 a year pouring into the union treasury. Despite Mitchell's warning, Henderson never seemed to understand that to the average sharecropper, six dollars a year was as unrealistic as sixty or six hundred. STFU dues in the past had been ten cents a month, but in 1936 less than 10 per cent of the membership had been able to pay that.[59] During the first half-year of affiliation, the STFU officially registered only about half its locals, 21,000 members in all, with UCAPAWA headquarters, and it paid dues on only 7,389 of these.[60]

From the beginning, the issues of autonomy and dues overshadowed all else in the relationship between the offices in Memphis and Washington. The scattered UCAPAWA locals in the Rio Grande valley moved almost at once to bypass District IV (STFU) and affiliate with international headquarters. Early in 1938, Henderson's men began to wean away J.E. Clayton, a black minister and teacher, who was the best STFU organizer in Texas. In Oklahoma, Odis Sweeden began to see himself surrounded by Communists and threatened to leave not only UCAPAWA but STFU as well.[61]

Mitchell had been lukewarm about the relationship with UCAPAWA from the beginning; he had accepted it as the only way to get CIO affiliation. By April 1938, however, the STFU was

[58] See, *e.g.*, Statement of H. L. Mitchell to UCAPAWA executive board, Apr. 28, 1938, STFU Papers.

[59] Mitchell to Jackson, July 9 [Oct. 9?], 1937, STFU Papers. *Sharecroppers' Voice*, Sept. 1936.

[60] Jamieson, 317. Grubbs, 169.

[61] Mitchell to Clayton, May 4, 1938; Clayton to Mitchell, May 10, June 4, 1938; Henderson to Sweeden, Dec. 21, 1937; Sweeden to Mitchell, Dec. 24, 1937; summary, Oklahoma STFU meeting, Jan. 13, 1938, STFU Papers.

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close to secession over the issue of autonomy. Sweeden precipitated the matter, demanding the international union communicate with locals and members only through the Memphis office. Howard Kester enthusiastically joined in. A meeting of the executive council seriously debated withdrawal, although Claude Williams posed the classic constitutional argument by saying that the STFU had lost that right when it accepted federation. The council finally withheld action until it presented its case to the executive board of UCAPAWA.[62]

Mitchell told the executive board meeting in Washington that union members were in a state of complete confusion because of the conflicting demands on their loyalties. He asked for either the recognition of his union's complete jurisdiction over all tenants, sharecroppers, and farm laborers throughout the South or else the peaceful agreement to seek a direct charter from the CIO for the STFU. Henderson countered with a proposal that the STFU become an autonomous district confined to the states of Arkansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma. John Brophy, national director of the CIO and Lewis's troubleshooter, strongly supported Henderson's motion. For two hours, Henderson's men poured abuse on the STFU delegation and then voted in favor of their leader's proposal.[63]

Mitchell bitterly concluded that "the cards were stacked" against STFU and moved to secede, but a special session of his executive council decided to make one more appeal to CIO headquarters. A new representation went to Washington to confer with Lewis and his advisers. With John Brophy and Powers Hapgood mediating, the contestants finally hammered out a shaky compromise: the STFU would remain autonomous within the region it already occupied, and its members' dues would be returned for use within the area. Both sides, however, continued to pettishly disagree over the interpretation of the settlement.[64]

[62] Resolution passed at the Oklahoma State Convention of the STFU, Apr. 23, 1938; Kester to STFU executive council, telegram, Apr. 25, 1938; minutes, special meeting of STFU executive council, Apr. 25, 1938, STFU Papers.

[63] Statement of H. L. Mitchell to UCAPAWA executive board, Apr. 28, 1938; minutes, UCAPAWA executive board meeting, Apr. 28, 1938; Mitchell to Powers Hapgood, May 16, 1938, STFU Papers.

[64] STFU press release, Apr. 29, 1938 (marked "not released"); Mitchell to Kester, May 5, 1938; Butler and Mitchell to John L. Lewis, May 23, 1938;

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In the midst of this atmosphere of general disagreement, Butler introduced a new element. He discovered a document in Claude Williams's possession purporting to be a plan for the Communist party to seize control of the STFU. The discovery was particularly vexing for Butler because he had always staunchly defended Williams against Mitchell's distrust. He immediately publicized his find and demanded the minister's resignation from the STFU executive council.[65] Williams refused to resign and denied that the document had any official standing, but after a lengthy "trial" the council expelled him. He countered by organizing a coalition of malcontents who aimed at winning control of the annual convention of the STFU, but he eventually dropped the fight on the advice of Henderson and Alfred Wagenknecht, district organizer of the Communist party.[66]

Henderson took a reasonable, hands-off attitude toward the Williams affair, but the long period of mistrust and ill will had taken its toll. The events of the next several months were a chronicle of mutual recrimination between the STFU and UCAPAWA.[67] When nine delegates made the long trip from Memphis to San Francisco for the second convention of UCAPAWA, December 12-16, 1938, they met with a cool reception. They received only one vote each despite their claim to represent 146 locals and 35,685 members. When they raised the issue of district autonomy, Henderson's response was to tighten centralized control. Whereas they had previously held four positions on the 24-man executive board, they now retained only one, that of O.H. Whitfield of Missouri, whom Henderson chose as one of his nine vice-presidents.[68]

Henderson to Mitchell, June 4, 1938; Mitchell and Butler to Henderson, June 6, 1938; Henderson to Butler, July 29, 1938, STFU Papers.

[65] Butler to Williams, Aug. 22, 1938; untitled plan to take over STFU, n.d. [Aug. 1938], STFU Papers. Williams later told Donald Grubbs that Cedric Belfrage had written most of the document; Grubbs and Cobb, 310.

[66] Butler to Williams, Aug. 22, 1938; proceedings, trial of Claude C. Williams, Sept. 16-17, 1938, STFU Papers. Grubbs, 175-79.

[67] See, *e.g.*, Henderson to Butler, Oct. 5, 1938; Butler to H. A. Davie, Oct. 17, 1938; Butler to UCAPAWA executive board, Oct. 27, 1938; minutes, STFU executive council, Jan. 21, 1939; Henderson to Mitchell, Jan. 28, 1939; Butler to executive board, CIO, Feb. 14, 1939, STFU Papers.

[68] Mitchell to Evelyn Smith, Dec. 13, 1938; Evelyn Smith to David L. Clendenin, Dec. 20, 1938; report of San Francisco delegation to Fifth STFU Convention, Dec. 29, 1938 – Jan. 1, 1939, STFU Papers.

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Whitfield soon proved a weak reed for the STFU to lean on. In January 1939, he led a roadside demonstration of evicted sharecroppers in the bootheel region of Missouri. He ordered Butler and Mitchell to keep out of his territory; Butler charged that he was being guided by the Communist Al Jackson, former secretary of the Share Croppers Union. Late in February, Whitfield called a state convention aimed at supporting Henderson in a move to depose the leadership of the STFU.[69]

Henderson had decided to spark a rebellion from below against the Memphis office. He invited executive council member, D.A. Griffith, to lead the Arkansas revolt. Oklahoma, he claimed, had already deserted. On March 1, he suspended the STFU executive officers and announced that the district would be reorganized on "a democratic and constitutional basis."[70] Butler and Mitchell responded with a hurried membership referendum which, they claimed, showed overwhelming support for secession. The executive council stressed heavily the issue of Communism as the reason for their action. They followed up with a special convention on March 19, which voted unanimously for withdrawal. The delegates purged their feelings with a "funeral service" led by Howard Kester in which they buried a cigar box labeled "UCAPAWA." As the members filed past to drop handfuls of dirt on the "coffin," a swingtime piano player banged out a union tune, and they joyfully sang:

> She's Ashes to Ashes and Dust to Dust
> Here lies A Union We Never Could Trust;
> Ashes to Ashes and Dust to Dust
> This Man Henderson Has Hushed His Fuss.[71]

Henderson did not give up easily. He sent Leif Dahl, whom most STFU leaders respected, to establish an office in Memphis. Mitchell established a guard at his own headquarters and obtained a federal injunction forbidding Henderson and his potential allies from

[69] STFU executive council to John L. Lewis, n.d. [Feb. ? 1939]; Whitfield to locals and members, Feb. 24, 1939, STFU Papers. Grubbs, 180-83. Louis Cantor, *A Prologue to the Protest Movement: The Missouri Sharecropper Roadside Demonstration of 1939* (Durham, 1969).

[70] Henderson to Griffin, Feb. 23, 1939; Henderson to Mitchell, Butler, and executive board, District IV, UCAPAWA, Mar. 1, 1939, STFU Papers.

[71] STFU press release, Mar. 12, 1939, STFU Papers. *S.T.F.U. News*, Mar. 21, 1939.

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using the STFU name. The naive Butler even suggested testifying before the Dies Committee.[72]

Henderson's own "STFU" convention met in Memphis on April 2. Mitchell and almost a hundred sharecroppers dramatically appeared at the door but were denied entry. The UCAPAWA leader read a letter from Gardner Jackson, who maundered on at great length about Henderson's sterling qualities. Violence was narrowly averted when Mitchell dissuaded A.B. Brookins, an elderly black man, from leading a group which proposed to make a Christian out of Henderson by "baptizing" him in the Mississippi River.[73]

Henderson had lost the battle despite his claims to the contrary. A number of ambitious leaders like E.B. McKinney, O.H. Whitfield, and Claude Williams joined him but only a handful of the STFU locals followed. Henderson could add his failure in the cotton South to his list of failures to organize farm workers in California, Florida, New Jersey, and elsewhere. In 1942, he gave up on the last of his locals in Missouri. He shifted his attention to cannery and packing workers, who were regular dues-payers and who were covered by the National Labor Relations Act.[74]

Henderson failed, but the STFU did not win. Its locals were confused and resentful. Mitchell made brave public statements about unanimity and bright future prospects, but in private he recognized that only forty of the one-time three hundred locals were active. Funds had almost dried up, and Gardner Jackson was doing his best to cut off sources of outside support.[75] Although the STFU organization lingered on for another twenty years, in one guise or an-

[72] Mitchell to Butler, Mar. 3, 1939; Mitchell to Harriet Young, Mar. 13, 1939; Henderson to STFU locals, Mar. 22, 1939; UCAPAWA press release, Mar. 24, 1939, STFU Papers.

[73] STFU press release, Apr. 2, 1939, STFU Papers. *Agricultural Unionist*, Mar. 1953. Jackson had already viciously attacked Mitchell and had tried to sabotage the fundraising activities of National Sharecroppers Week. Jackson to Mitchell, Mar. 13, 1939; Mitchell to Harriet Young, Mar. 17, 1939; Mitchell to Jackson, Apr. 3, 1939, STFU Papers.

[74] Jamieson, 164-92, 336-40, 351-55. *Tenant Farmer*, Nov. 15, 1941. *Farm Labor News*, Aug. 1946.

[75] Mitchell to Kester, May 1, 1939; Butler to Kester, May 5, 1939; Mitchell to Blaine Treadway, May 9, 1939; Jackson to Frank R. Crosswaite, Feb. 24, 1940; Walter White to Jackson, Feb. 27, 1940; Mitchell to Jackson, Feb. 27, 1940, STFU Papers.

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other—changing names and scrambling for new bases of support—it was truly dead.

The Southern Tenant Farmers Union had made the most dedicated and sincere effort in the twentieth century to ameliorate the condition of Southern farm workers, sharecroppers, and tenant farmers, both black and white. Its amazing strength had come from the faith of its humble members, manifested in the face of brutal beatings and persecution. For a brief period of time it touched a sympathetic strain in America. Yet, the STFU had been bound to fail. The provisions of the various New Deal agricultural programs —fostered by Henry Wallace, to whom efficiency and hybrid corn were more important than people—encouraged landowners to wipe out the institution of sharecropping. The increasing mechanization during the next two decades went even further in eliminating the need for a vast body of farm workers in the South.

The question remains whether the STFU could have done more to help in this period of transition if not for "Communist interference." The answer lies in large part in the character and actions of the two men, Mitchell and Henderson. In many ways, Mitchell was the STFU. He symbolized the dogged determination of those he led, but he had his own personal quirks. He was hard working, hard living, intelligent, and personally honest. His devotion to the STFU held it together under circumstances in which similar organizations had collapsed. He was also intolerant of those with whom he disagreed. He took an early dislike to the Communists he met—the Commonwealth College group, Claude Williams, and Don Henderson. The Communist party line which made strict distinctions between farm workers and sharecroppers or small tenants appalled him because he believed it was impractical in the South. He was lukewarm from the beginning about affiliating with UCAPAWA because it was, without a doubt, dominated by Henderson and other Communists. From the Denver convention on, he saw Henderson's every move as a Communist plot to subvert the STFU.

Henderson was the perfect enemy. He was demanding, dogmatic, and intellectually arrogant. When he decided to take over an independent union in Sugarland, Texas, he could write that he was going to do so " 'regardless of how the sugar refinery workers . . .

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feel.' "[76] As early as 1936, Mitchell wrote Norman Thomas, "Two or three centuries ago such people as Henderson were out burning witches. . . ."[77] Years later, Claude Williams reminisced, " 'You didn't work with Don Henderson, you worked for him.' "[78] As head of UCAPAWA he surrounded himself with party members. He had little knowledge of sharecroppers' problems, and the STFU was a bastion of those who did not fit his preconceptions.

The relationship, then, was bound to be unhappy and clashes frequent. The wonder was that it lasted as long as it did. From July 1937 onward, time and energy, sweat and tears, were devoted to an internecine battle rather than the goal of human betterment.

[76] Quoted in F. Ray Marshall, *Labor in the South* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 238.

[77] Mitchell to Thomas, Nov. 17, 1936, STFU Papers.

[78] Quoted in Grubbs, 82.

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The United States and Forced Repatriation of Soviet Citizens, 1944-47

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In a small cemetery on the bank of the Drava River near Leinz, Austria, lies the mute evidence of a wartime tragedy. The 134 persons buried there all died on June 1 or 2, 1945, all were Soviet nationals, and all committed suicide. These dead, and a few comrades who still tend their graves, were the only ones to escape forcible repatriation from Leinz. British troops handed over 30,000 others to Soviet authorities.[1]

A similar incident occurred at Fort Dix, New Jersey, where 154 Soviet citizens captured in German uniform were interned.[2] On June 29, 1945, the date set for their embarkation for Russia, the group attempted mass suicide. American military police brought the macabre demonstration under control with the use of tear gas, but only after three had succeeded in hanging themselves. At Soviet insistence, the United States repatriated the rest, amid Soviet charges that American soldiers had wounded and tear gassed Soviet citizens to prevent their return home.[3]

[1] Roland Gaucher, *Opposition in the U.S.S.R., 1917-1967* (New York, 1969), 353. Sven Steenberg, *Vlasov* (New York, 1970).

[2] Joseph Grew to Robert Murphy, July 11, 1945, U.S., Dept. of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, V, Europe* (Washington, 1967), 1099 (hereafter this series is cited as *FR*). *New York Times*, May 14, 1946.

[3] Grew to George Kennan, July 27, 1945, *FR, 1945*, V, 1100-01. Annex to

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Seven months later the *New York Times* reported that Dachau, Germany, already infamous for Nazi atrocities, was once again the scene for a "frenzy of terror"; the toll for one day of forced repatriation was 10 dead, 21 wounded.[4] Surprisingly, the details relayed to Washington by an American diplomat were more sensational than what appeared in the press. The United States political adviser for Germany reported that on January 19, American soldiers forced the Russians from their barracks with tear gas. Collapsing in the snow from wounds of their own making, the Russians, preferring death to repatriation, begged to be shot by their American guards.[5]

The mortal terror which accompanied repatriation perplexed General Eisenhower who lamely recalled "a number of suicides among individuals who preferred to die rather than return to their native land."[6] Why were "a number" of Soviet citizens opposed to repatriation? Why was the Soviet Union so adamant in demanding the repatriation of all its citizens? Why did the United States and Britain agree to this forced movement? And why were the Western allies so punctilious in fulfilling this obviously onerous obligation? The answers to these questions reveal more than just the details of the repatriation process. For in a sense, this study is a fragment of the history of the Grand Alliance against Hitler, the cold war, and the massive population shifts caused by World War II. Repatriation, dramatic in itself, reflects broader historical trends. The movement, in addition, sheds light on Soviet negotiating techniques and the continued decline of the Department of State as a formulator of American foreign policy.

Extent of Wartime Displacement of Soviet Nationals

Repatriation, for millions of ordinary Soviet citizens, was the denouement of a monumental but nightmarish drama which began

memorandum by Soviet delegation at meeting of Council of Foreign Ministers, Sept. 13, 1945, *FR, 1945*, II, *General: Political and Economic Matters*. (Washington, 1967), 154.

[4] Jan. 20, 1946.

[5] Murphy to Robert Byrnes, Feb. 14, 1946, *FR, 1946*, V, *The British Commonwealth; Western and Central Europe* (Washington, 1969), 141. See also Eugene Lyons, "Orphans of Tyranny," *Plain Talk*, II, (Mar. 1948), 44.

[6] Dwight Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City, N.Y., 1948), 439.

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with the German invasion of Russia on June 22, 1941. The speed of the German advance, coupled with standfast orders issued to Red Army commanders, resulted in the envelopment and capture of millions of Russian soldiers, 3.8 million by December 1941.[7] The following spring an acute labor shortage within Germany forced the Nazis to set aside their fears of racial contamination from Eastern workers, *Ostarbeiter*, and to force a massive influx of Soviet laborers.[8] Some prisoners of war were still put to work in the occupied eastern territories but many more were deported to Germany itself. By January 1944, one million former Red Army soldiers were forced laborers in "Greater Germany."[9] When the supply of prisoners proved insufficient, Germany "recruited" Soviet civilians to supplement the labor force.[10] Western sources estimate that two million Soviet civilians worked in the Reich as of January 1944.[11] A year later the figure had climbed to 2.75 million, exclusive of territory annexed by Germany.[12]

Unfortunately, these statistics do not include the families of Soviet laborers in Germany. They do not include those Soviet nationals, either collaborators or anti-Communists, who retreated westward with the German army. Nor do they account for Soviet forced laborers scattered across occupied Europe but outside Germany proper.[13] The best estimate of displaced Soviet nationals in Europe at the end of World War II is the total repatriated plus an approximation of the number of nonreturners, *nyevozvrashchentzi*. Soviet and Western sources are surprisingly close in their estimates of Soviet repatriates; they vary only from 5,115,709 to 5,326,445.[14]

[7] Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945* (New York, 1957), 409. Eugene Kulischer, *The Displacement of Population in Europe* (Montreal, 1943), 152.

[8] "Soviet Workers in Germany," *International Labour Review*, XLVII (May 1943), 589.

[9] John Fried, *Exploitation of Foreign Labour in Germany* (Montreal, 1945), 264.

[10] Edward L. Homze, *Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany* (Princeton, 1967), 84.

[11] Jane Perry Clark Carey, "Displaced Populations in Europe in 1944 with Particular Reference to Germany," U.S., *Department of State Bulletin*, XII (Mar. 25, 1945), 496. Fried, 264.

[12] Estimate by Edward L. Deuss, German economic analyst, Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (Washington, 1946), I, 894.

[13] "The Mobilization of Foreign Labour by Germany," *International Labour Review*, L (Oct. 1944), 476.

[14] "Five million plus": Michael Roof and Frederick Leedy, "Population Re-

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Statistics dealing with nonreturners are highly unreliable and, as a result, estimates of their numbers vary widely. An accurate figure is difficult to obtain because the West's adherence to a policy of forced repatriation prompted many Soviet citizens to falsify their displaced persons credentials. Many Soviet nationals concealed their identities by claiming to be Polish-Ukrainians. Britain and America refused to forcibly repatriate residents of territory recently seized by Russia; and since the USSR annexed 44 per cent of prewar Poland, claiming to be Polish-Ukrainian was the safest and most logical loophole, especially since more Ukrainians than Poles had lived in the eastern provinces before the war.[15] United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) statistics indicate the popularity of this exemption. The number of Ukrainians claiming Polish citizenship jumped from 9,190 in December 1945 to 106,549 in June 1947![16]

Unaccounted for and statistically undetected Soviet citizens further complicate the problem of estimating the numbers of refugees. Under the circumstances it is no wonder that estimates for nonreturners range from 200,000 to 1,000,000.[17] Still, most authorities put the figure between 250,000 and 500,000, the Soviet figure of 400,000 being quite compatible with Western sources.[18] Based on

distribution in the Soviet Union, 1939-1956," *Geographical Review*, XLIX (Apr. 1959), 211. 5,115,709: G. Ginsburg, "Soviet Union and the Problem of Refugees and Displaced Persons, 1917-1956," *American Journal of International Law*, LI (Apr. 1957), 348. 5,218,000: Malcolm Proudfoot, *European Refugees: 1939-52* (Evanston, 1956), 212. 5,236,000: Eugene Kulischer, *Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes, 1917-47* (New York, 1948), 308. 5,236,000: "Repatriation of Soviet Citizens," *International Labour Review*, LII (Nov. 1945), 533. 5,326,445: George Fischer, *Soviet Opposition to Stalin: A Case Study in World War II* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), 111.

[15] Charles Delzell, "Russian Power in Central-Eastern Europe," in *The Meaning of Yalta: Big Three Diplomacy and the New Balance of Power*, ed. John L. Snell (Baton Rouge, 1956), 77. Roman Umiastowski, *Poland, Russia, and Great Britain, 1941-1945: A Study of the Evidence* (London, 1946), 478. U.S., Dept. of State, "Poland: Ethnic Composition of the Population East of the Soviet-German Demarcation Line of September 28, 1939," *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945* (Washington, 1949), 492.

[16] George Woodbridge, *UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration* (New York, 1950), III, 423.

[17] George Fischer, "The Soviet 'Non-Returners,'" *New Republic*, CXX (June 13, 1949), 13; Lyons, 41.

[18] 500,000: Julius Epstein, "American Forced Repatriation," *Ukrainian Quarterly*, X (Autumn 1954), 356. 400,000: Soviet source quoted by Fischer,

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these figures, the number of displaced Soviet nationals outside the USSR as a result of World War II can be assumed to have been between 5,315,709 and 5,826,445, roughly five and one-half million persons.

Motivation of Nonreturners

During World War II European population experts realized that upon the conclusion of hostilities displaced persons would be a pressing problem requiring immediate attention. Regrettably, they paid little attention to the political problems which would accompany the displacement of an estimated thirty million Europeans.[19] "Foreign laborers in Germany," a League of Nations study naively predicted, ". . . will certainly wish to return to their native lands following the war."[20] This misjudgment resulted in part because the ideological barriers which separated Russia and its Western allies tended to blur before the more immediate threat of Hitler; and with the euphoria of a successful East–West military alliance went the unfounded assumption that a peacetime coalition would allow, in the case of displaced persons, humanitarianism to override more mundane political considerations. But the fact was that the prestige of the USSR was jeopardized by those Soviet citizens abroad who were reluctant to return home. There is no way to know what percentage of *Ostarbeiter* would have declined repatriation if they had been given the chance, but it is safe to say that the West overestimated their "great impatience to return. . . ."[21]

The obvious reason for avoiding repatriation was to evade punishment for collaboration or fighting in German ranks. Actually, this motivated only a small portion of the *nyevozvrashchentzi*. The majority who feared repatriation did so because they represented one of several oppressed classes within the Soviet Union, including

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Soviet Opposition, 111-12. 250,000: Merle Fainsod, "Controls and Tensions in the Soviet System," *American Political Science Review*, XLIV (June 1950), 266. 250,000: Fischer, *Soviet Opposition*, 111-12. 250,000: Proudfoot, 214.

[19] Fried, i; Bertram Pickard, *Europe's Uprooted People: the Relocation of Displaced Population* (Washington, 1944), 8.

[20] Frank Notestein, *The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union, Population Projections, 1940-1970* (Geneva, 1944), 89.

[21] U.S., Dept. of State, *Postwar Policy*, 642. See also John Hilldring, "Position on Resettlement of Displaced Persons," *Department of State Bulletin*, XVI (June 15, 1947), 1163.

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former czarist officers or officials, those who opposed the Bolsheviks in the Civil War, *kulaks* (well-to-do peasants opposed to collectivization), members of religious or national minorities, or victims of the purges such as former forced laborers. There were some among the nonreturners who had received no special mistreatment from the Soviets but simply opposed the oppression and restrictions of a totalitarian political system. Then too, some were impressed with the higher standard of living outside Russia and wished to avoid the inevitable sacrifices and hardships of Soviet reconstruction.[22]

Throughout the planning stages of 1944, SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) took account of the possibility of liberated persons unwilling to return to their homelands.[23] Even before the invasion of Normandy, General Eisenhower's staff queried the Russians regarding the treatment to be accorded Soviet citizens captured in German uniform. The Soviets replied that there were no Russians in German ranks and therefore the problem would not arise. Four months after the invasion of France the Western allies held 28,000 Soviet nationals captured in German uniform.[24]

While the fighting continued, Russia made no efforts to alleviate the plight of Soviet servicemen captured by the Germans. Foreign Minister Molotov said as much when, on a visit to the White House in May 1942, he sharply rejected a suggestion by President Roosevelt that Russia treat with Germany on the POW issue.[25] Russian soldiers in German hands did not have a shred of international protection either, for the USSR had not signed the Geneva Convention of 1929 which specified humane treatment for prisoners of war. This official posture stemmed from the Soviet concept of proper battlefield deportment. The Red Army field manual assumed that a loyal soldier was either fighting or was dead; surrender was considered tantamount to treason.[26] The wartime edition of the stan-

[22] Fainsod, 266-82. Lyons, 41-46.

[23] F. S. V. Donnison, *Civil Affairs and Military Government Central Organization and Planning* (London, 1966), 198.

[24] John Deane, *The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation with Russia* (New York, 1947), 186-87. Proudfoot, 152.

[25] James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom* (New York, 1970), 232.

[26] Ginsburg, 360. Lyons, 44.

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dard Soviet encyclopedia warned that "the penalty for premeditated surrender into captivity not necessitated by combat conditions is death by shooting. . . ." Decree Number 270 of 1942 was even more explicit; it declared "a prisoner captured alive by the enemy *ipso facto* a traitor."[27] As the war came to a close in Europe and more and more Soviet nationals came under the control of American and British forces, the Soviet Union expressed concern for the welfare of Soviet citizens formerly in German hands. But this was not before months of frustrating attempts by the Western allies to effect a reciprocal repatriation agreement with Russia.

Negotiating Repatriation

During the war the biggest responsibility for General John R. Deane, head of the United States Military Mission in Moscow, was the administration of American lend-lease to Russia. Yet he later indicated that his largest problem while in Russia was not lend-lease, but the relatively minor negotiations dealing with mutual repatriation for Soviet and American citizens. In his memoirs, he refers to the winter of 1944-45, the period of greatest debate over the POW issue, as his "darkest days in Russia."[28]

Deane, along with General Burrows, chief of the British Military Mission, first broached the subject with the Red Army general staff on June 11, 1944. Despite Soviet assurances of cooperation, Deane gathered the impression that the Russians had made no preparations whatsoever for the care and repatriation of liberated Americans.[29] This proved to be the case when one thousand American servicemen were liberated in Romania. Major General N.V. Slavin had promised at the initial June 11 inquiry to promptly inform Deane whenever the Red Army uncovered United States servicemen in Eastern Europe. Despite this, the American military mission did not learn of the servicemen in Romania until the United States command in the Middle East relayed the information from an Air Force liaison officer in Bucharest.[30] This lack of cooperation

[27] David Dallin and Boris Nikolaevsky, *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia* (New Haven, 1947), 282, 283.

[28] Deane, 182.

[29] Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson, eds., *Negotiating with the Russians* (Boston, 1951), 10.

[30] Deane, 184. Proudfoot, 153.

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prompted Deane to ask Ambassador Averell Harriman for help. On August 30, 1944, the two sent letters to Molotov and General A.E. Antonov, chief of the Red Army general staff, detailing proposals for the "prompt return of American or Soviet prisoners of war."[31] Molotov did not reply until November 25, at which time he agreed to the American proposals "in principle."[32]

In the interim the Soviet government made the first of what was to become a steady flow of accusations concerning American treatment of Soviet citizens. Andrei Gromyko, Russian ambassador to the United States, informed Cordell Hull on September 23, 1944, that the Soviet government "expects," among other things, that all liberated Soviet nationals be treated as free citizens, not as prisoners of war.[33] Early in October, some two weeks after Gromyko chastised Hull, *Pravda* carried an article by Colonel General Felip Golikov which castigated Britain and America for their treatment of liberated Russians. Golikov emphasized that Soviet nationals captured in German uniform had served against their will and had sabotaged German military operations at every opportunity. This interpretation, it should be noted, was reiterated by a Soviet historian as recently as 1970.[34] Having lost his patience after months of programmed invective, General Deane sarcastically remarked, "It was the old question of Russians captured in German uniforms while in the act of shooting at American soldiers. We could hardly be expected to put them up at the Ritz in Paris or the Mayflower in Washington. . . ."[35] The purpose of Soviet acrimony seemed to be to put the Western allies on the defensive at the negotiating table and to fortify the myth of the unqualified wartime devotion of all Soviet citizens.[36]

[31] Dennett and Johnson, 11. Averell Harriman to Cordell Hull, Sept. 4, 1944, *FR, 1944*, IV, *Europe* (Washington, 1966), 1245-46.

[32] George Kennan to Edward Stettinius, Nov. 27, 1944, *FR, 1944*, IV, 1265.

[33] *Ibid.*, 1252-53.

[34] E. A. Brodskii, *Vo imia pobedi nad fashizmom: Antifashistskaia bor'ba sovetskikh ludei v gitlerovskoi Germanii (1941-1945)* (Moscow, 1970). Dennett and Johnson, 12. Proudfoot, 154.

[35] Deane, 188. See also Forrest Pogue, *The Supreme Command* (Washington, 1954), 521-22.

[36] Grateful letters of appreciation to Western repatriation authorities from individual liberated Russians lend credence to the view that much of the Soviet outcry over mistreatment of Soviet nationals was feigned. Lieutenant Colonel Zapozin and Major Berizofski to Eisenhower, Apr. 9, 1945, Dwight David Eisenhower, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years*, ed. Alfred Chandler (Baltimore, 1970), IV, 2603. *New York Times*, May 1, 1945.

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By the first of December 1944, the Red Army was nearing two prison camps in Hungary known to contain Americans. An anxious Deane requested that American diplomats again approach Molotov on the POW issue.[37] Despite this renewed pressure the situation remained the same until December 29, 1944. On that date, A.Y. Vyshinsky, deputy commissar for foreign affairs, accredited two Red Army officers to negotiate with Burrows and Deane; this was six months and eighteen days after the Western allies first requested discussions on the question of reciprocal repatriation.[38] The two men appointed were Major General N. V. Slavin and Lieutenant General K. D. Golubev. Despite the former's higher rank, Golubev, as a political commissar, held the real authority. Deane marveled at this man's incapacity and described him as having "the largest body and the lowest I.Q. of any human being I have ever encountered."[39] Nonetheless, things now moved rapidly, perhaps too rapidly to serve the best interests of Americans liberated by Soviet forces. At their very first meeting on January 9, 1945, Golubev and Slavin presented a draft agreement on repatriation which Deane said was exactly what he wanted, save for some minor alterations. Deane may have been trying to fool himself or posterity by calling the Soviet draft a "good one."[40] More likely he made no serious objections for fear of prolonging negotiations.[41] There the matter stood until the Yalta Conference of February 4-11, 1945.

British, American, and Soviet military representatives negotiated the repatriation agreement at the same time that Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin held their famous discussions on "political" matters. The military negotiators worked with several different drafts during the conference but all of these were essentially the same. The preliminaries prior to the signing on February 11, 1945, were largely perfunctory.[42] For example, at the first and only tripartite session dealing with repatriation, Article 1, which would later provoke lengthy debates, elicited no comment whatsoever.[43] It pro-

[37] Keenan to Stettinius, Dec. 5, 1944. *FR, 1944*, IV, 1270.

[38] Harriman to Stettinius, Dec. 29, 1944, *ibid.*, 1272.

[39] Dennett and Johnson, 13.

[40] *Ibid.*, 14.

[41] Proudfoot, 154.

[42] Anthony Eden to V. M. Molotov, Feb. 5, 1945, *FR, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington, 1955), 693; second British draft, *ibid.*, 693-96.

[43] *Ibid.*, 864, 866. The negotiators made plans for a second meeting but the *Foreign Relations* editors found no notes to indicate that it actually took place.

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vided that "all Soviet citizens . . . and all United States citizens . . . will, without delay . . . be separated from enemy prisoners of war and maintained separately . . . until they have been handed over . . . ," the last six words being critical in subsequent debate over the agreement's interpretation.[44]

Sven Steenberg, a German writer, read this as a prescription for forced repatriation. Eugene Kulischer, an eminent authority on population movements, likewise asserted that the agreement called for "compulsory repatriation." In contrast, Julius Epstein, a research associate at the Hoover Institute, adamantly maintained that Article 1 did not sanction the use of force. "The use of coercion in repatriation," Epstein contends, "was an 'afterthought'. . . ."[45] The controversy was stimulated by the imprecise language of Article 1. The Russians certainly assumed the use of force. How else would all citizens be handed over? The fact that the negotiators made no provision for any course of action other than repatriation also favored the Soviet point of view. But whatever Article 1 legally required was not as important as what men in positions of authority thought it required. The West's changing interpretation of its repatriation obligations was actually of more consequence than the agreement itself.

Parenthetically, it is interesting to note a current trend in cold war historiography which parallels this interpretation of repatriation. Yalta was less than decisive in determining the ultimate disposition of Soviet displaced persons and, some would say, it was far from crucial in setting the course of postwar international relations. Diane Clemens and Gar Alperovitz, authors of recent studies on this period, do not, for example, regard the conference as the ir-

[44] U.S., Dept. of State, *Liberated Prisoners of War and Civilians, Agreement Between United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Crimea February 11, 1945*, Executive Agreement Series 505, Pubn. No. 2530 (1946), 1.

[45] Steenberg, 219. Eugene Kulischer, "Displaced Persons in the Modern World," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCLXII (Mar. 1949), 170. Julius Epstein, review of *Wlassow, Verrater oder Patriot* by Sven Steenberg, *Russian Review*, XXVIII (July 1969), 367-68; see also Epstein, "American Forced Repatriation," 357, and Epstein, "Forced Repatriation; Some Unanswered Questions," *The Russian Review*, XXIX (Apr. 1970), 209-10. Epstein's probing search for the originators of forced repatriation still hits a sore nerve with the United States Army which has refused him, or anyone, access to a three-volume dossier on the subject.

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refutable watershed between East-West wartime cooperation and postwar conflict.[46] At least in the instance of repatriation, this interpretation would seem to have considerable merit.

Article 2 of the repatriation agreement serves as a good illustration of phrasing uncontested by the West at Yalta which accrued solely to the Soviets' benefit. It provided that "repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens are located and they will have the right to appoint . . . the internal discipline and management. . . ."[47] As this worked out in practice the Western allies allowed the Russians to carve out extraterritorial islands throughout the Western occupation zones of Germany and Austria.[48] Yet Generals Deane and Burrows had extreme difficulty in getting even one repatriation team into Poland. The one and only camp under Western control was 1,400 miles from the closest point of liberation for British and American POWs.[49] Malcolm Proudfoot, a SHAEF repatriation official, made a penetrating observation in evaluating the torturous path from the initial Western note of June 11, 1944, to the signed agreement of February 11, 1945: "what properly should have been a flexible working arrangement concluded after a few weeks of discussion between friendly allies, became instead a tightly drawn contract serving Soviet convenience, carefully worded to provide for concessions already obtained by Soviet authorities, but making inadequate provision for reciprocal concessions.[50]

Soviet Campaign for Total Repatriation

The Soviet Union used the Yalta agreement as ammunition in its campaign for total repatriation, while continuing the barrage of accusations and complaints against the United States and British treatment of Soviet nationals. One reason for Soviet insistence

[46] Diane Shaver Clemens, *Yalta* (New York, 1970); Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* (New York, 1965).

[47] Dept. of State, *Liberated Prisoners*, 1.

[48] F. S. V. Donnison, *Civil Affairs and Military Government: North-West Europe, 1944-46* (London, 1961), 344.

[49] Epstein, "American Forced Repatriation," 357.

[50] Proudfoot, 155.

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upon total repatriation was the tremendous task of reconstruction within the Soviet Union which lay ahead. Also compelling was the propaganda value of the myth of the uncompromised wartime loyalty of all Soviet peoples.[51] Russia hoped to regain control over its citizens abroad before they could voice any opposition, since dramatic instances of resistance to repatriation would damage Soviet prestige. Moscow anticipated this unpleasant and damaging publicity and hoped to neutralize it by labeling all nonreturners fascists or indoctrinated Western stooges.[52] However, the Soviet epithets, indeed, the entire public display on behalf of Soviet citizens abroad, convinced the Western powers of nothing but Soviet intractability on the repatriation issue.

Why the West Agreed to Repatriation

In attempting to determine why the Western allies signed the repatriation accord certain characteristics of the diplomatic sparring between East and West must be considered. Western acquiescence to the draft agreement as it stood on February 11, 1945, stemmed in part from the Soviets' masterful sense of timing. Their calculated delays, beginning in June 1944, paid off. As already noted, a steady flow of grievances, real or imagined, accompanied this studied diplomatic procrastination and tended to put the West on the defensive.[53] It also prolonged negotiations by providing the Russians with an excuse for delay. Philip Mosely, who had experience negotiating with the Russians as a State Department officer and adviser during World War II, recalled that "The treasuring of grievances . . . within a cycle of themes for negotiation" was a predictable feature of Soviet diplomacy.[54] Russian verbal assaults were at times ludicrous; one Soviet complaint had it that United States' officials were poisoning Soviet citizens by putting methyl alcohol in their food. American officials delegated to investigate discovered that a

[51] Fainsod, 268. Walter Bedell Smith, *My Three Years in Moscow* (Philadelphia, 1950), 26.

[52] Keenan to Hull, Nov. 10, 1944, *FR, 1944*, IV 1263-64. Harriman to Stettinius, Jan. 10, 1945, *FR, Yalta*, 455. Donald Taft and Richard Robbins, *International Migrations, The Immigrant in the Modern World* (New York, 1955), 239.

[53] Proudfoot, 213.

[54] Dennett and Johnson, 282.

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number of Russian displaced persons had broken into a tank car of methyl alcohol and had consumed quantities which proved fatal despite the efforts of American doctors to save their lives.[55]

The Soviet barrage was so overwhelming that individual ripostes were pointless. The State Department adopted a policy of one answer per charge, ignoring repeated Soviet dispatches bearing the same complaint. SHAEF merely issued "blanket replies."[56] Those Western officials dealing with repatriation could readily empathize with the distraught British negotiator of 1933 who complained that the Russian counterparts were "completely unable to see themselves in any other light than that of an aggrieved Power. . . ."[57]

As effective as the Soviet stalling tactics were, they would have been of marginal value had it not been for British and American concern for well being of their servicemen liberated by the advance of the Red Army. London and Washington reminded its negotiators that the longer the delay in reaching an agreement, the more servicemen there would be fending for themselves in Eastern Europe. Russia's initial apathy about POW negotiations and its guilty-till-proven-innocent attitude toward all soldiers taken alive by the enemy heightened the concern of Western diplomats.[58] Soviet negotiators, in comparison, were not handicapped by humanitarian considerations which would have necessitated compromise. The question, however, cannot be so easily contrasted in terms of "Western white or Soviet black."[59] The West's humanitarian concern appears, in retrospect, to have been restricted to Westerners.

Britain-American concern for their liberated servicemen appears to have been the overriding motive behind the West's signing the repatriation agreement. Published diplomatic correspondence bears out this opinion, for the subject of liberated POWs figured prominently in communications dealing with Russian repatriation.[60] Interesting corroboration for this comes from testimony

[55] *Ibid.*, 18.

[56] Grew to Keenan, July 27, 1945, *FR, 1945*, V, 1100. Proudfoot, 213.

[57] Gordon Craig, "Techniques of Negotiation," in *Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective*, ed. Ivo Lederer (New Haven, 1962), 365.

[58] Dennett and Johnson, 9; Fischer, *Soviet Opposition*, 112.

[59] Taft and Robbins, 241.

[60] Gore-Booth of the British embassy in Washington to Bernard Gufler, Sept. 26, 1944, *FR, 1944*, IV, 1254. Byrnes [H. Freeman Matthews] to Murphy, Aug. 29, 1945, *FR, 1945*, V, 1105.

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given at a 1953 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing to confirm the nomination of Charles E. Bohlen as United States ambassador to the Soviet Union. The senators were less interested in Bohlen's credentials than in any light he could shed on the meeting of the Big Three at Yalta, where Bohlen had been Roosevelt's interpreter and an adviser on East Europe. The Republican senators on the committee attempted to accuse the Democratic administration of Franklin Roosevelt of negotiating a bad if not treasonous agreement, the "Sellout Theory" being particularly fashionable at this time. In his defense of Yalta, Bohlen made some revealing comments on repatriation. Senator Homer Ferguson asked him: "even after we knew that these people were committing suicide rather than go back, we forced them to go back. . . . How do you account for the fact we did not sense what was going on and refuse to carry out an agreement that not only enslaved these people but took their lives?"

"The purpose of it," Bohlen recalled, "was that there were 60,000 American prisoners in Poland and Eastern Germany under the control of or about to be under the control of the Red Army, and the purpose was to get those prisoners back."[61]

Another reason that the United States signed the repatriation agreement was related to the diminished influence of the State Department on the formulation of foreign policy. Franklin Roosevelt, an advocate of "personal diplomacy," often acted as his own secretary of state. At other times he bypassed the State Department by sending his own personal emissaries on particularly delicate diplomatic missions. Paralleling this was Roosevelt's inclination to heed more the advice of his military advisers than that of his political advisers. Bohlen's testimony relates these tendencies to the repatriation issue. The very fact that the military rather than the State Department negotiated the repatriation agreement is indicative. Bohlen expressed doubt that President Roosevelt had ever read the repatriation agreement, which prompted Senator Ferguson to ask, "Do you think he allowed his military men to do that without him seeing it?" Bohlen did not know, but in earlier testimony he had

[61] U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Nomination of Charles E. Bohlen, Hearings . . .* 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, p. 57.

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stated that the president did not take part in either negotiating or signing the agreement.[62]

At the Yalta Conference, Edward R. Stettinius, the newly appointed secretary of state, was overawed, overshadowed, and overruled by Roosevelt. The acting secretary of state, Joseph Grew, knew that Stettinius was a diplomatic novice and felt compelled to advise him on the repatriation issue. From Washington, Grew urged the secretary to oppose any agreement requiring the use of force. Stettinius replied, "The consensus here [at Yalta] is that it would be unwise to include questions relative to the protection of the Geneva Conference. . . "; that is, the Yalta delegation was ready to sacrifice the right of political asylum in order to "reach prompt agreement on this question."[63]

A repatriation arrangement negotiated by the State Department would have been much sounder than what the military produced. It must be remembered that General Deane had naively commented that the Soviet draft of January 9, 1945, "with a few minor amendments was exactly what we wanted."[64] In contrast, Bohlen volunteered that the "State Department people" in Washington had had misgivings about parts of the agreement as soon as they saw it.[65]

The precedent of forced repatriation set by the British as early as the fall of 1942 also made it difficult to avoid an agreement continuing this policy. The British had been forcibly repatriating those occasional Russians who fell into their hands as a result of British guerilla activity in Greece.[66] The British War Cabinet made the policy official late in August 1944. The overriding consideration in London was to avoid giving the Russians any cause to delay the repatriation of British prisoners of war who would fall into Russian hands as the war progressed.[67] The force of this precedent can be seen in a telegram to Washington from Admiral William Leahy, Roosevelt's chief of staff: "Since the British War Office, with For-

[62] *Ibid.*, 57-58.

[63] Stettinius to Grew, Feb. 9, 1945, *FR, Yalta*, 757. See also Epstein, "American Crime," 19.

[64] Deane, 189.

[65] U.S. Senate, *Hearings . . . Bohlen*, 57.

[66] Donnison, *Organization and Planning*, 199.

[67] *Ibid.*, 202. Dudley Kirk to Hull, Sept. 16, 1944, *FR, 1944*, IV, 1250.

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eign Office concurrence, has agreed that all captured Soviet citizens should be returned to Soviet authorities without exception . . . it is not advisable for the United States Government to proceed otherwise. . . ."[68]

Although difficult to appraise, the climate of opinion prevailing in the West in 1944-45 had an undeniable influence upon the repatriation movement. Allied propaganda, which drummed into the populace the necessity and correctness of the wartime alliance, took its toll. During the war, publicists claimed that Soviet industrialization was just a Russian version of the New Deal; "Uncle Joe," though a little eccentric, was one of the family.[69] While in reality the Grand Alliance of Britain, America, and Russia was a tenuous marriage of convenience united only by opposition to Hitler, the West heralded it as a harbinger of the millennium.[70] Soviet goodwill, therefore, was to be cherished and energetically nourished in order to perpetuate a peacekeeping alliance after the war. The United States was more susceptible to this myth than Britain. Indeed, President Roosevelt helped create it. Allied wartime solidarity and Western public opinion was thus a product of German aggression, supplemented by an ideological truce between East and West. The Soviets, always, and the West, too often, considered anyone unwilling to return home a fascist.[71] At least in the first full flush of victory, the West had no sympathy for the Russian anti-Stalinist movement headed by the former Red Army general, Andrei Vlasov. Despite the Vlasovite movement's considerable success in resisting the racist doctrines of its Nazi patrons, there was no place in 1945 for the "proud Western principle of political asylum" in a momentarily black-and-white world that was "blissfully pro-Soviet" and "passionately anti-German."[72]

[68] Leahy to Hull, Nov. 2, 1944, *FR, 1944*, IV, 1262.

[69] Warren Walsh, "What the American People Think of Russia," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, VIII (Winter 1944), 513-22.

[70] William Hardy McNeill, *America, Britain, and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941-1946* (London, 1953), 747-48, 760.

[71] Fischer, "Non-Returners," 13. William Leahy, *I Was There* (New York, 1950), 425.

[72] Fischer, *Soviet Opposition*, 114. See also Gerald Reitlinger, *The House Built on Sand: The Conflicts of German Policy in Russia, 1939-1945* (New York, 1960), 395.

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The Mechanics of Repatriation

Unlike the protracted negotiations, the actual repatriation of Soviet citizens was substantially completed in a matter of months. Clandestine exchanges of Russians for West Europeans began immediately after the first contact between SHAEF and Red Army troops on April 25, 1945.[73] The allies signed an agreement at Halle, Germany, on May 22, 1945, which formally implemented the Yalta repatriation accord.[74] The Halle instrument stated that the number of Russians and West Europeans to be transferred daily should not exceed 50,000. In practice, the number occasionally exceeded even this figure. The average daily total of Russian repatriates for the period May 27-June 5 was 60,000 and for June 9-12, it was 101,650, with individual exchange points handling from 2,000 to 5,000 people per day.[75] The transport priority accorded Soviet citizens over all other eastbound displaced persons helped speed Russian repatriation. Also, the explicit stipulation in the Halle contract that "All former prisoners of war and citizens of the U.S.S.R. . . . will be delivered," tended to expedite the transfer.[76]

The reasons that the West signed the repatriation agreement also help explain the energy and speed with which the task was tackled. In addition, a pragmatic consideration motivated the British and American commands. SHAEF realized that all those not repatriated promptly would have to be cared for at the military's expense in the coming winter.[77]

The period of heaviest movement was from May to September 1945. In these five months Western authorities delivered 2,034,000 Soviet citizens, at least 89 per cent of all Russians repatriated from

[73] Donnison, *North-West Europe*, 350. Proudfoot, 207.

[74] Dept. of State to N. V. Novikov, July 12, 1945, *FR, 1945*, V, 1095.

[75] Donnison, *North-West Europe*, 350. Malcolm Proudfoot, "Anglo-American Displaced Persons Program for Germany and Austria," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, VI (Oct. 1946), 455-56. Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 208, 211. U.S. House, Committee on Military Affairs, *Investigations on the National War Effort*, H.R. 2740, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1947, p. 2.

[76] John Balfour to Grew, Aug. 4, 1945, *FR, 1945*, II, 1181. Woodbridge, *UNRRA*, II, 515. Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 208.

[77] Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 208.

[77] Murphy to Byrnes, July 24, 1945, *FR, 1945*, II, 1178.

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Western occupation zones.[78] After September, repatriation slowed to a trickle. From July 1, 1947, when the International Refugee Organization took over the work of UNRRA, to December 31, 1951, when the IRO ceased operation, only 1,836 persons were returned to the Soviet Union.[79]

The military, at first, tried to carry out repatriation without deviation, but, Eisenhower recalled, "we quickly saw that . . . rigid application would often violate the fundamental humanitarian principles we espoused. Thereafter we gave any individual who objected to return the benefit of doubt."[80] Actually, the Yalta agreement was eleven months old before the United States officially gave those unwilling to return the "benefit of doubt," and only after a struggle within the government.[81]

The Use of Force

It is difficult to determine the source of the policy of forced repatriation. The fact that, after Yalta, SHAEF had to revise its memorandum on displaced persons to include the use of force suggests that the policy was not its doing.[82] Yet there is diplomatic correspondence which shows that the use of force was actually American policy before Yalta, at least in the case of Russians captured in German uniform in Europe.[83]

[78] Tabulated from Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 211, 218, and United States Forces European Theater, Military Government, *Weekly Field Report*, XIV (Oct. 1945), 27.

[79] Louise Holborn, *The International Refugee Organization, A Specialized Agency of the United Nations: Its History and Work, 1946-1952* (London, 1956), 361. International Refugee Organization, *Statistical Report With 51 Months Summary* (Geneva, 1951), 20.

[80] Eisenhower, *Crusade*, 439.

[81] A surprising number of sources, including memoirs, the press, and some government publications, evade the fact or flatly deny that the United States once subjected ordinary Soviet citizens to forced repatriation: Mark Clark, *Calculated Risk* (New York, 1950), 476; Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington, 1964), 582; Carl Friedrich *et al.*, *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II* (New York, 1948), 181; Hilldring, 1165; *New York Times*, Feb. 17, 1949; Smith, 25; Jerry Sage, "The Future of DP's in Europe," *Department of State Bulletin*, XVII (July 13, 1947), 87; U.S. Dept. of State, *Occupation of Germany, Policy and Progress, 1945-46* (Washington, 1947), 26.

[82] Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 461.

[83] Grew to Novikov, Feb. 1, 1945, *FR, 1945*, V, 1070.

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The forced repatriation policy, as nearly as can be determined from available sources, emanated not from SHAEF but from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. An unpublished army study, "The Recovery and Repatriation of Liberated Prisoners of War, Occupation Forces in Europe 1945-1946," explained: "Although the Yalta Agreement did not contain any categorical statement that Soviet citizens should be repatriated regardless of their personal wishes, it was so interpreted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[84] The *Foreign Relations* volumes for 1944-46 do not prove or disprove that JCS promulgated the policy but they do show that JCS ordered the use of force throughout most of 1945.[85] Interestingly enough, Secretary of State George C. Marshall declared in the summer of 1947 that opposition to forced repatriation was "fixed policy" with the United States: "It is against American tradition for us to compel these persons, who are now under our authority, to return against their wills. . . ."[86] General Marshall, as Army Chief of Staff until November 1945, however, had been intimately involved with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the forced repatriation policy.

The first breach in the policy of indiscriminate forced repatriation occurred less than a month after the Yalta agreement. As early as March 9, 1945, the United States made a distinction between citizens of pre-World War II Soviet territory and persons from areas absorbed by the USSR during the war, such as former inhabitants of Eastern Poland, the Baltic states, East Prussia, and annexed portions of Finland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) even advocated pressing the Soviet Union for the return of persons in this category inadvertently repatriated by Western authorities.[87]

Dudley Kirk, State Department representative at SACMED (Supreme Allied Command, Mediterranean), was one of several lower echelon officials who was distressed with the use of force in

[84] Quoted by Epstein, "American Forced Repatriation," 358. See also Epstein, "American Crime," 20, and Steenberg, 221.

[85] Report by Combined Civil Affairs Commission for Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 8, 1945, *FR, The Conference at Berlin (Potsdam)* (Washington, 1960), I, 798. Kirk to Stettinius, Aug. 7, 1945, *FR, 1945*, V, 1103.

[86] George Marshall, "Policy on Repatriation of Displaced Persons," *Department of State Bulletin*, XVI (June 1, 1947), 1085; George Marshall, "Concern Expressed on Resettlement of Displaced Persons," *Department of State Bulletin*, XVII (July 27, 1949), 195. See also Epstein, "Forced Repatriation," 210.

[87] SWNCC to Byrnes, Mar. 9, 1945, *FR, 1945*, V, 1076-77.

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repatriation. On several occasions he probed Washington, hoping to precipitate a reappraisal of the policy. In August 1945, for example, Kirk queried Secretary of State James F. Byrnes: "What is policy concerning Soviet civilians who will not admit Soviet citizenship but yet cannot claim other nationality. . . ?" Fishing for a more humane approach he added, "Are they to be treated as 'stateless' and placed in category of displaced persons, or are they to be screened by Soviets and returned if demand is made?" Byrnes did not take the bait.[88]

In September 1945, General Eisenhower, reacting to a groundswell of opposition within the military, as well as to the dictates of his own conscience, requested the State Department to reexamine the whole question. That same month Byrnes wrote to the Combined Chiefs of Staff from the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in London requesting an opinion on the proposed repatriation of five hundred Vlasovites. The secretary of state communicated a heretofore unexpressed hesitation "about the use of force," which suggests he had undergone a profound change of heart since August.[89]

Dean Acheson was one of the group of officials in the State Department who opposed the use of force. On September 29, 1945, he cabled Byrnes in London summarizing the development and enumerating the sources of opposition within the government to forced repatriation. Acheson reiterated Eisenhower's request for a policy review and noted a similar communication from SACMED; he warned that there was growing reluctance among British and American troops to carry out this distasteful task; and he summarized the contents of a report on repatriation prepared for the consideration of SWNCC. The SWNCC paper argued that the Yalta agreement did not obligate signatory powers to effect repatriation by force, but rather to "facilitate" it. Acheson urged the adoption of this interpretation, although he admitted it "has no specific justification in the text of the agreement." SWNCC debated America's obligation under the repatriation agreement throughout the fall of 1945, finally ruling on December 21, 1945, that the Yalta agreement

[88] Kirk to Byrnes, Aug. 7, 1945, *ibid.*, 1103; Byrnes to Kirk, Aug. 9, 1945, *ibid.*, 1104.

[89] Eisenhower to State Dept., Sept. 4, 1945, *ibid.*, 1106; Byrnes to Grew, Sept. 28, 1945, *ibid.*

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bound the United States only to facilitate, not to force, the return of Soviet citizens to their homeland.[90]

The British had adhered to a forced repatriation policy throughout 1945, and America's new tack disturbed them; the British embassy in Washington informed the State Department that Britain hoped the United States would reconsider this change in policy.[91] The United States maintained its new position but even this did not end the use of force in all cases, for the December 21 decision did not apply to persons formerly in the Soviet armed forces, Soviet citizens who had collaborated with the Germans, or those who had fought in German ranks. To add to the confusion, it appears that on June 7, 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and SWNCC reverted to their former policy of force for all save former inhabitants of territory recently seized by the USSR.[92] United States Army records for 1947 should provide proof for what respected scholars now claim: that 1947 saw the United States refuse the use of force in repatriation under any circumstances and in all cases. Until army archives for 1947 are completely open this educated guess must suffice.

The overpowering impression gained from a study of repatriation negotiations is Western ineptitude. Few responsible parties within the United States government realized beforehand that the repatriation agreement would lead to the use of force. Outstanding exceptions were Dudley Kirk, Joseph Grew, and Dean Acheson, who represented a faction within the State Department that was more experienced and knowledgeable than many of the secretaries of state whom they served. These men offered discerning criticism and advice which went unheeded by their superiors for nearly a year. Not until the military began to chafe under a policy for which it was responsible in the first place, did the use of coercion come under serious review. By this time repatriation was practically complete; the subsequent policy revision was of little comfort to the more than two million Soviet citizens already repatriated.

[90] *Ibid.*, 1106-07; SWNCC to Byrnes, Dec. 21, 1945, *ibid.*, 1108. The editors provided a great deal more information about this latter document than most, suggesting perhaps that they recognized its unique significance.

[91] Roger Makins to Matthews, Oct. 6, 1945, *FR, 1945*, II, 1193. Memorandum of conversation by Elbridge Durbrow, Dec. 27, 1945, *FR, 1945*, V, 1110.

[92] JCS to General Joseph McNarney, *FR, 1946*, V, 170.

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Conclusion

Big Three negotiations over repatriation bear out, in general, the diplomatic trend from 1944 to 1947 characterized by the erosion of the Grand Alliance and the advent of the cold war. During World War II, the United States and Britain immersed themselves in largely indiscriminate praise for the Soviet Union. At the war's end the success of Western war propaganda and the nagging fear of a future German renaissance caused Western public opinion to regard the maintenance of Soviet friendship as the best safeguard to world peace. Western leaders felt that the best way to convince Russia of their trustworthiness was to strictly fulfill all covenants. Thus, initially, the West was propriety itself in its dealings with Moscow concerning German reparations, Austrian and German zonal boundaries, the policy of unconditional surrender, and repatriation. Nevertheless, Britain and America gradually became disillusioned with their Eastern partner. For one thing, they disapproved of Russia's exploitation and Sovietization of Eastern Europe. More important was the ideological gulf separating the allies. The defeat of Nazism, cement of the Grand Alliance, brought an end to the wartime coalition. The chasm between the two systems was bridged only temporarily on the question of repatriation by the West's acquiescence to the Soviet interpretation.

Even more striking than the correlation between repatriation negotiations and the changing tenor of East-West relations was the correlation between the Russian population displacement and the vast movements of populations which accompanied World War II. There were 5.5 million Soviet citizens outside the USSR by 1945, as well as 25 million other Europeans displaced by the war.

The cumulative effect of wartime demographic rearrangements in Europe was the ethnographic simplification of the continent. Hitler started the process by encouraging the immigration of ethnic Germans to Germany, and after the war the victorious allies continued the process by making movement mandatory. Hitler's Jewish extermination policy also simplified the ethnic picture of Europe —at a frightening cost in human lives. Shortly after the war came a number of bilateral agreements which eliminated several minority problems; these provided for population exchanges between Poland

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and Russia, Russia and Czechoslovakia, and Czechoslovakia and Rumania.[93] Europe not only "solved" many of its longstanding minority problems as a result of World War II, it avoided a new one thanks to Russian insistence and Western compliance with a policy requiring the forced repatriation of Soviet citizens.

[93] Kulischer, *Europe on the Move*, 274-311.

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Book Reviews

The Best and the Brightest *by David Halberstam. New York, Random House, 1972.—688 pp. $10.00.*

In one of the many good anecdotes in this otherwise overwritten book, General Matt Ridgway found himself called on to talk with President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey during the flap over the 1968 Tet offensive. While Johnson took a telephone call, the man who saved the bacon in Korea turned to Humphrey and said there was one thing about the Vietnam war that puzzled him. "What's that?" asked Humphrey. "I have never known what the mission for General Westmoreland was," Ridgway said. "That's a good question," said Humphrey. "Ask the president." But when Johnson returned he launched into a monologue about his woes and the question never got asked.

Like the mission of United States forces in Vietnam, the mission of this book appears also to have been obscured by distracting and overpowering personalities. It started out, says Halberstam, who filed memorable *New York Times* reports from Saigon in 1962 and 1963, as a treatise on how America came to grief in Vietnam. Then in early 1969 he wrote a long profile for *Harper's Magazine* on McGeorge Bundy. Dazzled by the style and station of Washington's decision-making elite at the moment he was asking *why* America went into Vietnam, Halberstam found himself writing, instead, "a book about America, in particular about power and success in America . . . who the leadership was, how they got there, what their perceptions were about themselves. . . ." Fascinated, the author piled on more interviews about the power and glory of these luminaries around the president—about Bundy, Rusk, McNamara, McNaughton, Rostow, about the "best and the brightest" stars signed up by Kennedy and kept

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on by Johnson—until he almost seemed to be saying that these golden boys railroaded us into southeast Asia.

Recounting how things went wrong in Vietnam was Halberstam's bag, and when the *Pentagon Papers* disclosures placed important documentation in his hands that would otherwise have been unavailable for years, a triumphal fulfillment of his mission ought to have been assured. But not so. The theme—it cannot be called a thesis—of the crisis managers cuts across the awesome rush of events toward a climax, and makes a chronicle of almost Grecian grandeur hard reading. Bragging up the best and the brightest while they keep making the dimmest and worst judgments obtrudes adventitious glamor, obscures the ironic perspective, and snarls the pace.

The focus for how we got into Vietnam was the president himself. *The Best and the Brightest* skips past Kennedy's sending 18,000 men to Vietnam, and even slights the traumatic immediacy of Johnson's ordering the big escalation two years later. Material in the *Pentagon Papers*, source of the author's hardest information, was prepared for McNamara, and it lacks authoritative data on how the president escalated the war. It presents *Hamlet* without the prince. Interviewing half of Washington, Halberstam might have helped close this gap. But his gaze was fixed on the men around the president, and by making their portraits so personal he obliged himself, by the ground rules of such interviewing, to offer his anecdotes—and everything else—without attribution. So the book is without footnotes. In the hour of cease-fire after an eight-year ordeal, it is an advance bestseller. Yet, for reasons stated, it makes heavy going of a story of almost hypnotic concern.

It is not yet possible to assess the American adventure in Vietnam. When the time comes, however, it will be seen that the embroilment in the jungles of Saigon was an end result of the cold war. In that polar confrontation, General Marshall in the 1940s and General Eisenhower in the 1950s refused to send troops first to China and then to Indochina lest Moscow-managed world Communism lurched forward into Western Europe. For nearly two decades America stood taut, adjuring victory in Korea and vengeance in Asia against this supposedly single foe. Then in 1963 Khrushchev finally negotiated his nuclear test-ban treaty with Kennedy, the Chinese openly denounced him as a traitor, and the cold-war vision of two world camps collapsed. Grasping at last the reality of Communism's split, and certain now that the Communists were divided, Lyndon Johnson did what Marshall and Eisenhower feared to do—he sent American troops into Asia. And so, as Halberstam told us, America plunged into the quagmire. We are not out of it yet.

CARL SOLBERG

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Law and the Indo-China War *by John Norton Moore, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1972.—xxxiii, 794 pp. $22.50 (clothbound), $9.50 (paperbound).*

Reaching far beyond Vietnam, *Law and the Indo-China War* is a major book about the law of nations purporting to govern the use of force by and from states—certainly one of the three or four genuinely fine works of scholarship on the subject published during the last decade. It also contains a calm and solid treatment of our own constitutional law on the respective powers of Congress and the president in authorizing the use of the national force.

Moore's treatment of the controversy over the legality of American policy in Vietnam is definitive, and unanswerable.

The official theory of the Indo-China War has been that two Vietnamese states emerged both before and emphatically after the Geneva Conference in 1954. The expectation of the international community, as the United States perceived it, was that South Vietnam and North Vietnam, like North and South Korea, China and Taiwan, and East and West Germany, might be united some day by political agreement, but not by force. This is the predicate for the SEATO Treaty as a public declaration of state interest, and a public warning that South Vietnam was protected by the political and legal principle on which the United States and its Allies had relied in each of the cold war crises since 1945, from Iran, Greece, and Berlin to Korea—that the frontiers between the two systems cannot be changed by force.

Three competing theories challenge this thesis: (1) that the war between North and South Vietnam has been a civil war, not an international war; (2) that even if two Vietnamese states did emerge in the early 1950s, North Vietnam was legally entitled to attack South Vietnam because no elections were held in 1956; and (3) assuming that two Vietnamese states do exist, there has been a civil war within South Vietnam, and North Vietnam is legally entitled to assist the rebels, while the United States and its Allies should not be allowed to assist the recognized government of South Vietnam.

Moore marshals the evidence to demolish each of these theses. As he shows, North and South Vietnam were separate "states" in the early 1950s, under every criterion of international law and practice. South Vietnam was therefore exactly in the position of South Korea in 1950—fully entitled to defend itself, and to have other states assist in its defense, under the charter. Nor were those rights affected by the election provisions in the Declaration issued by the cochairmen of the Geneva Conference in 1954, and generally supported by four of the nine participants in that

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conference. As Moore shows, that statement was an expression of hope, not an international promise. And even if it had been a promise, the breach of an international agreement cannot as such be regarded under the charter as an act of force justifying the use of force in self-defense. As for the third argument, international law has always regarded it as permissible to assist a widely recognized government in putting down an insurrection, but not the rebels against its authority. This is the principle upheld when Greek guerrillas were being assisted from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania in the late 1940s, and on many occasions since. If other states do make war upon a government by helping a rebellion against it, that government is entitled under the *Caroline* principle to carry the war to its sources.

Moore is led into dubious terrain by his discussion of this third argument—that of intervention in civil wars. Many of his protagonists in debate defend the disastrous non-intervention policy attempted for the Civil War in Spain during the 1930s as the model which international law has embraced or should embrace. Such a rule, they contend, would justify wars of national liberation. Under severe but unrealistic safeguards, and in situations where cold war risks are minimal, Moore would admit the legality of international war not only in self-defense, but in behalf of the principle of self-determination and humanitarian relief as well. For the present reviewer, these concessions are impossible to justify under the charter, in the nature of the world community as a community of states and the nature of world politics. They would make the task of peace even more difficult than it is today.

As for the constitutional aspects of the Vietnam controversy, Moore shows conclusively that the powers of Congress and the presidency were fully pooled in support of the Vietnam war—through SEATO and its interpretation and application by the president, and through successive congressional votes in support of the president's construction of the treaty.

Moore's book will be indispensable to any study of the international or constitutional law of war.

EUGENE V. ROSTOW
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Suffragists and Democrats: The Politics of Woman Suffrage in America *by David Morgan. East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 1972.—225 pp. $7.50.*

Professor David Morgan of the University of Liverpool has treated the

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study of the woman's suffrage movement from a fresh point of view combining history and political science and adding a new dimension to the scholarly work of Eleanor Flexner, Aileen Kraditor, Alan Grimes, and William O'Neil. His emphasis is on the politics of the movement, at a period, chiefly 1916-19, when it had entered the national arena and had become an important issue on the congressional, state, and federal levels. He also offers an insightful analysis of the internal politics, the factions and divisions, the strategies and tactics of the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) and the National Woman's party. In a fine and detailed study of the tortuous legislative road of the Nineteenth Amendment, Morgan focuses on the battle of sectional and economic interests within the Democratic party and the dilemma faced by President Wilson over an explosive issue which threatened to alienate his Southern friends and the big city machines on which he relied for support of his foreign policy. Morgan explores the party conflict over the issue and traces the way in which the Republican party assumed leadership on this issue by Democratic default. Continuing the analysis of Flexner, Morgan diagnoses the opposition to woman suffrage as due to a combination of fears which allied the South with Atlantic seaboard cotton textile interests: fear of enlarging the black vote and reopening the question of black disfranchisement to possible federal intervention, fear of passage of legislation outlawing child labor, and fear of prohibition. Continuing the work of Kraditor, Morgan perceptively deals with the strategy of NAWSA in attempting to win Southern congressional votes for woman suffrage by accommodating racist fears and ideology. He also concludes that the tactics of the National Woman's party complemented those of NAWSA, by acting as a catalyst in "galvanising not politicians and parties, but Suffragists." Morgan's detailed study of congressional votes on the amendment reinforces the suffragists' assertion that organized opposition to woman suffrage rested on the cooperation of liquor, cotton, and textile interests. A succinct comparison of the movements for the emancipation of women and for the emancipation of blacks in the last chapter adds greatly to this study. While the somewhat technical discussions of congressional votes and party politics may be of greater interest to political scientists than to the general reader, this extensively researched, well structured, and clearly written book is a welcome addition to the growing literature on woman suffrage.

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Letters of Louis D. Brandeis: People's Attorney, Vol. II, 1907-1912 *edited by Melvin I. Urofsky and David W. Levy. Albany State University of New York Press, 1972—xxv, 750 pp. $20.00.*

This second volume has both the merits and the shortcomings of the first: excellent annotations, too many repetitive letters. Brandeis spent the five years covered here primarily in New England. In *Muller* v. *Oregon*, using statistics, he persuaded the Supreme Court that regulation of women's working hours in industry did not violate the due process clause. He acted for Mr. Glavis in the Pinchot-Bollinger-Glavis controversy, beginning in 1910 with a long letter to Senator Knute Nelson. Brandeis also negotiated the settlement of a garment workers' strike in New York, became the unpaid chairman of their arbitration board, and took part in hearings on freight rates before the Interstate Commerce Commission. In the political arena, he became acquainted with Woodrow Wilson and campaigned for him.

The letters reflect much of this activity and many other aspects of Brandeis' life. For example, they show his persistent refusal to benefit financially from any of his *pro bono publico* activities. Indeed, in connection with his opposition to the Boston & Maine merger he paid his law firm as though he were the client! Many of the early letters deal with the savings bank, life insurance, and annuity law that he was instrumental in getting passed. He believed this law would take care of the problems of the aged. He expressed his concern continually to a large variety of correspondents over the affairs of the New Haven Railroad.

In 1910 Brandeis initiated a steady exchange of letters with Felix Frankfurter. At the same time his earlier correspondence continued; among these are letters from friends and colleagues such as Edward A. Filene, Norman Hapgood, Theodore Roosevelt, Mark Sullivan, and William Howard Taft. One letter to the then President Taft urged him to establish a commission to investigate labor relations; this idea was spurred on by the McNamara dynamiting case. His letter was circulated and signed by many notables, including Jane Addams, John Haynes Holmes, Florence Kelley, Lillian Wald, and Stephen S. Wise. As a result Congress established the commission in 1912, although its members were not appointed until Wilson had become president in 1913. In this period Brandeis also first expressed his interest in Zionism: "The Zionist movement rests primarily upon the noble idealism which underlies it, and the conviction that a great people, stirred by enthusiasm for such an ideal, must bear an important part in the betterment of the world" (p. 402). In the same year Brandeis also began a long personal relationship with Senator Robert Marion LaFollette and his wife, Belle.

The first letter referring to Woodrow Wilson came after his nomination

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at Baltimore. Writing to Norman Hapgood, Brandeis said: "All that I have heard of him and particularly his discussion of economic problems makes me believe that he possesses certain qualities indispensable to the solution of our own problems" (p. 633). In letters to many other people he urged all Progressives to support Wilson. After his first meeting with the presidential candidate, Brandeis described him as "strong, simple, serious, openminded, eager to learn and deliberate" (p. 661). In September 1912 he wrote to Governor Wilson at length about trust problems. There is a long letter to Judge Lindsey of Colorado deploring a decision which had declared that state's "nonsupport" law unconstitutional. He regretted that "in the great forward movement which is sweeping over the country the courts and the lawyers have in the main, instead of leading, formed a strong reactionary eddy" (p. 609).

Interspersed among the letters dealing with economic and political matters are many with homely touches such as "The children & I have just been nutting. I returned heavily laden with hickory nuts & some butternuts to the girls' joy" (p. 206). "Two fine days and much sailing which Susan and Elizabeth are doing on their own account now" (p. 287). Occasionally German or Yiddish words creep in: "wie ein anderer Mensch" (p. 298); "molocha" [work] (p. 660). One letter should be quoted in full (p. 662).

To Alfred Brandeis

August 31, 1912 South Yarmouth, Mass. [Brandeis Mss, M 3-3]

Dear Al: The children, Joe January & I paddle[d] into Stage Harbour Chatham yesterday, returning by road, the Canoe & some or all of us at times in Joe Baker's Expresswagon, & walking at times.

Time going just 6 hours; returning 3 hrs & 20 minutes.

The canoeing would have been done readily in 5 hours but for hard N.W. wind which called at times for the full exercise of skill & strength.

All our old landmarks proved interesting objects of study—but I didn't see either the phantom or the Disagreeable old woman of the luncheon. We had plenty of that article with us. I thought how the Thermos Bottle would have contributed to Father's enjoyment of the "La Fontainesche Gefrass".[1]

The more I think of T.R.'s performances the angrier I get. It will be an interesting test of the American people to see whether he gains on them this trip.

It is surprising that there are so few references to any cultural matters —an occasional quotation from Goethe pointed, however, to a political subject; an occasional acknowledgement of the gift of a book.

OSMOND K. FRAENKEL
New York City

[1] "La Fontaine's fodder," a reference to the fable of the ant and the grasshopper.

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A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New York *by Patricia U. Bonomi. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1971.—xv, 342 pp. $10.00.*

A Factious People is the first full-scale synthesis of eighteenth-century New York politics since Carl Becker's provocative effort in 1909. Professor Bonomi offers us interesting and useful insights which no student of colonial politics or New York history can ignore.

New Yorkers, Professor Bonomi declares, developed "this habitual factionalism, this politics for its own sake" and built up layers of experience which enabled them to survive in a novel situation—a stable "condition of factionalism." Although they periodically decried excessive politicking, they actually reveled in it as a way of life. Indeed, factionalism in New York involved more than just the aristocracy. Professor Bonomi chides historians for concentrating on the aristocrats to the exclusion of the many others who participated in the political process. And she points to local government, with its random and diverse patterns, as a major factor in sustaining factional politics on the provincial level. Thus New Yorkers not only enjoyed factionalism, but more of them participated in it than we have appreciated. Its roots went deeper than we have imagined.

The author views the years around 1730 as a watershed in the colony's political development, and she explores the earlier years in terms of a merchant-landowner dichotomy. Factional leadership, she suggests, fell into one category or the other. However, she applies her categorization too rigidly and consequently fails to appreciate the eighteenth century's own value system. Commerce was an acceptable way of life provided it led to the acquisition of a landed estate, with or without a manorial label. Every "great landed family" had its commercial beginnings; every commercial family had its landed ambitions. Each family differed only in the timing of its transition, if it could accomplish it, to landed gentry status.

Professor Bonomi has summarized New York politics from 1692 to 1710 as "a rapid series of policy and party reversals," thereby oversimplifying a critical era marked by a vicious, vengeful factionalism which aimed at physically destroying the opposition. Both Leislerians and anti-Leislerians before 1709 took this primitive approach to power, and leaders of both had their estates confiscated, stood trial for treason, and courted death. After 1709 this changed because New Yorkers adopted a more sophisticated approach to the uses of power, a change in which Governors Cornbury and Hunter played key roles. Indeed, the Hunter debt bill of 1714 institutionalized this change in factional politics. Those who opposed the bill did so not because of their commercial orientation, as Professor Bonomi suggests, but because Hunter's assembly coalition rejected their claims. (An analysis of who received how much and for what reveals

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a good deal about the coalition of 1714.) The final coalescence of factions occurred with the 1717 debt bill which permitted those previously excluded from the public trough to feed there. Since both bills had essentially the same tax support (a liquor excise), and since the 1717 bill evoked little criticism in New York, Professor Bonomi's explanation of commercial opposition to the 1714 measure is unacceptable. The real answer lies in who did or did not participate.

Modern scholars, as the author notes, are "all aware, as their own studies testify, that New York Colony's politics cannot be reduced to simple formulas." Yet, by using a merchant-landowner dichotomy to explain factionalism before 1730, Professor Bonomi has done just that and has been led into several misinterpretations. She credits William Burnet with the coalescence of factions (p. 79), when he actually destroyed the unity created by Hunter and brought about a resurgence of factionalism. She misidentifies the Livingston who ran for the assembly from Albany in 1724 on Hunter's ticket as a "Clermont Livingston" and thus a landowner, when he was the nephew of the landowning Livingston and an established merchant (p. 92). She suggests that Burnet's prohibitory fur-trade law was replaced in 1726 by a double taxation of the Canadian trade because of protests by London merchants (p. 94), instead of recognizing that the original law was unenforceable—the Albany County sheriff could not patrol the entire frontier singlehandedly. And she assigns to William Burnet "an obvious bias in favor of the landed interest" (p. 94), even though he tried to ram through an antilandowner tax that almost wrecked his own political machine.

Fortunately, Professor Bonomi is on sounder ground in her analysis of post-1730 politics. Her explanation of the impact of the increasing appeal for popular support by New York's politicians amplifies the ideas of Professor Jackson Turner Main. Wider popular participation in politics, beginning in the 1730s, helped diminish aristocratic dominance, although it would not be institutionalized until the Revolution broke the traditional patterns of representation and apportionment. Professor Bonomi also offers a more sophisticated and meaningful view of the Rent Riots of 1766, suggesting that New Englanders intruding into lands claimed by New York's aristocracy caused the upheaval rather than traditional tenants suddenly upset by rack-renting. Indeed, Connecticut's role in the Rent Riots parallels its part in the Wyoming Valley dispute with Pennsylvania at about the same time.

With Professor Bonomi's judgment that New Yorkers were a factious people, none can disagree. With her evaluations of some of their factiousness, scholars may disagree. However, that is the sign of an important

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book. Students of politics will continue to wrestle with *A Factious People* for a number of years.

LAWRENCE H. LEDER
Lehigh University

Securing the Revolution: Ideology in American Politics, 1789-1815 *by Richard Buel Jr. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1972.—xii, 391 pp. $14.50.*

Richard Buel argues that in the 1790s, Federalists and Republicans—former comrades-in-arms—fell out not over mere economic issues, but rather over the validity of republicanism itself. The pivotal issue, one brought to the fore by the debates over foreign events, was the role of public opinion. Federalists, far more "elitist" than their Jeffersonian counterparts, thought republicanism inherently defective: they feared and had contempt for public opinion; they thought government should be invulnerable to the masses; they adopted a "manipulative" style in their dealings with the common folk; and they finally sought to "control" them completely via the Sedition Act. The Federalists' antipopular ideology stemmed from social realities: their status was insecure. Jeffersonians, Buel suggests, thought republicanism sound, sought stability by adjusting government policy to popular wishes, adopted a public style of "exposure"; their ideology flowed from confidence about their firm social position (many being Southern slaveholders). Once party differences were taken to the public, Republicans, because of their "dynamism," won out over the Federalists, hampered by their lack of a "popular ideology."

Much in Buel's approach that seems promising—his attention to the social basis of ideology and changing attitudes toward public opinion—is ultimately vitiated by an ahistorical approach; but even within his own frame of reference Buel undermines his thesis by muddled argumentation. For one thing, he never thinks through his central concepts. He talks of "securing the Revolution," but never tells us what he, or contemporaries, thought the "Revolution" was. He writes glibly of the "national interest," as if the nation were homogeneous; of "stability" and the search for it, without asking—stability for *whom?*; of "republicanism," without exploring its meaning, a crucial and finally confounding omission. Conceptual fuzziness and logical imprecision are at their worst in Buel's treatment of "public opinion." Time and again he refers to "the people" or "the people in general" as holding this or that view; in more cautious

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moments he modifies this to "most Americans." The public's "mind," moreover, is divined from—variously—what this or that Congressman thought, or a handful of petitions argued, or what newspaper commentators wrote. Not surprisingly this great beast thinks contrary things, on the same subject, at the same time, depending on whom Buel is consulting: Hamilton's program is "popular," it is "unpopular"; now the public is "inflamed" at the Jay Treaty, now it is quite "apathetic"—and so on, until the reader is bewildered and infuriated.

Another problem is the imposition of artificial dualisms. Take the Federalists manipulate, Republicans expose formula. From the minute Buel advances it, exceptions abound: *Republicans* manipulate, *Federalists* expose. The arrangement groans and creaks; Buel patches furiously; but finally the whole thing collapses, Buel conceding massive "imitation" and "copying," but rejecting the obvious: choice of "style" was a matter of tactics, not ideology. So it goes, too, with the notion that Federalists flout and Republicans follow "the people." His own evidence shows clearly (and he half-admits) that each obeys and lauds "public opinion" as "public opinion" supports its own position, and vice versa.

These procrustian impositions suggest the book's basic problem: the absence of historical context. For example, Buel never investigates the contemporary meaning of "republicanism," and because he never comes to grips with the many-mansioned character of the Republican house, he is forced to imply that Federalists betrayed the Revolution. Namecalling replaces analysis: Federalists are found "guilty" of "monstrous elitism," "contempt for public opinion," "hysteria" and "hypocrisy." But many classical Republicans (e.g., Harrington) believed in a balance between wise elites and virtuous citizens; the ideology—as Buel himself has told us elsewhere—was hardly synonymous with democracy: Republicans determined public policy not by counting noses but by having elected representatives wisely consider the "public good." Federalists adhered to this traditional paradigm which, though eroding, retained great force; they considered "democracy"—the *excessive* involvement of the people—a falling away. In context, their response to the French Revolution—which Buel proclaims, "from the perspective of the twentieth century," to be "irrational"—makes perfect sense: "France" symbolized the threat to *republican* liberty from *democratic* despotism.

The same problem bedevils Buel's interpretation of the Jeffersonians. Though for him they are clearly the good guys, they do such "puzzling" things as attack the Bank of the United States (because of "ridiculous" fears), bewail the public debt with excessive fervor, launch "diatribes" against "insignificant" accretions in execuitve power. Buel pronounces their anxieties groundless and hurries on, but his job is to explain, not

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explain away. Buel's failure to set the Jeffersonians in their ideological context is highlighted (and rectified) by reading Lance Banning's "The Quarrel with Federalism" (unpublished Ph.D. diss., Washington University, 1971). Banning analyzes Republican rhetoric with the same skill and compassion that Bernard Bailyn and Isaac Kramnick applied to earlier periods, and finds the Jeffersonians operating within the old Country Party tradition, a species of republicanism that located the chief threat to liberty in the machinations of "paper aristocrats" and "corrupt executives." Banning then shows that happenings abroad assumed grandiose proportions because of the prior domestic anxiety about liberticide: "England" symbolized a hateful mode of life Jeffersonians saw being foisted on the United States. The ultimate reason that *Securing the Revolution* is unsatisfactory—despite useful specific insights—is that it lacks this willingness to understand the Federalists and Republicans in their own terms.

MICHAEL WALLACE
John Jay College of Criminal Justice

Experiment in Republicanism: New Hampshire Politics and the American Revolution, 1741-1794 *by Jere R. Daniell. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970.—xiv, 261 pp. $10.00.*

Merchants, Farmers, and River Gods: An Essay on Eighteenth-Century American Politics *by Robert Zemsky. Boston, Gambit, Inc., 1971.—xvi, 361 pp. $10.00.*

These well written and extremely useful volumes represent two divergent approaches to the study of eighteenth-century American provincial politics. The Daniell volume is the more conventional. The author employs some quantitative techniques in analyzing the composition of political institutions and makes a cursory effort to relate political developments to the broader perceptual framework in which they occurred. But his methods are mostly those of the traditional political historian. Like many earlier students of other colonies, he focuses upon the interaction between local politics and the American Revolution, and his main concern is to provide a comprehensive and economical narrative of the central developments in New Hampshire public life from 1741 to 1794. What distinguishes it from its predecessors, most of which have concentrated upon either the period preceding the Declaration of Independence or the war and Confederation years, is this broad sweep, which has enabled the author to show more clearly than any other writer for any other state the

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precise impact of the Revolution upon New Hampshire's political life.

By contrast, the Zemsky volume is highly analytical and borrows heavily from the conceptual and methodological arsenal of modern political science. Sharply critical of the tendency among older historians to view the eighteenth-century American experience as little more than a prelude to the Revolution, Zemsky presents us with an in-depth study of Massachusetts politics from 1730 to 1755, a period of exceptional political calm when there were no great events and few intense political controversies. Eschewing any effort to achieve a comprehensive narrative of political events, he has concerned himself largely with delineating the salient features of the political system through a series of case studies of individuals and topical chapters based upon a heavy—and highly intelligent—reliance upon quantitative analysis (unfortunately tucked away in a "Statistical Appendix") and a somewhat less skillful use of the latest techniques of the historians of social perceptions. The result is one of the most informative and important books ever written on colonial American politics.

Together, these volumes provide a vivid demonstration of the wide variations in the nature and functioning of politics from one early American environment to another. Already by 1730, Massachusetts was a large and "an especially varied conglomerate" of interests, orientations, and social settings, whereas New Hampshire as late as 1770 was a much smaller and simpler society with only one major interest: lumbering and the mast trade. The social complexity of Massachusetts inevitably spawned a much more intricate and differentiated political system in which a small group of leaders, mostly from the maritime east, exercised the dominant voice and enjoyed the fruits of political power so long as they served the interests of the rural, agricultural majority. Deriving their position not from seniority or connections but primarily from high social status, the very quality that earned them deference in the society at large, the leaders, Zemsky argues in his most original chapter, were really professionals in the sense that "the roles they played within the political arena" gave them an expertise that was denied their less well situated colleagues and a pragmatic concern for compromise, for finding ways to harmonize the manifold interests within Massachusetts political society. Along with the prevailing ideological aversion to parties, this multiplicity of interests made Massachusetts politics highly atomistic. Alliances were "invariably small, close-knit, and ephemeral," and debate, rather than manipulation or party allegiance, continued to be of great importance. In this kind of political milieu, a skillful governor like William Shirley could use the limited resources at his command to secure support from the leaders for his legislative programs. But the indepen-

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dence of the large backbench majority and the desire of the professionals to remain in office both limited the choice of programs among governors and leaders alike and insured that the political system was remarkably responsive to the public at large.

New Hampshire politics during the late colonial period presents a markedly different aspect. Also dominated by a small group of leaders representing the maritime East and also largely free of factionalism, New Hampshire politics may perhaps be characterized most appropriately as a benevolent oligarchy. Its leaders derived their position not from their high social status but from their alliance with Governor Benning Wentworth, who used excellent connections in London, dominance of the mast trade, and a generous disposition of land, offices, and mast contracts to secure a virtual monopoly of political power. Nor was there any significant countervailing force within the political arena after 1752, and this narrow elite of merchants, officeholders, and relatives was responsible to the public not because a large group of independent backbenchers was determined that it should be so but because, in this undifferentiated economy, there was a marked correspondence of interest between the elite and many segments of the public. Thus, despite its oligarchic character, this system of "family government," Daniell argues persuasively, operated to the satisfaction of almost everyone from London authorities down to the lowliest inhabitants of the towns because it provided "stable and effective government" that permitted men of all levels to get on with their own private concerns. Although the imperial crisis of 1774-76 destroyed this system and shifted political power from those who had been attached to the Wentworths to the prosperous farmers and professionals of the outlying towns, the rapid demographic and economic growth of the colony after 1760 had already strained the system to the breaking point by stimulating the development of a churn of competing interests that could not be accommodated within the old system. With the destruction of that system, these interests came surging into the political arena and, along with many exogenous forces, produced severe factional rivalries and kept New Hampshire in a state of convulsion for almost fifteen years. When stability was finally restored in the early 1790s, moreover, it was a stability that was more similar to that of Shirley's Massachusetts than to that of Wentworth's New Hampshire, the stability of a responsive, differentiated, and pragmatic political system.

What these two volumes seem to suggest is that there was a marked correlation between size, state of political development, and socioeconomic circumstances and the character of the political system, and that variations in character may to a considerable extent have been a function of the profound differences in those variables from one political environ-

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ment to another. To evaluate this hypothesis properly would require explicit comparative study. In the meantime, the authors of these two volumes and other recent studies such as Patricia U. Bonomi's excellent *A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New York* (New York, 1971) make it more obvious than ever that no single general description can adequately characterize the political life of every colony in eighteenth-century British America.

JACK P. GREENE
The Johns Hopkins University

New England Dissent, 1630-1833: The Baptists and the Separation of Church and State *by William G. McLoughlin. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971.—2 vols., xxiv, 1324 pp. $35.00.*

Many book reviews invoke a "can't see the forest for the trees" image. Professor McLoughlin of Brown University has written a thorough study of the separation of church and state in New England which carefully examines many trees and yet keeps the reader aware of where he is in a thick forest. The story of the ambiguities and transmutations of the Puritan establishments of religion in Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts to their final collapse in the early nineteenth century is told here in leisurely detail. Both because the establishments were basically of "church and town" and because of the steadily increasing number of dissenting groups, the history is complex and varied. McLoughlin has researched it afresh, digging into church, parish, and town meeting records in a hundred towns, probing county courthouse and state supreme court files, and perusing mountains of pamphlets, periodicals, and papers. He chose as his track through the wilderness the role of the Baptists in the achievement of religious liberty (with considerable emphasis on their forceful leader of the later eighteenth century, Isaac Backus). Fair to the Baptists, he has not idealized them, but shown them in their periods of passivity and self-centeredness as well as in their times of leadership and unselfish devotion to a coveted goal. He departs from the main track to deal with established groups and with other dissenters (especially Separate Congregationalists, Separate Baptists, and Universalists) when the discussion is needed to make the full context clear, but such departures are well controlled.

Having done his research carefully, the author shares it at considerable length with his readers in this basically narrative history, which is studded

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with many quotations, summaries of little-known writings, and biographical sketches. The prose is lucid, even, and largely undramatic; the main device used to whet interest is "forecasting" coming highlights. The overall organization of the text into 13 parts and 64 chapters is so clear and well labeled that the reader can always know where he is in an involved account. This feature, supplemented by a bibliographical essay and a good index, will make these volumes an indispensable reference work for the histories of New England and of religious freedom. One way to summarize the content of the work is to suggest that it unfolds in six main movements. In the first, Baptists, Quakers, and Anglicans pressed for toleration. In the second, following the Great Awakening, the Separate Congregationalists carried on the battle for freedom, but were largely suppressed. The Separate Baptists then continued the struggle down to the Revolutionary period. The fourth movement was the resurgence of the Calvinistic Baptists and the merger of their vitalities with the Separate Baptists in the Warren Association which made solid contributions toward separation in the latter part of the eighteenth century. Next came the emergence of the "new dissenters" (Shakers, Universalists, Methodists, Freewill Baptists, Christ-ians) in the early decades of the new republic. Finally, the recognition of the Trinitarian Congregationalists that they had become a minority too (especially in Massachusetts, where the Unitarians were reaping the benefits of the remnants of the establishment) contributed significantly to the final separation of church and state.

McLoughlin has not twisted his narrative to make it "relevant," yet as an account of complex human groups contending over the perennial issues of church and state, of freedom and order, of individual versus corporate rights, of intellect versus emotion, he has written a documented case study of the way such issues played a shaping role in the human drama in a given time and place. Inevitably, there is some repetition in the book, most of it unavoidable in a full-scale account of so many struggles often closely parallel to one another. There is perceptive handling of both the history of religious thought and of ecclesiastical institutions —a difficult combination. The concept of pietism is used much too generally; various usages seem to suggest such diverse things as rural orientation, sincerity, enthusiasm, primitivism, anti-intellectualism, and individualism. The author himself rightly notes in his introduction that his effort has been "toward monographic definity rather than interpretative generalization," yet some intriguing generalizations are given. The treatment of the Great Awakening as providing Americans with a new source of authority and new confidence is stimulating, and the concluding observations on the meaning of the transformation from Puritan to Evan-

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gelical establishments for nineteenth-century character and culture in America summarize the importance of the complex tale that has been so fully told.

ROBERT T. HANDY
Union Theological Seminary

The American Quest, 1790-1860: An Emerging Nation in Search of Identity, Unity, and Modernity *by Clinton Rossiter. New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971.—xvi, 396 pp. $9.50.*

A greatly respected scholar has left us something between a tract and a testament in this posthumous work.

Its tractarian character is due to the fact that Clinton Rossiter places himself (p. 13) in the consensus school of students of American history. It is probably fair to say that consensus is more easily detected in the apparent divergencies between Federalist and Republican in the early national period than it is in the debates which preceded the war with Mexico, or in the fact that all ends with collision.

Indeed, consensus demands from its votaries either a paradoxical approach, as in Louis Hartz' enchanting *The Liberal Tradition* (1955), or a certain bias towards the providential. "To ponder the ironic juxtaposition of liberty and slavery in the young republic," Rossiter writes, "of the 'hope of all mankind' and mankind's most pernicious institution, is to wonder if Fate or Providence—some readers may wish to introduce God —had decreed that things not be made too easy for the citizens of the United States in their efforts to become and remain a modern nation" (p. 295). To make such a statement requires courage, in a political scientist or anyone else; it may well equal, in ingenuity though not in subtlety, any of the theological arguments adduced in Newman's famed Tract 90. What we have to remember is that Rossiter, like Newman, is passionately in earnest.

Chapters 2 and 3, which give Rossiter's taxonomy for "Nationhood" and "Modernity," are very rewarding to students of nationalism. Rossiter had a copious, able, sinewy, inquiring mind. Some of his marks of a modern nation are very apt. For example, *efficiency* (p. 50), *communication* (p. 64), and *solvency* (p. 58) have a peculiarly disturbing effect on one's mind when one thinks of the Pentagon, the *Pentagon Papers*, and the price of national defense. As Rossiter suggests, however, America may now be suffering from "overmodernity."

This is not, to be sure, a theme upon which he dwells. He is more in-

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clined to see the antebellum past as having shaped "much of the quality of American life down to this day" (p. 187); and since this past is said to take "second place to no country in modern history, not even to the United States of later years" (p. 312), it would seem to follow that contemporary America is in no grave danger.

The danger lies elsewhere, in chapters 5 to 11, in the endeavor to adjust early national and middle America to the classifications of (especially) chapters 2 and 3. This does require some special pleading on the author's part. Yet it is here that *The American Quest*, as a reflection upon our contemporary dilemmas, is so well worth study. It is, after all, the reaction of a distinguished and determined consensus thinker to an America where the terms "consensus oriented" and "conflict oriented" have really ceased to have relevance. This is his testament: profoundly moving, truly courageous. This is Clinton Rossiter's *non omnis moriar.*

GEORGE DANGERFIELD
University of California, Santa Barbara

Between Harvard and America: The Educational Leadership of Charles W. Eliot *by Hugh Hawkins. New York, Oxford University Press, 1972.—xi, 404 pp. $12.50.*

Among Charles W. Eliot's many blessings has been the quality of the work commending him to posterity. First there is the magisterial two-volume biography by Henry James (not *the* HJ but son of *the* WJ), which was, at least until Edmund S. Morgan's *The Gentle Puritan: A Life of Ezra Stiles*, the best biography written of an academic president. Then there are Samuel Eliot Morison's *Three Centuries of Harvard* and his edition of *The Development of Harvard University, 1869-1929*, which deal authoritatively and appreciatively with Eliot's part in transforming the provincial college he inherited in 1869 into the world-renowned university he passed on to his successor forty years later. Now we have Hugh Hawkins's *Between Harvard and America: The Educational Leadership of Charles W. Eliot.*

Hawkins, professor of history at Amherst and author of an admirable history of the founding and early years of the Johns Hopkins University, has focused his attention on aspects of Eliot and Harvard only lightly touched on by James and Morison, their relations with "the real world." Before describing that relationship, however, he provides a biographical chapter and another on Eliot's role in the internal restructuring of Harvard during the 1870s and 1880s. Both are briskly written and based on

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extensive archival research but neither makes many claims to original interpretation. Where Hawkins does break with James, as in making a case for the young Eliot as " a chemist among chemists" during his faculty days at Harvard and MIT, he is not always convincing. Also, if as argued (pp. 39, 42), Eliot's articles on "The New Education," published in the spring of 1869, caught Emerson's attention in 1867, the Transcendentalist's "transparent eyeball" must have been working overtime! More importantly, the assertion that Eliot did not turn to Europe for faculty members until the 1890s overlooks the fact that he tried all through the 1880s, albeit unsuccessfully, to snag a European "star."

It is in the later chapters where Hawkins comes into his own. In these Eliot is depicted as mediating between the intellectual, if not explicitly elitist, ethos of the emergent university and the utilitarian, if not equalitarian, thrust of late nineteenth-century America. The rendering of Eliot's politics, which reflected the Mugwump persuasion at its most expansive, is not likely to be improved upon. Nor is the way Eliot's defense of the elective system at Harvard described as part of his larger effort to provide the nation with a model polity wherein "individuals exercise freely their spontaneous diversity of choice." After Hawkins's analysis of Eliot's views on suffrage limitations, racial segregation, and economic inequality —all of which he publicly defended—we can no longer think of him as somehow immune to the Social Darwinian ideas that permeated the era of his presidency and the era when the American university assumed its modern form.

After *Between Harvard and America* we are far less likely to tolerate academic history presented in a vacuum, but insist that institutions of higher learning and the men who presided over them be meaningfully integrated with the other institutions and public figures of their day. If Hawkins's lead is followed, and it deserves to be, the days of presidential hagiography and *apologiae pro alma mater* are numbered.

ROBERT A. MCCAUGHEY
Barnard College

The Shadow of Slavery: Peonage in the South, 1901-1969 *by Pete Daniel. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1972.—xii, 209 pp. $7.95.*

The Shadow of Slavery is a scholarly, carefully documented account of the struggle to eliminate peonage in the South in the years from 1900 to 1969. Peonage, "the shadow of slavery," was hard to define, difficult to

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prove (it had many variations), and was firmly embedded in a social structure with deep roots in the past. In Mr. Daniel's vivid and perceptive phrase, peonage has been "like the dark side of the moon; it exists, but only exceptional circumstances enabled one to see it."

Of great interest is the account of the antipeonage struggle in Alabama. Thomas Goode Jones, Civil War hero, twice Democratic governor of the state, a railroad lawyer with an antilabor record, had been appointed to the U. S. District Court by President Theodore Roosevelt. For some reason, Jones was interested in peonage and made himself a recognized authority on the subject. Largely because of his efforts, a federal grand jury returned a series of indictments in the summer of 1901. In a predictable reaction, Thomas Heflin, the demagogue, promptly went around the state "like a roaring lion," conjuring up Civil War memories. But Judge Jones was persistent and eventually some convictions were secured. An enlightened man, Jones was convinced that once the existence of peonage had been exposed and its illegality clearly established, it would gradually disappear, provided, that is, that the defendants were not made to appear to be martyrs. So his sentences were most lenient and, in several cases, he sought pardons for those convicted. Judge Jones, of course, was proven wrong; the prosecutions he initiated discouraged but did not stop the practice of peonage. Impoverished, largely illiterate, immobile, and necessitous, the "peons," white and black, lacked the political and economic power as well as the organization to protect the rights—and status —which had been established in the courts and widely publicized.

Later, in 1908, Alonzo Bailey was arrested in Alabama for breach of a labor contract. William V. Thomas, city court judge in Montgomery, became interested in his case as did Judge Jones. With aid from them, Bailey's attorneys petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus which was denied and then took an appeal to the Supreme Court. A majority held that the case should first have been submitted to a jury. So back it went, a jury found the defendant guilty, and a new appeal was taken. In 1911, Justice Charles Evans Hughes ruled that the contract labor law violated the peonage statute which had been passed under the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment. It is depressing to note that in this and the earlier appeal Justice Holmes took tthe position that the contract labor law was valid.

In the forefront of this courageous and spirited fight against peonage were a few white Southerners: Judge Jones; Judge Thomas; two Montgomery lawyers, Fred S. Ball and Edward S. Watts; Fred Cubberly, a Florida attorney who discovered the 1867 statute against peonage; Judge William B. Shepphard of Florida; Erastus J. Parsons, the district attorney of Montgomery; John Eagan, a U. S. attorney in Florida; and Judge Em-

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ory Speer, a federal district judge in Georgia. A few Southern blacks—Dr. Sidney S. Redmond was one, Booker T. Washington was another—cooperated, but circumstances forced them to play subordinate roles. For example, Washington raised money for the Bailey appeal but felt compelled to stay in the background for fear of adverse public reaction. In the North the antipeonage Southerners found staunch allies in Oswald Garrison Villard, Charles Wells Rusell (assistant attorney general), William J. Schiefflin, Ray Stannard Baker, Lawrence Abbott, and the remarkable Mary Grace Quakenbos, an attorney for "The People's Law Firm" in New York, who would seem to be a fine subject for future study and research.

The long struggle against peonage, which began with Cubberley's discovery at the turn of the century of the 1867 statute, forms an important chapter in the postbellum history of what Booker T. Washington called "a kind of slavery that is in one sense as bad as the slavery of antebellum days." Half forgotten, buried in obscure sources, full of complexities, it has for years needed the thorough exploration it receives in this excellent study. Thanks to Mr. Daniel it can now be said that as a subject of major social and historical interest, peonage is no longer on the dark side of the moon.

CAREY MCWILLIAMS
New York City

Blacks in the City: A History of the National Urban League *by Guichard Parris and Lester Brooks. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1971.—xvii, 534 pp., $12.50.*

In mid-1941, J. H. Kindelberger, president of North American Aviation, announced: "Regardless of their training as aircraft workers, we will not employ Negroes in the North American plant." The National Urban League began a concentrated protest action, and in a matter of months, Kindelberger, without a trace of sheepishness, was proclaiming that, "Our Negro workmen have turned out swell." A small crumb, perhaps, but the reversal of such discriminatory policies has been the special concern of the NUL for more than sixty years. This social work, civil rights agency has remained little-known throughout the period. Unlike the NAACP, the NUL has never been a mass membership organization and its successes have rarely captured the headlines. But, as Gunnar Myrdal recognized a generation ago, the League has filled "an unquestionable and eminently useful community need" in its attempt "to soothe so much suffering among the Negro people."

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Founded in 1911 as a result of the merger of the Committee for Improving the Industrial Conditions of Negroes in New York, the National League for the Protection of Colored Women, and the Committee on Urban Conditions Among Negroes, the NUL was specifically designed to help blacks make the transition from farm to city life. In 1910, only about one-fourth of the American black population was urban; by 1970, the proportion was about four-fifths. Had the migrants been white, the problems would have been difficult enough; because they were black the obstacles were often overwhelming. Parris and Brooks, who deny that the League existed to serve the middle class, mention most of the important civil rights struggles of the period as well as many with which most readers will be unfamiliar. And they leave no doubt that the League was as short of funds and high-level support as the people it sought to serve.

This 534-page volume, the first full history of the NUL to be published, has much to recommend it. The authors have used extensively the NUL papers in the Library of Congress for the years 1910-1960 and have scoured manuscript collections in more than a dozen other locations. Their treatment of such pivotal leaders as Eugene Kinkle Jones, L. Hollingsworth Wood, Lester B. Granger, George E. Haynes, T. Arnold Hill, and Whitney Young is especially thorough and thoughtful. Moreover, the book has been handsomely produced and is well-indexed, well-documented, and well-illustrated.

On balance, however, I found *Blacks in the City* disappointing, if only because the potential is so great. Parris and Brooks offer no real interpretive or conceptual framework; although they cite most of the important secondary works they fail to put their research in context with other work that has been done. The prose proceeds from year to year and conference to conference without capturing the human feeling of the time or providing a careful analysis of events. In their effort to include every name and to offend as few persons as possible, the authors make only soft judgments and bland generalizations. While not an "official" history of the League, *Blacks in the City* reflects an excessive reliance upon internal sources and especially upon the correspondence, working papers, and annual reports of the national office. It sometimes seems as if the authors wanted to put to use every index card and note that they took.

Scholars will find this book valuable as a reference, but it is not an interpretive, critical analysis of the first half-century of the National Urban League.

KENNETH T. JACKSON
Columbia University

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Railroads and the Granger Laws *by George H. Miller. Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1971.—xi, 296 pp. $12.50.*

Long before there was an organization known as the Patrons of Husbandry or before there was a Granger with a capital G, the arrival of the railroad and the arrangements under which it operated in this country raised the issue of railroad reform. The states chartering railroad corporations expected them to promote the economic welfare of the granter and the various interests which constituted it. Once when the state built highways and canals, it had set the rate schedules and other conditions under which competitive private carriers could use them. The provisions of the common law relating to fairness and equality were relied upon to govern performance. On the other hand, if the state relied upon a group of private persons to provide internal improvements through a railroad, "railroad economics" made these concepts difficult if not impossible of attainment. Competitive carriers over a monopolistic right-of-way, like the railroad, simply bred an intolerable confusion. The managers of railroads also soon realized their business represented a large amount of fixed capital upon which they could earn greater returns by charging "all the traffic could bear" without taking itself off to other means of travel and transport. Rebates were given to big shippers—long hauls were more profitable than short ones, steady traffic was preferable to seasonal traffic. The result was a series of discriminations which affronted primitive concepts of equality and reasonableness. The community struck back with demands for pro-rata rates, that is, the cheapest rates must apply to similar traffic on every mile of carriage and with outright prohibition of personal rebates. These are the lessons the Eastern states had learned by mid-century.

Without much essential change, these purposes and these measures moved west after the Civil War to the four "granger states"—Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin—the hard core of Miller's analysis. Over time, however, the features of the background had changed a bit. Illinois, for instance, had an experimental interval with state works, and many states had promised private capital favors if it would do the job. Legislatures, for instance, bestowed charters upon railroad corporations giving them the right to set their own rates. As railroads filled in the state network, areas served by railroads grew irritated at discrimination and other inequities. "Have-not"areas—to use Miller's designation—still wanted the stimulus provided by a railroad and opposed restraining legislation. They wanted to encourage not crush capital. The Civil War interrupted the north-south trade on the Mississippi and rearranged the heavy commodity business on an east-west axis of the Great Lakes and the

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trunkline railroads. Consequently new rivalry, between urban terminals —for example St. Louis, Chicago, and Minneapolis—and at intermediate shipping points sharpened antirailroad feeling. With the possible exception of Wisconsin, investors from the East held managerial power. Hence absentee ownership became an issue. By the mid-seventies, also, the Grange had become a political force. In some areas it was influential, in others not. Its ideology was as much antibusiness as antirailroad. In truth it was the mercantile community, not farmers, which furnished the leadership and evangelism for railroad reform.

The drive of the seventies led to the passage of regulatory measures which, in Miller's estimation, were generally compromises. They were neither radical nor agrarian: they conformed to moderate business opinion. This generalization did not apply to the Granger Cases which some midwestern rail giants carried to the Supreme Court in the expectation the justices would uphold the railroads' position vis-à-vis granger legislation. In this the railroads miscalculated. The justices gave the regulators the benefit of the doubt on nearly every issue—at least for the moment.

Miller's book is compact and competent. Coupled with the fact that Lee Benson and Carter Goodrich have already anticipated many of its insights, the low key in which it is written may make the book seem less impressive than it is. Miller has chosen to write without boasting, excitement, or name-calling. There are no dragons, no Saint Georges. In dealing with ideologies, it is probably better to be sober than spirited.

EDWARD C. KIRKLAND
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The Administration of United States Foreign Policy *by Richard A. Johnson. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1971.—xviii, 415 pp. $10.00.*

The Cinderella Service: British Consuls since 1825 *by D. C. M. Platt. Hamden, Conn., Archon Books, 1971.—x, 272 pp. $11.50.*

The Nineteenth-Century Foreign Office: An Administrative History *by Ray Jones. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971.—224 pp. $3.75.*

"Administration" in Johnson's title must be very broadly interpreted. The author asserts "that the form and process of administration now serve as

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major determinants of the content and effectiveness of policy." With that thesis as a foundation he is free to range widely even to policy formation and review.

The writer started with sound research training. Then he spent a quarter of a century in the Foreign Service, where he became familiar with consular duties and gained experience in diplomatic tasks, rising to the post of counsellor of embassy. He broadened his training at the National War College and had administrative posts in the Department of State. By study and action, he gained intimate knowledge of the history, process, and current state of policy in action.

He comes to the rueful conclusion that "the Department of State and the Foreign Service seldom exercise enough power today even to dictate major interpretational decisions without prior presidential approval or lateral clearance." Yet because of historical expectations "they frequently serve as whipping boys . . . when international affairs do not develop along lines favorable to the United States."

There is an historical sketch of the departmental development and the origins and establishment of a professional foreign service. His comments upon successive studies and proposals for reform are objective and scrupulously fair. The record shows that "the authority of the department and the Foreign Service fluctuated with the administrative philosophy of each president and secretary of state." He reports the multitude of administrative changes but without extended critical comment. In like manner rather bland terms are used regarding the way in which the White House staff influences "decisions and activities."

Great stress is laid upon the proliferation of agencies with a finger in the pie; "unhappily, field coordination still suffers from the fact that some 120 different agencies of the United States Government send representatives abroad": "in April 1967, of 46,779 Americans attached to overseas posts only 7,065 . . . were Foreign Service employees," many of whom were in administrative support. Only 9 per cent of those serving abroad "were working at traditional Foreign Service tasks." Such proliferation of personnel with diverse interests frustrates "policy and operations." This remains true despite the fact that "virtually all American Embassies now have country teams."

He calls for a completely unified foreign service and an executive under-secretary who could give long-term professional direction to administration.

Platt's book is the record of the British consular service from its private beginnings, its public mismanagement, and its final absorption into a unified Foreign Service. The title indicates the theme and the tone—but this Cinderella never had a ball; no fairy godmother ever

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rescued her from drudgery and abuse. The elder sisters, the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service, followed the script of the story.

The Foreign Office was neglectful when it was not contemptuous. If, in a surge toward reform, an effort was launched to make compensation more rational, hence more adequate, it was quashed by the Treasury, which "remained in many respects in a nineteenth century cocoon until the Second World War." Reform was slow, "measured in decades."

Even after unification into the Foreign Service, the ancient preference for political over commercial and consular duties persisted: "Once, after 1943, the barriers were down, the result, predictably, was a flight from consular work." Snobbishness was not conquered, but, to some extent, reinforced.

From such a summary it might be inferred that this book is more a tract than a study. Such an inference would be wholly in error. The conclusions are based upon extensive and meticulous study of an extraordinarily wide range of sources, published and archival. There is every evidence that the many adverse judgments were reached after mountainous evidence was closely examined. This is a well written work of scholarship in the classical tradition.

In Jones's volume the word "administration" has a narrow construction in contrast to the broad connotations of the word in Dr. Johnson's volume on United States policy. This is a lucid, complete record of the British Foreign Office from its formal inception in 1782 through to 1906.

Within those limits, it is a work of scholarship of a high order. Every development, even to the handling of papers, some "with the addition of a coloured border for the edge of the docket of really secret and confidential papers" is covered. Estimates of the permanent officers are sometimes sharp; friction with the Treasury over structure, procedure, and expenses is discussed; the mode of selecting clerks and their functions are all detailed.

Finally, the union of the Diplomatic Service with the Foreign Office was begun in 1906 and virtually completed in thirteen years—par for the pace of change.

This is an indispensable handbook for future diplomatic historians.

HENRY M. WRISTON
New York City

A New U.S. Policy Toward China *by A. Doak Barnett. Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, 1971.—xvii, 132 pp. $5.95.*

Remaking China Policy: U.S.—China Relations and Governmental

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Decisionmaking *by Richard Moorsteen and Morton Abramowitz. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, A Rand Corporation Research Study, 1971.—xxxviii, 136 pp. $5.95.*

Nations in Darkness: China, Russia, and America *by John G. Stoessinger. New York, Random House, 1971.—ix, 197 pp. $6.50.*

America's Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-Soviet Relations *by Warren I. Cohen. New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1971.—xiii, 242 pp. $7.95.*

Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation: Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy *by Peter Van Ness. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971.—252 pp. $3.25.*

In 1968, Dean Rusk told Henry Graff: "If anyone had asked me three years ago whether we could have 500,000 men there [Vietnam] and bomb as we have, without bringing in the Chinese, I would have said no." For the last two decades the prevailing theme of modern Chinese studies in this country has been that China is bellicose and aggressive. Although entitled to sympathy for earlier humiliations, the People's Republic, in the view of most China-watchers, should be kept at arm's length while being coaxed back into the family of nations from her "self-imposed isolation."

The Indochinese disaster, and the two decades of mummification known as U.S. China Policy, produced sufficient self-criticism to make acceptable attitudes once regarded as unrealistic and emotional. The question, of course, is: how realistic are he new, more "flexible" propositions.

Most of A. Doak Barnett's chapters in *A New U.S. Policy Toward China* have appeared elsewhere. The change in Barnett's orientation may be discerned in the titles of his impressive list of earlier publications. Nine out of twelve, and all the first six, use some cold-war name for the People's Republic of China. (When President Nixon first used this exotic term in a news conference it is said that the Russian ambassador, anxious about the implications, rang up the State Department.) Barnett's recent view is simply stated: "We must deal with China as we do with other major powers, not as an outcast from the international community. . . . it is the United States that should take the initiative by defining a new policy for China." He advocates "redefining" the U.S. attitude toward Taiwan, facing up to seating China in the UN, and expanding "both non-official and official contacts." He hopes that China will then adopt "a less hostile general posture towards the United States and its role and

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activities in Asia." We cannot, however, "abandon the present defense commitment to Taiwan," and we must, because "of the realities of the situation," support Taiwan's representation in the General Assembly. Barnett admits that China "has not been adventurist, reckless, or irrational." (He thinks that North Vietnam is "the main danger to the stability of the area.")

In my judgment, Barnett provides a schizophrenic analysis. He recognizes (p. 61) that "the continuing war in Indochina doubtless reinforces Peking's predisposition to view the United States as a security threat," but advocates (p. 62) that "the United States can and should maintain a credible nuclear deterrent in the region, relying primarily on its naval forces." What or whom this naval nuclear capability should "deter" remains unclear.

Moorsteen and Abramowitz, like Barnett, appeal for more "realism" in U.S. policy. Like him, too, they advocate "defense" and "deterrents," while agreeing that in Southeast Asia, "past Chinese involvement has been very limited." (This central fact emerged starkly in the 1969 Foreign Relations Committee Hearings on Laos and Thailand; nonetheless, U.S. obsession with Chinese aggression informs all twelve volumes of the *Pentagon Papers*.) They propose a "one China but not now" formula in order to still Peking's "paranoia." They display touching concern for the welfare of the people of Taiwan "because too many of our hopes for world peace depend on maintaining our reliability in such matters." Japanese, "most" of them, and Taiwanese, "at least the more sophisticated," all understand the importance of an American "shield." "The war in Indochina apart," Thailand constitutes "our most pressing problem in Southeast Asia." We might, Moorsteen and Abramowitz therefore suggest, delicately bring Bangkok and Peking more closely together. This might even help solve the Laos problem which, they explain, has been shown by Langer and Zasloff (*North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao*, 1970) to be the fault of Hanoi, "a rich finding"—contradicted by many other students of Laos. As with Barnett, these two serious and responsible scholars cannot decouple "deterrence" from their hopes for a "more reasonable" China.

In searching for ways to make China more reasonable, neither Barnett nor Moorsteen and Abramowitz take account of America's aggressive record over the years beginning with Indochina. *Nations in Darkness* by John E. Stoessinger displays such awareness and presents an altogether different thesis from the previous two volumes. Both America and China, Stoessinger feels, have been groping toward each other in (largely) self-induced ignorance. For this reviewer the book raises some serious problems. Chapter One, "China and America: the Burden of the Past," con-

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tains numerous oversimplifications or errors: "the political structure of the empire remained essentially stable"—a plausible case can be made that, since the Ch'in, China, as a centrally controlled entity, has been disunited for more *centuries* than united; and "there was no interest in the conquest of strange lands of lesser value"—Vietnam, Korea, Tibet?

In an almost mechanical desire to be fair and unpolemical, Stoessinger singles out various examples of mutual Chinese-American misunderstanding. (He devotes considerable attention, also, to Russo-American relations.) In so doing he repeats tiresomely how "few Americans" have understood or how "few books" point out what are, in fact, well known realities, such as the significance of the Boxers, the Open Door, the Korean conflict, or the origins of the Vietnamese War. His footnotes display a bibliographical grasp sometimes a decade out of date. An example of his incomprehensible double-vision is the Korean conflict. After describing American misperceptions at the beginning of the war, Stoessinger goes on to present Peking's "error":

> The world as viewed from Peking presented a picture of implacable American hostility. Not only were American troops marching directly to the Korean border at the Yalu River, but the United States was protecting the hated Nationalist regime on Taiwan and was aiding the French against the revolutionaries in Indochina. In addition, the United States was rehabilitating and rearming Japan. . . . With this kind of outlook it was hardly surprising that the Chinese regarded verbal protestation of good will on the part of the United States as a mockery.

Where is the error? Even without the *Pentagon Papers,* Stoessinger could have used Allen Whiting's *China Crosses the Yalu* (1968)—which he cites rather irrelevantly three times, Acheson's *Present at the Creation* (1969), or Edward Friedman's conclusive essay in the book he edited with Mark Selden, *America's Asia* (1971), to portray the usually "pragmatic," "cautious" China described by Barnett, Moorsteen, and Abramowitz. In the case of Vietnam, Stoessinger flies in the face of mountains of documentation when he claims that "the evidence reveals that the Chinese superimposed their own perceptual grid upon the situation." Many public sources "reveal" China's restraint in response to more than fifteen years of U.S. provocation, a word used repeatedly in the twelve volumes of the *Pentagon Papers.* Ross Terrill's superb essays in the *Atlantic* (1971-72) show China's patient determination to wait for the American drive in Southeast Asia to shatter itself on the long-term resistance of *local* opposition.

Warren Cohen and Peter Van Ness furnish careful, well documented summaries of America's historic interest in China and of China's foreign policy. Cohen's, despite his claim to use Chinese, is drawn for the most

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part from easily available English-language sources; Van Ness, who clearly knows Chinese, rationally periodizes Chinese policies abroad. Both authors make understandable the long-term real threat posed by America to a People's Republic determined to avoid direct clashes (especially in the Bandung period) and to encourage only those convulsions based, in Van Ness's words, on "a truly mass-based and popular revolutionary movement . . . the Chinese strategy was profoundly radical but their tactics remained astutely pragmatic."

None of this is intended to portray a vestal, shy, or pacifist China. One need only ask a Tibetan. John Fairbank, whose third edition of *The United States and China* (1948, 1958, 1971) demonstrates an awareness absent from most of the books under review, stresses the responsibility for *Americans:* "The old ways no longer serve, the old ideas have lost their efficacy. To coexist and survive, we have to seek a new understanding both of Asian realities and of our own aggressiveness."

JONATHAN MIRSKY
Dartmouth College

American Deserters in Sweden: The Men and Their Challenge *by Thomas Lee Hayes. New York, Association Press, 1971.—192 pp. $5.95.*

The New Exiles: American War Resisters in Canada *by Roger Neville Williams. New York, Liveright Publishers, 1971.—xiii, 401 pp. $7.95.*

They Can't Go Home Again: The Story of America's Political Refugees *by Richard L. Killmer, Robert S. Lecky, and Debrah S. Wiley. Philadelphia, Pilgrim Press, 1971.—118 pp. $2.95.*

None of these books provides a dispassionate account of what motivated tens of thousands of young Americans to flee the draft, the military, and the country during the Vietnam war. The authors have personal links with the Canadian and Swedish communities of American military deserters and draft dodgers who, by conservative estimates, now number more than 30,000 in Canada and 450 in Sweden. Williams is an exiled draft resister who tried to evade his induction call by going to Vietnam as a war correspondent. He returned to the United States, then fled to Canada to escape government prosecution for draft evasion. Thomas Lee Hayes, former national director of the Episcopal Peace Fellowship, spent several months in Sweden ministering to what he calls

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his "parish over the hill." Killmer, Lecky, and Wiley have worked with deserters in Canada and Sweden through the Emergency Draft Ministry of New York.

The three books afford general descriptions of the deserter/resister communities. However, the authors offer empathic explanation, not critical analysis. Williams's reportage is uneven, although his is easily the best researched and most comprehensive book of the three. Hayes's self-indulgent emotionalism clouds some perceptive comments about the deserters he admires so much. His penchant for trite contemporary expressions and an excess of glibness weaken the book considerably. *They Can't Go Home Again* is the least pretentious of the three books. With its index to Canadian aid centers for deserters, the book could serve as a guide to any prospective immigrant.

Implicit in all three books is the assumption that emigration is the natural response to a horrid war, but I think none of the authors intends to present a treatise on the corrupt policies of the American government in Vietnam. Rather, it appears that the writers want to humanize their subjects for their readers.

Half the Williams book is devoted to autobiographical accounts by thirteen emigrés. Killmer, Lecky, and Wiley have punctuated their description of the Canadian exile community with personal stories from twenty men and women whom they have interviewed. Hayes capsulizes biographies of ten deserters in one chapter but writes later that those who "see themselves as acting with a sense of moral and social rightness" (p. 136) can be chronicled only by themselves.

If that be the case, why write a book about deserters? The answer, I hope, is that there is something to be learned from understanding the phenomenon of the mass emigration of young Americans during the Vietnam war. Specifically, I would ask, what motivated these men to leave when so many others—with common backgrounds and from similar situations—chose different courses, the Army, jail, or evasion by legal means. The authors of these three books provide no answers.

They admit that many men have fled the country without well defined motives. "Many men in Canada are inarticulate, reject rationalism and have no system of belief," write Killmer *et al.*; "they state simply that the war in Vietnam is wrong, or the Army is brutal to both its enemies and to its own soldiers. . . . These statements are from the gut" (p. 99). Hayes agrees: "It would be misleading to suggest that a *conscious* [italics in the original] moral and political idealism motivates all the men . . ." (p. 158).

Still there are those who have emigrated from this country, mostly during the early stages of the campus antiwar movement, with articu-

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late arguments against the war and the military. By 1970 the first group of draft evaders was eclipsed by a new wave of military deserters —younger, less educated, and generally from a lower social and economic class than their predecessors. According to the Department of Defense, in the 1970 fiscal year there were 89,088 deserters—men who have been absent without leave from the military for thirty days or more. That figure was up from 73,121 for the previous fiscal year. Of course, not all the deserters who went over the hill failed to return, but the movement certainly had reached epidemic proportions by 1970.

Who is responsible for such an exodus? Not the deserters themselves, two of these authors respond. Williams writes: *"It is for the exiles to continually remind America who the real criminals are and not to spend their time hoping the criminals will forgive them"* (p. 400; italics in the original). Hayes asks: "How can we who now find our militarism in Vietnam and violence at home unconscionable turn our backs on those who have acted out of similar convictions?" (p. 53). "Our problem now," he explains, "is the acceptance of guilt" (p. 170).

Guilt, though, will bring no political solutions. Only a national sense of shared responsibility for *all* the casualties of the Vietnam war will bring our boys back home from Canada and Sweden.

THOMAS R. LINDEN
Beverly Hills, California

The Myths of Cabinet Government *by Richard H. S. Crossman. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1972.—xxix, 126 pp. $5.95.*

The main body of this book consists of the author's three Godkin Lectures delivered at Harvard in April 1970 while there was a British Labour government of which he was a member. With an intellectual boldness uncharacteristic of governmental officeholders, and of much of the academic profession for that matter, Crossman extemporaneously delivered these lectures which, together with their question-and-answer sessions, were stenotyped. Retaining this form after apparently minor editorial changes, the work possesses a provocative vivacity not often found in scholarly literature on the subject of comparative governmental systems. To be sure, such vivacity has been the hallmark of Crossman's career as an Oxford don, a backbench MP, a Cabinet minister, and a journalist. Always an acknowledged virtue, even among his numerous critics, has been his capacity to state an intellectual position sharply and without the inhibiting qualifications accepted, for different reasons, by most politi-

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cians and most scholars. This flair is evident not only in the lectures themselves, but also in Crossman's short introduction, written in July 1971 to apply his analysis to the first year of Heath's Conservative government.

Perhaps the whole of the book but certainly the introduction and the first two lectures can be viewed as Crossman's effort to restate and redevelop the thesis that he had earlier proclaimed when writing a now well known introduction to a 1963 edition of Bagehot's *The English Constitution*. That thesis was that British government is better described as prime ministerial rather than as Cabinet government. Now, after Crossman's own substantial experience in a Cabinet, he believes that he is in a better position to fortify the thesis. There can be no doubt that he has learned in a most intimate way about the limitations of a minister's power in dealing both with his own department, notably its civil servants, and with his fellow Cabinet members and the prime minister. But he cannot have had the same chance to learn about any limits that the prime minister perceives about his power. That power, while it has unquestionably grown since Bagehot's time in all of the ways stressed by Crossman, may still be so significantly hedged in relation to that of his principal colleagues that Cabinet government is a more appropriate term than prime-ministerial government. The latter surely suggests an approximation to U.S.-style presidential government, with respect to the concentration of executive authority although not with respect to executive-legislative relations. And the suggested approximation, while only implicit, seems misleading. Although readily granting that the old first-among-equals phrase now understates—probably it always did—the prime minister's relative power, it remains true that he shares executive authority with at least certain Cabinet members whose positions of influence rest on their standing in the parliamentary party on which the prime minister also depends. True, they are in the Cabinet, or at least in particular ministries, because the prime minister puts them there. But he does so under the political exigencies involved in maintaining his own position as party leader, and he is similarly situated when removing and replacing Cabinet members. Most significantly, because he must have the support of his parliamentary party in order to remain prime minister, he needs in practice to carry with him most of the other important leaders of that party—in other words, his principal fellow ministers. Executive power in British government thus remains meaningfully collegial, as another former Labour Cabinet member, Patrick Gordon Walker, has recently stressed in reviewing his experience and observations.

LEON D. EPSTEIN
University of Wisconsin-Madison

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Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery: A Study in Leadership and Policy *by D. A. Hamer. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972.—xv, 368 pp. $16.25.*

Like the "Unspeakable Turk," whose Bulgarian horrors spurred its revival in 1876, Great Britain's Liberal party was one of nineteenth-century Europe's chronic sick men. Time and again, its ills were diagnosed as incurable; yet the party always managed somehow to recover, most spectacularly in the general election of 1906. Finally, the patient expired, like the Ottoman Empire and other invalids, in the ordeal of the First World War.

A procession of historians has since attempted to account for the party's death, strange or othewise, and to evaluate its significance. We have been told, among other things, that the Liberal party was better dead (George Dangerfield, *The Strange Death of Liberal England*, 1936), that it need not have died (P. F. Clarke, *Lancashire and the New Liberalism*, 1971), and, indeed, that it has not yet died (Roy Douglas, *A History of the Liberal Party, 1897-1970*, 1971). Each chronicler has tended to see different events and periods as crucial. According to Trevor Wilson, to cite a prominent example, the war and the war alone brought *The Downfall of the Liberal Party* (1966). But Wilson, as D. A. Hamer pointedly observes, "gives almost no consideration to the history of the party before 1914" (p. ix), and thereby stacks the deck in favor of his thesis. Hamer demonstrates that in "the age of Gladstone and Rosebery" that long preceded the war, the party was already palpably unable to contend with modern electoral forces, and its leaders to agree on basic matters of policy and strategy. Especially after Gladstone's belated retirement in 1894, this lack of coherence and common purpose, once paradoxically a source of strength, proved increasingly debilitating. Regional, religious, and class interests jockeyed for priority, and, putting themselves above party, virtually destroyed the party as a tactical unity. Gladstone, true to the spirit of John Stuart Mill, took a perverse pride in his followers' propensity for individualistic disagreement. With less conviction, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman later took the same line. But it was clear that the party was hopelessly dependent upon disparate groups that refused to coalesce and that, in the long run, proved mutually antipathetical.

It is the next-to-the-last phase of Liberal history with which Hamer is primarily concerned, although he has much to say about the nature of political activity in other periods as well. Acknowledging his debt to John Vincent, and with an impressive command of primary and secondary sources, he has provided a penetrating analysis of the party's ideological and structural peculiarities. Perhaps mirroring its subject, the book is less

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a unified whole than a collection of rich and diverse elements. A chapter on "Gladstone and the Unity of Liberalism" is a self-contained essay that makes a significant contribution to Gladstonian studies. There is also an astute discussion of Liberal imperialism, the first that manages to relate that *fin de siècle* phenomenon to the complexities of intraparty politics. If Hamer fails to do as well by Liberal unionism, he nonetheless provides first-rate assessments of the 1885 Radical Programme, the next year's Home Rule split, and Herbert Gladstone's adept efforts at reconstruction after the turn of the century.

Alternating with sections of analysis are stretches of narrative that retrace, sometimes less satisfactorily, some of the ground covered in Peter Stansky's *Ambitions and Strategies* (1964). Hamer is obviously reacting against the popular tendency to interpret political developments exclusively in terms of personality, but he occasionally goes too far in the other direction. One is relieved to see Lord Rosebery's perplexing behavior attributed to something other than his insomnia, but surely Rosebery's personal characteristics were more important than Hamer implies. John Morley, about whom Hamer has written a full-length biography (1969), emerges more clearly, but Sir William Harcourt and Joseph Chamberlain are too sketchily drawn, making it difficult to asecertain the degree to which they operated out of ambition or pique.

Until we have a comparable study of the Tory party, we cannot say whether the Liberals had a monopoly on sectionalism. But it is safe to say that the Liberals, with their "Broad Church" concept, probably invited it. Was it that the party encompassed too many rival interests or simply that it assigned the wrong priorities? Or, as a party of the Left, was it especially susceptible to internecine strife? One looks in 1972 at the Labour party leadership, divided over the issue of Common Market entry, and wonders.

STEPHEN E. KOSS
Barnard College

The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill *by Robert Blake. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1971.—xii, 305 pp. $12.50.*

Lord Blake's Ford Lectures will be disappointing to those who had hoped for a magisterial work on the scale of his *Disraeli* (1966) or *The Unknown Prime Minister* (1955). Instead, we are warned at the beginning that this book is "a commentary upon the history of the party from 1830 to 1955," rather than a formal history. And Lord Blake rubs the point in at the end with a little flourish: "History is not an exact science and it never will be.

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It is a good story. The fortunes of a political party, like those of an individual, make a fascinating tale, and that, rather than general truths or lessons from the past, must be the justification of this survey." The story is, of course, extremely well told, but it is hard not to regret that there is not more of it. Moreover, in the earlier chapters of the book Lord Blake whets our appetite for a bigger book by writing what is in effect a substantial interpretative study of the origins of the modern Conservative party.

The theme of the book may be summarized simply. The Conservative party, like any other party, exists today because it has successfully resisted the tendency to fall apart. Its history is, therefore, not the history of its ideas or policies or of its organization and support, but rather the history of the way in which individual party leaders have shaped the fortunes of the party. Some—notably Derby and Salisbury—have done well. Others—notably Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain—have done badly.

Two great problems of interpretation are left unresolved by this approach: (1) What was the relationship between the Conservative party as a political party and the Conservative party as the spokesman of "Conservatism"? (2) Was the Conservative party of Peel significantly different from that of Disraeli, Salisbury, Baldwin, and Churchill, and, if so, how? In everyday talk it is common enough for people to say that the Conservative party has always stood for a single coherent principle: reluctance to make changes for change's sake. But such a statement is quite as true of most nineteenth-century Liberals or twentieth-century trade unionists.

Lord Blake, quoting Lord Salisbury, argues simply that the Conservative party could always be defined in terms of opposition to other parties, first the Liberals, then Labour, which were committed to change in principle. It did not need to have a coherent set of beliefs or a coherent program. It just had to govern well and imaginatively.

H. J. HANHAM
Harvard University

Lewis Namier: A Biography *by Julia Namier. London, Oxford University Press, 1971.—xvii, 347 pp. $13.75.*

The name of Sir Lewis Namier today evokes quite different images in different minds. For students of eighteenth-century British politics, Namier is the author of several rather imposing monographs, the principal mover behind the vast *History of Parliament* project and the principal advocate of a style of intensely detailed collective biography sometimes called "namierization." For students of the nineteenth century, he is, by

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contrast, the author of a few widely read, freewheeling impressionistic (but erudite) essays, the best known of which is *1848—The Revolution of the Intellectuals;* while, for students of twentieth-century diplomatic history, he is the author of a number of essays and books published during and after the Second World War (the most important of which is *Diplomatic Prelude*) which closely analyze the apologetic literature on the origins of that war and begin the scientific study of the diplomatic history of the 1930s.

But there are still other Namiers. There is the well tutored son of a Jewish landed proprietor in Galicia who mastered written English so well as to be considered almost an historiographical Joseph Conrad. (About this skill, Balfour exclaimed, "What phrases! Where did the fellow get his power of writing English? . . . Political Nation—is that his phrase? . . . What an amazing race the Jews are!") Finally, there is Namier, the striking presence, the personality which many found imposing, a few distasteful, but none forgettable. A student of his at Oxford in 1921 remembered forty years later, "Even in 1921 we knew he was a man of destiny and of a quite different mould from the other dons. I think he was probably the only truly great man I have known personally."

Among his other wide-ranging intellectual accomplishments, Namier had a longstanding interest in psychoanalysis, reflected in his work both on George III and Charles Townshend. Realizing that he no longer had the physical or nervous strength to write his own autobiography, in the last eighteen months of his life Sir Lewis dictated notes on his early life to his second wife (whom he married in 1947), much as he might have given information to an analyst. It was his intention that from these notes and his papers, his widow should write his biography. To this material, Lady Namier has added her own researches, establishing, for example (from the papers of A. F. Pollard), that "his race" kept Namier from a fellowship at All Souls in 1912—an explanation Sir Lewis had refused to accept in his lifetime.

From all these materials, Lady Namier has put together a fascinating biography. It is wonderfully rich on the early years in Poland, both in the sociological depiction of life in the house of a cultivated Jewish landowner in eastern Galicia and in the psychological reconstruction of the young Ludwik's relations with his family, his nurses, and his teachers. Her narrative is also very rich on the years between 1915 and 1920 when Namier was in British government service and was attacked by the Roman Dmowski variety of ultra-Polish nationalist for the pro-Ukrainian advice he gave the British Foreign Office on Poland's eastern boundaries. (On this point, Namier also broke with his father, who completely identified

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with the aspirations of the Polish ruling class in Galicia.) Lady Namier's account is also rich in human details about Sir Lewis's life during and after the Second World War when she was with him. (For example, in 1940, Mrs. Chaim Weizmann collected three lethal doses of veronal—for herself, her husband, and Namier—for use in case the Nazis occupied London.) This fascinating account is somewhat deficient only in what may be called the intellectual biography of Sir Lewis, the formation of his professional mind, outlook, and methods. This is a difficult genre at best: from Gibbon's time, the most interesting examples have been autobiographical. Unfortunately, Sir Lewis did not leave the materials for such an "educational" portrait.

After due allowance is made for the technical difficulties implicit in the materials at hand, this remains a remarkable biography. An exploration of the personality and searchings of a brilliant maverick among historians, it is a book which old hands will read for piety and acolytes for understanding.

JACOB M. PRICE
University of Michigan

In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence *by James Eayrs. Toronto and Buffalo, University of Toronto Press, 1972.—xiv, 448 pp. $17.50.*

This is the third volume of a work dedicated to analyzing Canadian national security policy since the War of 1914-18. All three volumes are published in the series "Studies in the Structure of Power: Decision-making in Canada" sponsored by the Social Science Research Council of Canada and edited by John Meisel. The present volume covers the years 1943-49, and sometimes later, under six heads: military reorganization, the establishment of the United Nations, the settlement of Europe, Commonwealth relations, control of the atom, and continental defense. Its sources include not only a wide range of published matter but also interviews with prominent actors on the Canadian scene and sixteen collections of unpublished documents, private and institutional. This is indeed a work of sound scholarship. It goes behind official statements and actions to uncover their origins and the process by which decisions were reached.

In doing so, Eayrs chooses to omit underlying factors of geography and political culture in favor of stressing the element of personality—the ministers, top military people, and especially civil servants who were ac-

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tive in the period. His judgments of men are often sharp, but never sharper than in the case of the central figure of Mackenzie King. The prime minister's powers, says Eayrs, were clearly failing during the later years of the war until he became "a liability to his colleagues." His "quirks and aberrations" threatened parliamentary government itself. "Irascibility," "unpredictability," "xenophobia," and "paranoia" are terms the author applies to this ancient monument of Canadian statesmanship in his last years.

What saved the country, it is shown, were its civil servants and the small group of ministers who counted for most in the cabinet. Canada had what a British ambassador called "one of the highest-powered Foreign Services in the modern world." In Norman A. Robertson (at different times undersecretary of state for external affairs, ambassador to the United States, and high commissioner in the United Kingdom) she had a man whom the *Times* of London called "a diplomatist of world rank"; and in Lester B. Pearson after he entered politics and became secretary of state for external affairs in 1946, an international statesman who attained world fame. Men such as these won for Canada her reputation for "discreet statecraft." It is an indication of the subordinate role assigned to Parliament that the House of Commons is mentioned only ten times in the index, Norman Robertson more than forty times, Pearson about as often, and Brooke Claxton, a highly effective minister of national defence after December 1946 and perhaps the closest to a hero in Professor Eayrs' saga, even more frequently.

The output of policy emanating from the labors of these men is quite highly regarded by the author. It is true that on the United Nations, Europe, and the Commonwealth deference has to be paid to Mackenzie King's xenophobic prejudices. But the military services were successfully reorganized for their peacetime tasks, while on the problem of atomic energy at least as much wisdom was displayed as in other countries concerned.

American readers who are not primarily concerned with Canadian affairs will probably be most interested in the last two chapters which deal with control of the atom and continental defense. They contain some candid comments on American policy. For example, General McNaughton, Brooke Claxton's predecessor as minister of national defence, pronounced the Baruch plan for the control of atomic energy "insincerity from beginning to end"; Eayrs himself characterizes the United States Air Force ideology in 1946 as "at once messianic and demanding"; while Brooke Claxton argued that the American military's propensity for spending was

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such that it would be at least as cheap for Canada to pay the whole cost of a radar chain along the 55th parallel as to share in a joint enterprise.

This is a first-class book—learned in content, lucid and witty in style.

THOMAS P. PEARDON
Barnard College

The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation *by Stephen P. Cohen. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971.—x, 216 pp. $7.50.*

How the long British military presence in India helped shape the armed forces and the pattern of civil-military relations in the two successor states is the theme this book by Stephen P. Cohen develops in some depth. From documentary sources supplemented with interviews of British and Indian officers, he has produced not a conventional history of personalities, disputes, campaigns, and structural reforms, but rather an analytic study that describes the evolution of the military system from early British rule to the postindependence period. His general point is that the Indian army, though never in any sense a major instrument for liberation of the subcontinent from colonial domination, has nevertheless had and continues to have a profound influence on national politics.

A major legacy of British colonial rule was, of course, the theory of separate civilian and military spheres. Applied to India, where the military enjoyed much greater autonomy than at home and where its presence was everywhere felt, this meant at first little more than strict fiscal auditing. Yet little by little the principle of civilian control was accepted and, though occasionally abused, has generally provided the doctrinal base for any dialogue between civilian and military groups, so Cohen contends.

If I read him correctly, however, the doctrine must have meant something different for the KCOs (King's Commissioned Officers, nearly all of whom were British) and the native VCOs (Viceroy's Commissioned Officers), who provided the essential link between the ordinary soldier and his British commander. The KCO was bound to his own society by his loyalty to the Crown; the VCO, selectively recruited and eager to press this advantage, tended to become increasingly insulated from the main currents of Indian life. His position gave him a special reason to be impressed with British history and tradition. He was apt to take a continued British presence for granted. Few thought that anything was to be gained

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by rocking the boat beyond espousing the cause of more Indianization of the army.

This makes understandable the lack of close links, bordering on outright estrangement, between the army and most nationalist leaders during the struggle for Indian independence. The nationalist leaders, imbued with intellectual liberalism and other Western ideas, had a natural suspicion of the military, which they usually viewed as the extension of British rule. Yet developments within the army facilitated civil-military collaboration once independence was a fact. One of these was the evident professionalism of the officer corps—partly the result of the sound technical training made available to Indians, partly cultivated as an overcompensation for racial slurs inflicted on officers by their British peers. This, in turn, bred a reluctance to be used in quelling civil disturbances. A third factor was the Indian officers' lack of sympathy for communalism; service in the army evidently fostered a national orientation.

The Indian Army today is portrayed as a loyal and fully professional force hesitant to take on any civil functions beyond those mandated by necessity. It acts as a shield to ensure national integrity but is always potentially available to deal with internal disorder and hence to control the pace of social change. However, as the case of Pakistan, long dominated by British-trained officers, illustrates, the professionalism of officers provides little insurance against coercive intervention. Military coups and takeovers take place, according to Cohen, because the military in developing nations is often temperamentally and technologically ahead of the rest of the political system. In these circumstances, doubt about the competence of the government to defend the national boundary can supply a motive for intervention. The military acts against a regime it considers inept and corrupt. The lack of legitimate civilian political leadership forces the professional soldier to take full responsibility for acts of violence, as the responsibility can no longer be shifted to the shoulders of the government. The civilian leadership must demonstrate its effectiveness to keep the reins of power in its own hand.

There is nothing basically wrong with this theory, but it is not followed through so as to account satisfactorily for the difference in the types of civil-military relation in the two successor states. Is it that Pakistan was divided and its army disproportionately recruited from only one enclave? Is it the lack of a single overpowering personality, like Nehru, who shepherded India through the first years of independence? Is it the way the British presence made itself felt given the differences in the social structure of the two states? Or is it merely a matter of accident, so that they can be expected to develop in an essentially similar direction either through a military takeover in India or by the full restora-

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tion of parliamentary rule in Pakistan?

The book could also benefit from a clearer periodization of the events, trends, influences, and so forth during the time-span covered. To disentangle what generalizations apply to what period is sometimes difficult. The two-and-one-quarter-page introduction is inadequate as a synthesis of a book packed with all kinds of intriguing observations. In spite of such flaws, this well written and timely study, the first of its kind of the Indian army, has much to recommend it not only to those specifically interested in India but also to those whose interests range into comparative study of political development.

KURT LANG
State University of New York at Stony Brook

Gaullism: The Rise and Fall of a Political Movement *by Anthony Hartley. New York, Outerbridge & Dienstfrey, 1971.—xv, 373 pp. $10.00.*

Gaullism was a complex movement, far removed from the traditional conservatism with which it was sometimes confused and into which it has now become absorbed. With his thorough knowledge of French history and culture, the author perceptively brings out its ambivalence: a doctrine drawing from both classical and romantic traditions, a movement synthesizing in its nationalist credo its appeals to both Right and Left, a strategy exploiting temporary circumstances to advance unchanging if overambitious objectives. Centered on De Gaulle's political impact rather than his life or character, this admirable book provides an excellent brief account, clearly written and with a useful bibliography, of French history since the 1930s.

Mr. Hartley is a very fair-minded critic. He defends De Gaulle's wartime record and is most judicious on the strengths and weaknesses of the Fourth Republic (but De Gaulle's own disastrous contributions to those weaknesses are never brought together; though his rejection of Mendès-France's financial rigor, his fatal choice of proconsul for Indochina, his original untenable German policy, and his wrecking of governments are mentioned, his support for the Algerian settlers against the feeble political reforms of 1947 is not). To the Fifth Republic, which takes up half the book, Mr. Hartley maintains the same cool detachment. The Algerian settlement was "a considerable political feat . . . but . . . the path . . . was strewn with wreckage" (p. 186). He does not bother with the silly charge of dictatorship or raise his voice over the contradictions of Gaullist foreign policy. By rejecting European integration, the general

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ensured that "it was Germany, not France, which would embark on the dialogue with Russia" (p. 243). Meanwhile, for nuclear protection, "why should other European countries trust . . . the major contemporary theoretician of the sanctity of purely national interests?" (p. 209). The general's spectacular activities in the third world brought domestic advantages, but not for long: "Large sections of Gaullist foreign policy were 'happenings' played, it was hoped, before an attentive audience—nothing more . . . . [But] a hectic political activity abroad [did not] compensate . . . the young for the sleep of politics at home" (pp. 242-43). Eventually the spell of Gaullist romanticism "was to be broken not by everyday realities, but by another, no less romantic conception of the world, drawing equally upon the historical past of France" (p. 273). From the May 1968 crisis, the prime minister emerged as the leader of the Right—a role De Gaulle never sought. Dismissed and relegated to " 'the reserve of the Republic' (a phrase that might be used of soldiers, but also of bottles of wine)" (p. 289), Pompidou now offered the missing alternative to De Gaulle or chaos. With his succession the Gaullist "episode" was over and a modernized Right inherited the political structures the general had created. Grandeur was superseded by interests and "the main ingredient of 'integral' Gaullism is now nostalgia . . . the eagles and kettle-drums of the First Empire have been transformed into the furniture of the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe" (pp. 307-09). The real beneficiaries of De Gaulle's mission are the ex-Vichyite social classes and the opportunist "Gaullist" politicians for whom he had such contempt. Once again, in Péguy's words, "*Tout commence en mystique et tout finit en politique.*"

P. M. WILLIAMS
Nuffield College, Oxford

France—An Interpretive History *by Ernest John Knapton. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971.—xix, 616 pp. $15.00.*

The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy *by Derek Beales. London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd.; New York, Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1971.—176 pp. $7.50.*

For all that novel circumstances are shifting the focus away from the emphasis on national history, this type of history will be a long time dying. The nation and the state remain too important a reality in our world for them to be demoted. To the prosperity of the nationalistic force, France has contributed as much, if not more, than any other nation.

Like others, the French nation has been the result of long historic tra-

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vail, and the author's design is to trace the unfolding of this process. In a one-volume treatment of the better part of two millennia the leeway for interpretation is reduced in the face of little controversial large developments. That the entity France was the work of the monarchy is hardly matter for debate, any more than the divisive legacy of the Great Revolution. Within this broad perspective one may differ about the relative degree of attention given to particular episodes; perhaps the magnitude, duration, and impact of the contest with England could have been stressed more, or the role of the peasantry in the revolution. These are minor details which in no way detract from a comprehensive and balanced treatment characterized by a critically sympathetic approach.

The legacy of the Great Revolution could also have been spelled out with greater sharpness, the combination of a fundamentally conservative outlook with a verbal dedication to revolutionary slogans, which has produced the deceptive phenomenon of French political *sinistrisme*. It is also out of the aftermath of the revolutionary experience that the tradition has taken root in France of the fear of the man on horseback, in turn reflected in the increasingly unsatisfactory operation of the parliamentary system of the Third and Fourth Republics. Here lies one leading thread of France's internal functioning since 1789. Only yesterday has an attempt been made at constitutional arrangements that adumbrate the possible balance of a division of powers, the solution advocated by eighteenth-century political thinkers. The fate of that experiment is currently in the making, but its possibilities and significance are considerable, and for that reason, despite its contemporaneity, a more searching discussion of the Fifth Republic would have been appropriate.

Quite rightly, especially in a book addressed to an English-speaking audience, considerable attention is given to cultural developments. Sketchy as it must inevitably be and not attempting to make comparative assessments, this aspect of the book is well done. For the student and the general reader seeking an overall and integrated view of how France has come to be France this introduction can be recommended.

With Beales' book we come from the general to the particular, as befits a volume in the series "Historical Problems: Studies and Documents." Italy, too, like France, is the product of historic circumstances; but unlike France, as a united nation she is very new. For that reason the immediate background of unity, the Risorgimento, and the final accomplishment of unification have taken on an aura of desirability and received hagiographic treatment. Unlike the validity of the French Revolution, that of unification has not been questioned in Italy. Nevertheless, the events of our century, the Fascist episode in particular, have given rise to some rethinking, not indeed about the desirability of unification, but about the

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neat consistency of its accomplishment.

That is the problem to which Beales addresses himself, in a very limited compass, for he is mainly concerned with English (British only) historiography of the problem. In simplest summation, the unquestioningly sympathetic view of Trevelyan and others is being challenged. "If the peninsula was to be united in the manner of 1859-70, not only the attitudes of the people of Italy, but also those of some at least of their rulers, and those of some non-Italian peoples and rulers as well, had to change" (p. 41). Hence Beales' emphasis on accident and on Cavour's lack of farsighted, consistent plan. In broad terms the thesis is not altogether new, and Beales is driven to minimize some aspects of the Italian background. Nevertheless, his case is well argued, his iconoclasm is a welcome counterweight to hagiography, and the result is a stimulating book, an illustration of the fact that history is forever rewritten, not only in the light of added information, but under the impact of the preoccupations of the day.

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ
Rockford College

In the Twenties: The Diaries of Harry Kessler *by Harry Kessler, translated by Charles Kessler. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971.—xvi, 535 pp. $10.00.*

My original delight on reading Count Harry Kessler's diaries of the Weimar era when they were first published in Germany has been rekindled by their publication in English. The translation is excellent, the format handsome, there are useful notes to provide background information for the non-German reader, and the introduction by Otto Friedrich is intelligent and sympathetic.

The publication in the United States of the diaries of a comparatively unknown figure of Weimar Germany reflects something of the fascination this period seems to hold for contemporary Americans. This was the era of Brecht and Gropius, of Klee and Kandinsky, of Hindemith and Hermann Hesse, all of whom seem to have a special appeal for contemporary audiences. It was also the era of a titillating moral and psychological decadence, of the Blue Angel and Caligari, the milieu of Christopher Isherwood's *Berlin Stories,* which have recently reemerged as *Cabaret.* But perhaps the major reason for the current fascination with Weimar is that it invites analogies with the problems confronting contemporary America and indeed all modern democratic societies, for this

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was an era when democratic government was in travail, challenged on every hand by political and cultural extremists, an era of generational conflict, radical experiments, and permissiveness, when traditional standards of behavior and morality were collapsing on every front.

And in the vortex of Weimar, seemingly involved in every crisis and acquainted with every prominent figure in the political, cultural, and social worlds, was Count Harry Kessler. He was the first German emissary to the newly established government of Poland, he represented Germany at the fateful Genoa conference of 1922, he served political leaders of many persuasions as a trouble-shooter in a variety of missions at home and abroad. As founder and owner of the Cranach Press, he published high quality limited editions of Virgil, Shakespeare, and Rilke, illustrating his productions with woodcuts by such artists as Maillol and Eric Gill, and printing them on paper specially manufactured in France. He attended parties where Josephine Baker danced in the nude, most of the men in dinner jackets, most of the ladies in the same condition as Miss Baker. He observed with aesthetic pleasure the naked young men and women sunbathing around the handsome new swimming pools built under the Weimar government. He aided Maillol to escape with his mistress from the clutches of a jealous wife, and observed with malicious amusement the inability of the 69-year-old artist to satisfy the hot-blooded girl of 20: "Mme. Maillol is avenged!" He had tea with Leonard and Virginia Woolf; he worked on projects of international cooperation with Bernard Shaw. He was the friend of Richard Strauss and Max Reinhardt, of Albert Einstein and Georg Grosz, and he had amusing stories to tell and shrewd comments to make about them all.

Yet as one reflects about Kessler and his activities, some of the delight in his commentaries begins to fade. Although he professed to be a democrat and pacifist, filled with sympathetic concern for the popular welfare, there is little indication in his diaries that this sympathy was deeply felt. He took an almost ghoulish interest in the violence around him, he followed street battles as some men follow fire engines. But after a day of excitement amid the bullets of the revolution and the reaction, he took care to dine well in the company of distinguished or amusing friends. Of the famine and disease that affected so many Germans in the first months after the war, of the impact of inflation and the Great Depression on German society we hear almost nothing. All this time Kessler continued to live well, his money obviously safely invested abroad.

While Kessler has little to say about major problems besetting German society, he has a good deal to say about the leaders of Germany's new democratic government, most of it scathing. President Ebert is a "master-

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saddler . . . raised to the throne," although an improvement over William II because he would not "cut any capers." Erzberger, the leader of the Catholic Center party, is derided for his commonplace appearance and boorish dialect. Kessler gives him credit for delivering an effective indictment against the ultranationalists in the Reichstag, but concludes that "Erzberger and his opponents are just about worthy of each other."

One is left with the impression that Kessler, like so many Weimar intellectuals, was basically unsympathetic to the democratic process and contemptuous of the majority of Germany's democratic leaders. What democratic or radical sentiment he possessed was of the parlor or hothouse variety, an attitude which in another generation might have found expression in giving cocktail parties for Beautiful People on behalf of radical causes. At home with intellectuals with a wide variety of political views, preferably of the Left, he was essentially a snob. It is easy to understand how, with friends such as this, the Weimar Republic in its moments of crisis was naked to its enemies.

NORMAN RICH
Brown University

The Czechs under Nazi Rule: The Failure of National Resistance, 1939-1942 *by Vojtech Mastny. New York, Columbia University Press, 1971.—xiii, 274 pp. $10.00.*

Hitler's first foreign conquest was also the longest lasting of his non-German acquisitions. From March 1939 to May 1945, the Czechs lived under German rule; not only did all the other countries that fell to German arms go under later, but, except for Denmark and most of Norway, they were also liberated earlier. The more than six years of German control of Bohemia and Moravia, therefore, constitute a unique situation in many ways; and Professor Mastny has taken on the task of examining the period in two volumes, the division coming at the crushing of what Czech resistance there was in June 1942, right after the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich. It is the first volume, covering slightly more than half the occupation experience, that is under review here.

The book is a model monograph, based on careful research in a wide variety of archives, with the resulting material skillfully woven together in a fine narrative. The volume is especially good in its description of the early institutions and internal consolidation of the Protectorate, its delineation of the problems between the Germans and the Czech exile leadership in London which affected the Protectorate government, its

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presentation of the economic development and exploitation of the Protectorate, and its explanation of the situation in the uproar of November-December 1939.

Two key figures in the drama, Emil Hácha and Alois Eliáš, appear in this narrative in improved perspective while Edvard Beneš hardly emerges with much credit for perspicacity. In spite of his brief role in the Czech drama, Heydrich dominates the scene. It is unfortunate that Mastny missed Schlomo Aronson's work on him. The question of Heydrich's role might have been further clarified if Mastny had questioned more deeply the nature and roots of a national resistance movement that could be crushed in ten days.

The most serious criticism of the book that can be made is its misinterpretation of Hitler's intentions and policies and hence its misunderstanding of the framework within which the events described here transpired. Because he fails to recognize that Hitler in 1938 wanted to seize *all* of Bohemia and saw its nationality problem as the presence of Czechs, not Germans, inside the area, Mastny's picture of the broader issues is dated. The irony of Munich, which was a defeat for Hitler's ambitions that he regretted to his last days, thus escapes the author. The post-Munich lull (confined to German-Czech, not German-British, relations) and the use of the Slovak ploy in 1939 reflect first an angry inability to break the detested agreement right away and later a determined effort to find a way around it without a direct breach. This, in turn, gave a general *direction*—as distinct from a specific plan—to German policy, which the customary German administrative confusion must not be allowed to mask. Had Mastny recognized this, he would not have been so shocked by Neurath's ideas about the fate of the Czechs (pp. 126-27). Had he seen how in the same general framework of German agricultural expansionism the newly acquired Eastern territories looked vastly more important, he would have understood more readily why Hitler was willing to postpone radical implementation of Nazi plans in the Protectorate until after German victory.

Whether a country responds to its occupation by resistance, apathy, or collaboration is of enormous historical and current interest. Now that these issues can be studied for the World War II period with more evidence and less extreme passion, a contribution oriented toward a combination of narrative and analysis is most welcome indeed. All interested in that broader problem, as well as the specific topic of this book, will learn much from Mastny's work and will look forward to its sequel.

GERHARD L. WEINBERG
University of Michigan

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Germany in Our Time: A Political History of the Postwar Years *by Alfred Grosser, translated by Paul Stephenson. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1971.—vi, 378 pp. $12.50.*

Professor Grosser is a well known French authority on contemporary Germany; he looks at the political scene across the Rhine with a cool and critical eye, and he offers shrewd comments on almost any aspect of German life, from education and the churches to intellectual life, television, and the press. He is particularly scathing on Allied policies in the postwar years, on German "re-education," de-Nazification and the trials of war criminals, and on the different standards applied in the four zones of occupation. As to the politics of the Federal Republic, even M. Grosser's pen fails to discover any great and exciting issues, or even any great personalities (with the possible exception of Adenauer), so that his text is cluttered with the names and activities of totally insignificant politicians or totally uninteresting facts (such as the exact figures of the three successive ballots of November 10, 1966, when the CDU parliamentary party selected a candidate for the chancellorship or the age and date of death of Helene Wessel, a SPD deputy, after receiving a decoration from the president of the republic!). It is a pity that these chapters were not pruned drastically and equally that there is only one brief chapter on the German Democratic Republic out of a total of eleven, especially since most readers will have a better knowledge of West than of East Germany.

M. Grosser, of course, cannot be blamed for the endless printers' errors and wrong initials for parties and institutions—such as, SPD (Social Democratic party) for SED (the East German Communist party), or SDP (the Sudeten German party of Henlein) for SPD. But on occasion, the author, in spite of all his great knowledge of the German political scene, is curiously ill informed. Thus Walter Ulbricht was not "a founder of the KPD" (the German Communist party), nor is it true that he "returned to Germany in 1939" (as asserted on pp. 64, 269); by 1939, Ulbricht was safely—or perhaps not so safely—installed in Moscow. It is equally incorrect to say that "the academic world, in Germany as in France or Britain, prefers its history to be well matured" (p. 212); in West Germany, the output of serious monographs and academic journals dealing with *Zeitgeschichte* is simply colossal, as anyone teaching that subject will be able to testify. Nor is it true that social mobility in the Federal Republic "is greater than in Britain or France" (as claimed on p. 186); since the number of working-class children getting to the universities is only a fraction of that in Britain, the reverse seems to be the case, but naturally the German Democratic Republic presents a completely different picture. In general, M. Grosser has little to offer on the social structure of the two

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German states, which would have been a fascinating subject. Less political detail and more on the really important issues of Germany, both East and West, would have been welcome.

F. L. CARSTEN
University of London

The Gentlemen Negotiators, A Diplomatic History of the First World War *by Z.A.B. Zeman. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1971.—xi, 402 pp. $9.95.*

A Broken World, 1919-1939 *by Raymond Sontag. New York, Harper & Row, 1971—xx, 415 pp. $8.95.*

It is commonplace to regard diplomacy and war as only two facets of the same fundamental activity, the exercise of power; indeed, they pursue the same ends, although by different methods. In this respect the First World War presents a complex and in some ways a blurred situation, for it happened to be one of those conflicts in which the intrusion of ideology complicates the more classical, or "normal," functioning of power. Russian events emphasized the weight of the ideological component, and the rest of the belligerents were at times nonplused by the unorthodox behavior of the new Bolshevik regime. But the crusading aspect of the struggle existed independently of the Russian Revolution; it received a large impulse from the American intervention, which contributed to the struggle the characteristic slogan of "making the world safe for democracy." Wilson was allergic to the petty quarrels of Europe, but the prospect of instoring a new age of democratic peace was close to his heart.

The method chosen by Zeman to disentangle the threads of a complex skein is to divide his analysis into chapters under the rubrics of the chief belligerent capitals. The device has possibilities, as was successfully demonstrated in Mattingly's study on *The Armada*, for example, but it can also be a constraining framework. In this particular treatment we get a not always satisfactory compromise between the chronological and other threads, but instead a rather artificial forcing of the material into arbitrary, not to say irrelevant, classifications. Thus the Parisian chapter, rather than dealing with the French aspect of the war, is almost exclusively concerned with the Russian situation and the issue of allied intervention in particular. Under "London" we find mainly a discussion of Near Eastern affairs and of the problem of how to deal with the Hapsburg state and its disparate nationalities.

Quite properly, American developments, Wilson's own role in particu-

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lar, receive considerable attention. The observation that the belief was widespread in America that the battle of Waterloo was won by Wellington rather than by Blucher may be no more than indication of the author's personal bias, but to say that "unrestricted submarine warfare was more important as a proof of German duplicity than as a threat to American merchant shipping" (p. 206) properly underscores the importance of psychology and propaganda. On the other hand, the treatment of the negotiations preceding the German armistice is so sketchy as to be rather misleading. This was an important passage; it engendered some difficulties, but the reservations of the British, the French, and the Italians did not significantly affect the Wilsonian program embodied in the Fourteen Points.

From such a book as this, one might expect the use of new documentary material or new ideas and interpretations, unless it is intended as a work of popularization. The danger of falling between two schools has not been altogether avoided, and one can only express surprise at the selectiveness of the documentary sources indicated. The maps also, unfortunately, do not contribute much enlightenment. Yet it would be unjust not to acknowledge that what documentation is used is apt and sound and that the author's judgments rest on solid foundations and are balanced. If the diplomatic history of the First World War remains to be written, this is a contribution to it that has both interest and merit.

The title of Sontag's book is well chosen and not the least merit of it lies in the order with which it succeeds in presenting the multitude of tendencies and occurrences that fill a confused passage of transition. The "vengeful peace" that followed the First World War has often been blamed for the subsequent record of the uneasy truce that lasted only twenty years, a comfortably simple explanation to which John Maynard Keynes made a powerful contribution.

Clemenceau was a realistic man who understood the limitations of French power. The dominant position of France among the chaos of the European continent immediately after 1919 was not a dependably lasting condition and Clemenceau set great store by the continuance of Anglo-Franco-American cooperation. But the weight of the past was too strong for an England that interpreted the great war as but another instance of a recurring experience, hence wanted to restore German power after 1919 as she had defended the French one hundred years before. Similarly, America soon returned to the contemplation of the halcyon days of her isolation when it appeared that the Wilsonian dream of an orderly, democratic world would not at once become reality.

In the light of past history these reactions are understandable. The fact remains that both Britain and America evaded their responsibility; in

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those countries, as in others, the wishes of the masses were catered to by the politicians, and French militarism became a convenient scapegoat. The French, too, wanted peace and tranquility above all. Left to themselves, their record became the absurd one of asserting their power when opposition to it was virtually nonexistent, then abdicating when they should have asserted it. The false position of France and the dimensions of French power lie at the root of the problem of the organization of Europe.

Britain did not awake until past the eleventh hour, and the judgment is very apt that "the unity with which Britain faced up to the fact of war in 1939 must in some measure be credited to Stanley Baldwin, but the fact that Britain, and Europe, faced war in 1939 is in part the result of Baldwin's refusal to give more than grudging and sporadic leadership to Europe" (p. 110). The United States was even more sluggish in facing up to reality.

The tragedy may well be seen as a manifestation of the problem of how to conduct foreign policy in a democratic milieu. The totalitarians had an easier task, and Sontag renders a service in reminding us of their methods. Throughout the book runs the disappointment of a liberal—taking the word in its authentic sense—a reaction well illustrated in the chapters dealing with the cultural aspects of the period. In a world increasingly complicated by the impact of science and technology that offer the ambiguous promise of combined salvation and doom, the artist too was at sixes and sevens.

René Albrecht-Carrié
Rockford College

Revolution in Central Europe, 1918-1919 *by F. L. Carsten. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972.—360 pp. $11.95.*

The revolutionary wave which swept over Central Europe in 1918-19 continues to attract scholarly attention after more than fifty years. It is not the concrete achievements of the uprising which account for this interest, since what it produced was a change in the form rather than the substance of politics. The reason historians go on reexamining the postwar period is that they sense that therein lies a tragedy of great but missed opportunities. The defeated nations had seemingly stood on the threshold of democratization, and then somehow the old tradition of authority reasserted itself. Why? There are those who blame the moderate socialists like Ebert and Noske for being timid when they should have been bold. Others emphasize the baleful influence of conservative army officers and civil servants who opposed the revolution while pretending to accept it.

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And still others maintain that the doctrinairism of the far Left alienated the bourgeoisie and drove it to the far Right. The story has no heroes, only villains. F. L. Carsten has now restudied the revolutionary movement in Germany, Austria, and Hungary in the light of extensive archival research. He has concentrated in particular on the workers' and soldiers' councils which arose after the military collapse and which for a time played an important role in affairs of state. The most original part of his book is its new information regarding the outlook and function of these organizations described by so many writers as a breeding ground of radicalism. This myth has now been exploded once and for all.

The author makes it clear that the workers' and soldiers' councils, far from flirting with the far Left, were moderate in their social and political attitudes. Even more unexpected is the persuasive evidence that the councils performed a useful service in the chaotic days which followed defeat. They helped demobilize the wartime armies, administer food rationing, maintain national security, and enforce law and order. At a time when the traditional instrumentalities of power were in a process of dissolution, they safeguarded the fabric of society. It is Carsten's great contribution that never again will we see in them the dissoluteness which a hundred other books have portrayed. Yet he is not content merely to rescue them from obloquy. He sees in them institutions which might have saved the revolution from the tragic fate to which it eventually succumbed. His thesis, implicit but unmistakable, is that the councils could have served as schools of democracy. The masses, alienated by the formalism of traditional party politics, could have learned through them to exercise a more responsive form of authority. Instead, socialists and conservatives alike opposed the councils in which they saw a potential rival. The result was the emergence of a rigid and uninspiring parliamentarianism.

The argument is intriguing but not altogether convincing. The middle-of-the-road regimes established in Germany and Austria after 1918 reflected the view of the great majority of the population. They did not destroy all remnants of the traditional authoritarian system, to be sure, but they did provide the legal basis for a gradual development of democratic institutions. What undid the Teutonic republics was what had undone the Teutonic empires: their inability to deal effectively with a major crisis which was destroying the foundations of society. Failure in peace undermined the new order, just as failure in war had undermined the old one. A reader can admire Carsten's scholarship without necessarily sharing his view of how Central Europe could have been made safe for democracy.

THEODORE S. HAMEROW
University of Wisconsin-Madison

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Political Grouping in the Czechoslovak Reform Movement *by Vladimir V. Kusin, New York, Columbia University Press, 1972.—XII, 224 pp. $11.00.*

Social Change and Stratification in Postwar Czechoslovakia *by Jaroslav Krejci, New York, Columbia University Press, 1972.—XIV, 207 pp. $11.00.*

Both of these studies focus on years preceding the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, using statistical information on Czechoslovakia from the 1930 census or quantitative estimates of 1938. Kusin's study concentrates on the number and type of social organizations while Krejci covers occupational statistics as related to stratification.

Kusin chapter titles are: workers, farmers, intelligentsia, youth and students, nationalities, political organizations, and finally societies and churches. Note that he first identifies large social categories and then he moves to identification and analysis of organizations. Since farmers are tending to become a smaller category, it is appropriate that he uses 10 pages for that discussion while the discussion concerning the intelligentsia requires 67 pages. The number of farmers, in 1962, who were 20 years or less made only 4.2 percent of the whole age category.

In 1948, as Kusin reports, there were between sixty and seventy thousand societies, clubs, and other associations in Czechoslovakia but by 1967 their number had dwindled to seven or eight hundred. One can note statistics of particular age categories, students, and their fields of study, as well as how many artists were working in the different art fields. One is told that Prague with one million inhabitants has published half a million newspapers. What is more interesting is that Kusin in a comparison with Hungarian and Polish liberalization efforts argues that in Czechoslovakia everybody was in favor of reforms (p. 118). Likewise, Kusin stresses that what is asked for, for the non-Marxists, is a recognition by the state of their right to exist and to publish.

In his analysis of political organizations, the author reports about attempts to restore the Social-Democratic party which had been forced to merge with the Communist party. One can read of a group of Engaged no-Party Persons, as well as of "a group" called "Law No. 231," i.e., a law that was designed to suppress any opposition. Characteristically physicians have sought to reestablish their own professional organization (not a demand for a "permanent revolution" but very simply for democracy and freedom). In his concluding chapter, Kusin lists several reasons for developing new organizations. He writes of the disintegration of old monopoly structures, of associative processes of very small groups, of newly felt requirements, as well as of redefinitions of certain functions.

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It is a pity that Kusin cannot add to the number or apportion strength to particular reasons. Nevertheless, Kusin stresses that the whole broad reform movement is not directed against any particular category of persons but rather against the state as a misuser of power. Czechoslovaks asked for a pluralistic system that would be represented by a multiparty parliamentary system. Certain economic and institutional changes introduced by Communists were not questioned. Kusin feels that the majority of people were in favor of Dubcek's government.

Krejci discusses occupational statistics as well as planning. He reports that the Czechs voted in the first post-World War II election, giving 40 percent of their votes to the Communists and the Slovaks, 30 percent. One is also informed that in 1930, 64 percent derived their income from wages and salaries, while in 1966, 89 percent. In 1930, farmers were almost 33 percent of all employed persons; in 1961, the number declined to 19.6 percent. When the 1968 occupational statistics are compared with 1930, by far the greatest increase is in educational and health employment, a four-fold increase, and research occupations, an eight-fold increase. It is reported that Czechoslovakia is gradually spending a smaller proportion of its income on food; it is also reported that almost 183,000 persons occupy positions which call for university education and 300,000 persons have jobs that would call for middle-level schooling but which they lack. About 16.9 percent of adults are Communist party members. Czechoslovak industry and organizations are directed by about 200,000 persons. While there has been a general leveling of income, one estimated that 300,000 former manual-job holders got white-collar positions, while 400,000 former nonmanual-job persons were moved to manual positions. A comparison of pre-World War II Czechoslovakia discloses that it was spending about 2-3 percent of the GNP on police and army while the present system gives 4-5 percent. At present, Czechoslovakia has about twice the number of persons with university and middle-level education compared with Czechoslovakia before World War II.

In his conclusion, Krejci states that there are two major problems in Czechoslovakia today. The first is the relationship between the rulers and the ruled majority, and the second is the relationship between Czechs and Slovaks. What Czechoslovakia has today is a reorganized government. As Kusin and Krejci stress, the Czechoslovak problem is not economic, but primarily political. The crux of the issue is that the majority of Czechoslovak people do not feel represented in their government.

Critically considered, both authors seem unaware of other studies by Czechoslovak or other nationalities on social stratification. Though this reviewer was pleased by frequent references to Professor Machonin's research on stratification, no references to Blaha and others are noted.

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Moreover, contemporary analysis of Czechoslovak political and organizational structure as represented by I. Gadourek, V. Chalupa and others are not considered. I have found particularly helpful the list of contemporary Czechoslovak organizations that Kusin cites. However, it would have been desirable to list "official organizations" in social and recreational areas as well as the Communist party. Are the former also "governmental associations"? Probably the author should have made clear the criteria of selecting governmental or nongovernmental organizations. The fact that these have been spontaneously emerging indicates that the organizational stance of Communism seems to be rigidified and out of contact with new social phenomena.

JIRI KOLAJA
West Virginia University

Deviance in Soviet Society: Crime, Delinquency and Alcoholism *by Wālter D. Connor. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1972.—viii, 327 pp. $12.50.*

Dr. Connor presents a depressing picture to those who hope for the ultimate elimination of crime in a well-organized society, such as the Soviet one is often conceived to be. He concludes that very little is innovative in the Soviet approach, unless it be the attempt to involve the public as well as state agencies in social control. But even the popular institutions such as the comrades' courts and voluntary patrols have been muted since the mid-1960s. As Connor sees it, youths still learn crime from adults in prisons; new arrivals are bullied, sexually molested, and taught a convict culture; released convicts often do not get jobs and many repeat their crimes; property is still stolen in multitudes of cases.

Connor concerns himself not only with the facts that come through the limited Soviet reports, but with Soviet thought on criminality. He concludes that Marxism-Leninism as a world view which is taught to Soviet scholars without giving equal time to contrasting views still hampers basic scientific research. This is evident in the fact that most Soviet writing concerns applied and not basic research. Judges and prosecutors attempt to patch up the existing system rather than to innovate. At most, crime can be only the result of faults in the immediate environment in which a criminal has circulated, not in the system itself, for that is the "good society." Further, no research is tolerated on possible biological causes of crime because of the doctrinal position that all crime is caused by social conditions.

Nineteenth-century ideas of deterrence still hold sway, and that ex-

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plains the severe penalties still provided by Soviet criminal codes. This is so in spite of statistics from some samples of the convict population showing that many had given no thought to penalties before committing crime. Urbanization and industrialization which elsewhere are blamed for crime escape condemnation by Soviet authors because they are seen as the desideratum of a modern society. This is so, even though samples indicate that crime occurs less frequently in rural communities than in cities. One has the impression that researchers blind themselves to conclusions seemingly impelled by their own studies, and that doctrine compels this closing of the mind.

Connor will not go so far as to indict socialism generally for the Soviet situation, for he believes it was created by Stalin's policy of coercive modernization at high speed. This policy remains Stalin's legacy within the USSR, but Connor does not think it necessarily in the arsenal of socialists who may gain power elsewhere.

This is a convincing book, written on the basis of careful scrutiny of Soviet sources and a period of residence in the USSR. It lacks, of course, materials which would be desirable in an analysis of a society, but it is all that can be hoped for at the present time while field research remains closed to Westerners. It is important as establishing a well-founded hypothesis to be proved later if the opportunity ever comes.

JOHN N. HAZARD
Columbia University

Election Campaigning Japanese Style *by Gerald L. Curtis. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1971.—xiii, 275 pp. $10.00.*

On the evidence of this book, Professor Curtis is a member of that elite corps of academic authors who combine sound methodology, painstaking research and field work, interviewing skill, acute observation and analysis, enlightening and informative comparison, and an engaging literary style. It is pleasing to learn from the jacket that a Japanese translation rapidly went through four printings with critical acclaim from major Japanese journals, but it is disheartening to reflect on the limited readership that a book like this will probably have in the English-reading world.

The central theme of the book can be stated simply: a detailed descriptive analysis of the successful 1967 campaign of Satō Bunsei, a Liberal

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Democratic party candidate centering in the city of Beppu, northeastern Kyushu, for election to the House of Representatives. But the book goes far beyond that. Professor Curtis does the reader an exemplary service by providing in his preface a statement which admirably summarizes what the book actually accomplishes:

> No candidate . . . can be regarded as "typical," but the study of individual candidates does provide insights into campaign practices and political processes. All candidates, regardless of their own idiosyncrasies, must operate within a structure determined by institutions, laws concerning the electoral system and campaign practices, historical tradition, cultural norms, economic characteristics of the constituency, and so on. . . . By examining one politician's campaign we can gain insights into the characteristics of this structure and thereby achieve a better understanding of the dynamics of political processes (p. xi).

What the book tells us about Satō Bunsei, who seems to be a most engaging human being as well as a most effective politician, and how he gained office is both interesting and entertaining. However, its lasting value lies in the manner in which the author uses his subject and his political activities to produce a most enlightening analysis of Japan's contemporary political processes.

Of particular value to both the Japanologist and the student of comparative politics are the detailed analytical description of the sociological and traditional context of rural and small-city politics; the discussion of the little-studied (by either Japanese or foreign political scientists) *kōenkai* (supporters' organization), a postwar, intraparty organizational device; the peculiarities of election campaigning, created in part by Japan's highly restrictive election law; organization strategy; a brief (pp. 236-242) but penetrating analysis of the role of bribery in election campaigns; and the great impact of the "multimember district single entry ballot" on both election campaigning and the party structure in Japanese politics.

Professor Curtis has also supplied us with some extremely valuable insights into the nature of Japanese democracy, that is, the character which sets it apart from its Western counterparts. Though it stems mainly from Japan's nondemocratic tradition, it does not appear to be in conflict with the general concepts of democracy. At least, Professor Curtis has demonstrated that it does not interfere with an institution fundamental to democracy, the free election.

JOHN M. MAKI
University of Massachusetts/Amherst

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China and Japan at War 1937-1945: The Politics of Collaboration *by John Hunter Boyle. Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1972.—ix, 430 pp. $16.50.*

In this excellent study Professor Boyle demonstrates again that the tragic and costly clash of armies in the field is only one aspect of modern war. As his subtitle indicates, he is primarily concerned with the political aspects of the 1937-45 Sino-Japanese war. His principal character is Wang Ch'ing-wei, the nationalist patriot who turned Japanese collaborator, but he also sheds much light on the bungling efforts of Japan's generals to convert military success into the political and economic consolidation that was their professed goal for a Japan-dominated China. He provides *the most detailed account in English* [Ed.] of the tangled web of intrigue surrounding the Japanese efforts, doomed to failure from the start because of an inability to understand the Chinese position, to achieve a negotiated peace with Chungking.

This book is first-rate political history. It is meticulously researched with the preponderance of the documentation from Japanese sources, not strange given its greater availability, but Professor Boyle seems equally at ease with Chinese sources. He also interviewed almost twenty Japanese and Chinese participants in many of the events that he deals with. Fortunately for the reader his scholarship is matched by his skill as a writer. He writes with clarity and grace and has the capacity to present complex events and issues in a fashion that is enlightening, stimulating, and consistently interesting.

Perhaps the most difficult feat that Professor Boyle has performed is to be equally convincing in his presentation of both the Chinese and the Japanese sides while avoiding special pleading for either. Of course, the evenhandedness of his research was essential to his success in this area, but more fundamental is his talent for both reflection on and analysis of the wealth of material of which he is clearly the master.

Professor Boyle's account of Wang Ch'ing-wei not only tells us a great deal about the man, his ideas, and his actions, but also contributes significantly to our understanding of the phenomenon of collaboration. However, he renders a judgment of a man, not a verdict on a collaborator. His final conclusion, directly on his problem, indirectly on his protagonist, will not satisfy those who are hot for certainty in either life or politics: "the topic of wartime collaboration is by nature full of ambiguities. . . ." (p. 362). To accept this "theory of ambiguity" may well bring us closer to an accurate appraisal of both individual cases of collaboration and of the thing itself.

The author gives equal billing to those, primarily the Japanese generals,

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who would have made Wang their puppet. Although it was obvious even at the time that those who were responsible for Japan's policies toward China had no appreciation of the nature of either the leaders or the people of China, the wealth of detail here provided establishes the point beyond any lingering historical doubts. However, Professor Boyle provides an excellent portrait of an exception, namely, General Ishiwara Kanji, who not only understood the problem of China's resistance far more clearly than his fellows—and paid for it—but urged a more moderate policy, not out of "dovishness" but because he perceived the Soviet Union as the major threat to Japan.

The very excellence of this book underlines the unhappy fact that there has not yet appeared in English a detailed history of the war which was such a fateful segment of World War II. Professor Boyle has established his credentials as the man to do the job.

JOHN M. MAKI
University of Massachusetts/Amherst

Revolution in the Middle East and Other Case Studies *edited by P.J. Vatikiotis. Totowa, New Jersey, Rowman and Littlefield, 1972.—232 pp. $10.00.*

In the Middle East and North Africa, as in most parts of the world, it is not only very stylish but almost de rigueur to be revolutionary and socialist. This is true not only among intellectuals; governments vie in proclaiming their own fervor and purity, branding their opponents "reactionary" and "feudal." Such pronouncements are not only lip service: most of these governments have nationalized large sectors of their economy, carried out some kind of land reform, and implemented various five-year plans. Lastly, successive army coups have accelerated the circulation of elites.

Do these convulsions mean that the Middle East and North Africa are now undergoing a fundamental transformation of their political, economic, and social structures? Or are they merely a continuation of the revolts —tribal, peasant, and urban—that have characterized their history for millennia? Do they represent some enigmatic process, peculiar to the inscrutable East? These and other related questions were taken up at a seminar held by a group of the most prominent British Middle-Eastern scholars, flanked by a team of French North-African experts and by specialists on Eastern Europe, Latin America, and China. The result is an illuminating and highly readable book, written with a minimum of social science jargon.

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The introduction and first two chapters deal with semantics: A.T. Hatto discusses the terms used to indicate *revolution* by the Greeks, Romans, and modern Europeans; while Bernard Lewis traces with a sure hand the evolution of Islamic concepts, relating them to their background and carefully distinguishing between medieval and modern, Arabic and Turkish, usage. These subjects are followed by an essay on "Economic Aspects" in the Middle East by E.R.J. Owen, who argues that the export-oriented dependent economies of the region are undergoing a structural change which would have been impossible without a revolution.

Then come two very interesting chapters. A.H. Hourani divides the modern history of revolutions in the Arab Middle East into three parts. Under Ottoman rule, revolts aimed not to overthrow the existing order but "to change its policy or its personnel and to preserve or indeed make more stable the balance between local governors and local leaders on which Ottoman provincial society depended." Similarly the leaders of the nationalist struggles against the British and French sought "some relaxation of foreign control" while making "sure that they became the sole intermediaries between the imperial rule and the people." It is only in the third, postindependence, phase that "real revolutions" have taken place. The French scholars—Professors Le Tourneau, Flory, and Duhac—addressed themselves to the Maghreb, giving first an illuminating account of the tribal and ethnic revolts of the past and then a detailed analysis of the divergent ways of Bourguiba and the Algerian leaders. Bourguiba is a reformist, seeking to accelerate modernization by minimizing internal conflict, while the others are forced by both their background and the upheaval caused by the war of independence to pursue a radical policy and carry out deep structural changes.

Because of lack of space it is possible only to mention the other chapters, "Tribal Rebellion in Morocco" by Ernest Gellner, "Law Reform in Egypt" by J.N.D. Anderson, and "The Persian Revolution of 1905-06" by A.K.S. Lambton, each of which makes a good contribution. The essays on Eastern Europe by Hugh Seton-Watson, on Latin America by Harold Blakemore, and on China by John Gardner are also very interesting—at least to this layman. I have only one major criticism: no one discussed in depth what I believe to be the basic social change in the region—the overthrow of the fledgling entrepreneurial middle class by the salaried middle class or bureaucracy. And two minor criticisms: an unduly large number of misprints and an amusing mistranslation from the French, which makes President Bourguiba *prodigious* rather than *prodigal* with his words.

CHARLES ISSAWI
Columbia University

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Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire Under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807 *by Stanford J. Shaw. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971.—xiii, 535 pp. $15.00.*

Much has been written about Selim III and the reforms he initiated, but little that could substantiate the claims made as to the scope and significance of these reforms. Stanford Shaw has truly filled a gap in our knowledge as only so competent a scholar can, especially since he has spent years gathering materials in the Turkish archives and elsewhere. As a result, his book has a wealth of new evidence. His footnotes and bibliography alone will be a boon to scholars who are working in this period of Ottoman history. The book is well written, attractive, and has a useful appendix listing the principal officers under Selim III and Mustafa IV and a detailed index-glossary which includes Turkish terms.

In his preface Shaw sets forth quite precisely his objectives and approach. Much of the book is devoted to a discussion of diplomatic and political affairs frequently dealt with elsewhere. Nevertheless, Shaw is fully justified because Selim's reforms can only be properly understood in their full historical context; the author therefore deals with these diplomatic and political affairs from the Ottoman viewpoint based on Ottoman sources. The consequence of this approach is that while these matters are not unfamiliar, the Ottoman focus is unique. Textbooks for this period and professorial lectures will need considerable revision to reflect the more balanced version provided by Shaw of the Ottoman dimension in modern European history. Textbooks and lectures will also need considerable revision regarding reforms attributed to Selim. Selim's image as a precocious ruler far in advance of his contemporaries needs modification. He appears very much a product of his society, capable of responding to change as several of his predecessors did, but a man who moved only gradually and timidly towards attempts at reform—reform limited in scope and largely unsuccessful. Selim's failure may be attributed in part to the prevailing political situation in the Ottoman state which was under constant external threat, accentuated by the French Revolution and Napoleonic Age, and by the internal revolts in all parts of the empire. At the same time, Selim showed an incapacity to break with the past. He operated within traditional modes and worked for a traditional objective—the restoration of the kind of Ottoman institutions that had produced successes in the Empire's heyday. He never understood the underlying causes for Western superiority. He never fully grasped the implications of the revolutionary age in which he lived. Instead of attacking the root causes for Ottoman failure to keep apace with the rest of Europe, he resorted to time-honored methods that were no longer adequate in a vastly changed

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world. His major contribution, Shaw concludes, was to set the stage for later developments.

Although this method is not precisely new, Shaw provides in great detail evidence to verify what other authors have only intuitively grasped. He clearly felt that his task was to provide adequate proof at the descriptive level before others move on to new theoretical analysis that may expand our understanding of modernization in the Ottoman Empire. As Shaw states in his preface (p. viii): "The historian must walk before he can run." All too frequently theorists run before they walk, with resultant distortions. By providing so much new material based on so much research, especially in the Turkish sources, Shaw has brought us closer to the time when new thinking on Ottoman history can be initiated.

The two most interesting sections of the book deal with details of the reforms themselves and the people who contributed to the evolution and implementation of the reform program. The very dramatic events that ended with the murder of Selim and his associates are also given. All this new material is required reading for scholars, students, chroniclers, and writers of exciting, imaginative historical works.

HELEN ANNE B. RIVLIN
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Urban Dynamics in Black Africa: An Interdisciplinary Approach *by William John Hanna and Judith Lynne Hanna. Chicago, Aldine-Atherton, Inc., 1971.—x, 390 pp. $9.75.*

African studies have been frequently divided into two schools of thought. The first one, area oriented, is keen to stress the specific aspects of African cultures and to highlight the most picturesque vignettes of the local scenes. The second one is more likely to treat Africa as a privileged laboratory for the study of social change. Characterized by a low level of economic or political development, most African nations indeed do experience a high rate of change. The major merit of this book is that it reconciles these apparently exclusive perspectives of analysis.

The wealth of data covered is impressive. The authors invite us to travel from east to west and from tropical to equatorial Africa. And they invite us to undertake this trip by use of distinctive, but equally appealing, techniques. There are many, usually well chosen pictures from a variety of places. There are maps and graphs, which give a clear and adequate graphic translation of the problems treated, and there are many explicit references to ethnographic or folkloric materials. Most

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important, such references tap the most recent sources and it is not so common, after all, to find in a book published in 1971 a number of sources that are only two years old.

If the authors thus cover much ground and make us feel a number of African scenes as if we were there, they are nevertheless keen to present evidences, propositions, and theories in an organized manner. At the empirical level, the authors are able to take a variety of local statistics (on the demographic, social, and economic consequences of urbanization) and to show how they can be applied *mutatis mutandis* to other areas. In short, they are always concerned with the problem of identifying the limits within which patterns of division of labor, of educational enrollments, or of familial organization observable in one particular scene reflect only a regional reality or a process more characteristic of urbanization in the entire black Africa, or for that matter in all newly developed parts of the world.

At a more theoretical level, the authors are keen to highlight the network of interactions between the individual and societal aspects of urbanization. Beginning their enterprise with a macroanalysis (chapter 2 on patterns of urban growth and parts of chapter 3 on migrations), they indicate, thereafter, the various facets of the experiences undergone by African city dwellers and the number of problems which face them (notably chapter 5 on poverty) before returning to a macrolevel of analysis and speculating about the consequences of urbanization on conflict and integration (chapters 8 and 9). In this sense, the work of the authors goes much beyond a mere description of urban phenomena in black Africa. The models suggested to account for social change are far from being simplistic. Thus, the authors stress the importance of multiple causations in patterns of migration (chapter 3); they similarly emphasize convergences and divergences in the processes of urbanization (in chapters 6, 7, and 9 they demonstrate the impact of the perpetuation of ethnicity and of the emergence of a class system on urban structures and dynamics). Finally, in their last chapter, they take off from their analysis of urban Africa to delineate both the regularities underlying the emergence of large urban centers as well as the varieties of responses such an emergency elicits.

The only reservation I have concerns the exclusion of data pertaining to South Africa. The authors define the scope of their venture in a simple footnote (p. 1) and it is perhaps too short, in view of the fact that in many respects the South African scene magnifies some of the problems faced by urban individuals and groups elsewhere in Africa. Yet, the book is well written and well composed. It offers both a thorough summary of the available case studies and a stimulating review of the theoretical is-

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sues which can be raised by such studies. In this sense, it is the interdisciplinary analysis it claims to be.

REMI CLIGNET
Northwestern University

Modernizing Racial Domination: South Africa's Political Dynamics by Heribert Adam. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971. —xi, 203 pp. $8.00.

The publisher tells us that the author is a native of Germany who spent some time in South Africa and who is now at Simon Fraser University. It is a pity that the publisher did not have the author's style revised by somebody who has mastered the art of using the English language for the purpose of lucid exposition. As it is, the reader is hard put to discover exactly what the author is trying to say in these turgid pages. Of course, only a minority of social scientists express themselves clearly and with precision, but we really must protest that obscurity cannot be accepted as wisdom.

To his credit, Mr. Adam perceived the paradox whereby a country that should, by all reports, by overripe for revolution (because rotten with injustice) is today the most stable in Africa. If the author had had clear and valid ideas about political theory and practice, he might have contributed something of value to the much needed explanation of this paradox. As it is, his exposition is admittedly derived in the main from informative books previously published and there is nothing fresh or stimulating in this book.

Perhaps the vital fact to grasp about South Africa is this: British policy, open or disguised, continues to support Pretoria, while condemning apartheid on formal occasions. This policy, especially in the economic field, is in effect endorsed and followed by the United States, France, and West Germany. Mr. Adams devotes a few pages to this situation but he fails to explain its basic importance. We must, however, recognize that even without these powerful allies, South Africa's white rulers could continue to keep the black millions in subjection. To think otherwise is to believe that an unjust society is necessarily an unstable one. Unfortunately it is not; and Mr. Adam at least knows that there is no revolution around the corner. But to describe the government of this sick society as a "pragmatic oligarchy" is to cover the absence of deeper analysis with a fancy phrase.

JULIUS LEWIN
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The Foreign Powers in Latin America *by Herbert Goldhamer. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1972. A Rand Corporation Research Study.—xiii, 321 pp. $10.00.*

Focusing on the 1960s, this valuable work describes the political, economic, and cultural activities of the United States and other foreign powers in Latin America since World War II. The author rather apologetically warns his readers that "points of special interest to them are sometimes embedded in rather dense thickets of information." However, this reader is pleased to reassure Mr. Goldhamer that penetrating his underbrush is worth many a *machetazo;* the shrubbery is exotic and the nuggets are novel.

As a member of the Rand Corporation's staff, Mr. Goldhamer had access to an enviable range of sources. Browsing among his nearly nine hundred footnotes, one finds such leafy forage as *Il Veltro, Revue Juridiques [sic] et Politique, Planovoye Chosyaistvo* (Moscow), *Revista de derecho internacional y ciencias diplomáticas* (Rosario), *Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Sveriges Statskalander 1964* (Uppsala and Stockholm), and *Revista Brasileira de Politics Internacional.*

Drawing from these sources, Mr. Goldhamer presents new and interesting material to students of Latin American international relations. The main body of the book is a comparative study of foreign powers promoting their territorial, security, economic, political, or cultural interests in Latin America. Their techniques are various and their assets disparate. Of what value is the prestigious cultural past of France? Very little. In the early 1960s, books, periodicals, and newspapers imported from France and the United States respectively were valued as follows: Argentina, 9.4 percent and 56.3 percent; Brazil, 7.0 percent and 51.6 percent; Chile, 1.8 percent and 23.5 percent; Colombia, 1.3 percent and 74.9 percent; Peru, 0.7 percent and 51.1 percent; Venezuela, 5.7 percent and 39.8 percent (p. 152). The chapters on "Affinities," "Advocacy," and "Models" are also enlightening discussions of experiments in influence.

The chapter on "results" summarizes the efforts of other countries to influence Latin America. In general, "the last several years have seen an unquestionable deterioration of the United States ability to influence Latin American behavior" (p. 276). For Japan, on the other hand, "no other industrial nation can show in Latin America so much gained [economically] at so little cost" (p. 226). West Germany has also fared relatively well. The information and rationale for these judgments are worthy of serious consideration, not only regarding inter-American relations, but also more broadly with types of political, economic, social, and other influences recently exerted by affluent peoples on developing countries at levels short of coercion.

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The significant, innovative feature of this book is its wide-ranging study of the comparative effectiveness of foreign policies. The comparative element lends weight to the author's negative evaluation of the Alliance for Progress; he judges the Alliance not only in terms of its lofty aims, but also by comparison with policies of other foreign powers. In this connection, a curious weakness emerges on one major issue. Mr. Goldhamer asserts that "a tutelary posture of moral rectitude has not been unusual in the United States-Latin American aid relationship and it *may well have played* a larger and more damaging role in intercontinental relations than the frank employment of aid as a counter in international bargaining" (p. 180). And, again, "interventions by the CIA and the United States military in Latin America . . . have attracted much more attention than the more prosaic day-to-day tutelary interventions. Nevertheless, the latter *probably* have done more damage to United States-Latin American relations than the former" (p. 208, italics supplied).

This reviewer's search for "dense thickets of information" which the author claims may obscure special interests on this fascinating subject was in vain. What is "damaged"? How intense, enduring, and forgivable? On this point the author's commendable devotion to comparisons breaks down. Let us hope in his next decennial volume (for there should be one) this lapse will be remedied—along with a lesser one. For it is a pity that, in a book so richly endowed with rare sources, Mr. Goldhamer or the Princeton University Press could not afford us a bibliography or a bibliographical note.

BRYCE WOOD
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The United Nations in International Politics *edited by Leon Gordenker. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971.—241 pp. $7.50.*

This collection of essays by Oran R. Young, Stanley J. Michalak Jr., Gabriella Rosner Lande, Linda B. Miller, Leon Gordenker, and Richard A. Falk is unified only because all the authors concern themselves with the United Nations. Young and Falk undertake broad analyses of the actual and potential roles of the organization in the realm of high politics and security. Michalak presents a comparative treatment of the performance of the League of Nations and the United Nations with regard to conflicts and disputes, giving thereby a convincting demonstration of the value and importance of reviving the study of the League and, more

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broadly, of developing the historical dimension of scholarship in the international organization field. Lande reports her findings—insufficient for evaluation—from an examination of the degree of compliance elicited and of effectiveness achieved by 29 General Assembly resolutions pertaining to political and security matters. Miller's essay, looking mainly to the future, deals with the international implications of conflicts within states and the response of international organizations to such problems. Gordenker draws upon field research in Africa to develop an analysis of the political aspects and possible political consequences of United Nations programs in the economic and social fields.

Though these articles do not add up to a first-rate book, they provide some assistance to the student who wishes both to understand the record of the United Nations and to evaluate its prospects and potentialities. The various authors assert or take for granted the "actorhood" of the United Nations, but they tend in fact to emphasize its uses as an instrument of states. Several of them contribute significantly to our understanding of how shifting configurations of power and interest in the "real world" of international politics determine the uses to which international agencies are put and the nature and degree of the usefulness that they develop. One finds general acknowledgment that the United Nations has stopped serving primarily as a partisan tool of the West, only to become such a tool of the South. The latter phase is no more conducive than the former was to the realization of the ideal—making the organization a truly impartial community agency, approaching issues on their intrinsic merits, and diverting states to the joint pursuit of clearly recognized common interests.

If there is a chord of optimism from this symposium, it consists of the notes that the superpowers have achieved and have made some progress toward stabilizing mutual deterrence at the nuclear level; that those same powers have been pushed together in some measure by pressures from the South and have been inspired to deal sympathetically with the enormous problems of that region while becoming more cautious about competitive involvement; that the urgency of planetary challenges to human survival —the ecological crisis, conceived in the broadest sense—may force our divided race to transform the United Nations at last into the central agency of a concerned community of man. This latter vision is Falk's "UN System V" (p. 226); to contemplate it is to adopt Michalak's conception of the United Nations as "an institution of opportunity" (p. 104). We are left with an open question as to whether the United Nations will continue to be what the multistate system permits or will become what that system requires.

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Yearbook of the United Nations, 1968. *New York, Office of Public Information, United Nations, 1971 vol. 22—xiv, 1215 pp. $25.*

Yearbook of the United Nations, 1969. *New York, Office of Public Information, United Nations, 1972 vol. 23—xiv, 1133 pp. $27.*

In the words of the secretary-general, these volumes are "designed as a comprehensive, compact and fully indexed guide" to the activities of the United Nations for the two calendar years. They fully live up to this purpose and are indispensable reference books for academics, practitioners, and concerned members of the general public. The size of the volumes reflects the variety and comprehensiveness of the activities of the United Nations and related agencies. The skeptic might wonder why it is necessary to devote so many pages to describing a relatively small accomplishment and raise questions of values and of judgment. The purpose of the *Yearbook*, however, is not to provide a critique of the organization's work. Rather, its purpose is to provide the material as objectively and accurately as possible for the interested person, whether a private citizen or a government official who wants to form his own opinions.

In a period when demands upon the United Nations are increasing, organizational structure is proliferating, and costs are mounting, member states are showing increasing reluctance to provide the funds to meet the increased expenses. Even the United States, which is admittedly the wealthiest member of the organization, is currently demanding that its percentage of the total assessed expenditures be reduced. Strong pressures are being exercised to reduce the costs of the organization, and the cost of documentation is one of the primary targets of the economizers. The *Yearbook* has already come under scrutiny, and proposals for drastic curtailment of its contents have been made. It is therefore desirable in the interest of the continuation of a highly useful, if not indispensable, reference work to raise the question of what might be done to reduce the size and cost of the yearly volume without seriously detracting from its value.

The purpose of the *Yearbook* and the position of the secretariat in the organization preclude any possibility of achieving this goal by discriminating between what might be regarded as the more important and the less important activities of the organization. While individuals may have their private views regarding the value of certain activities and the justification of devoting space to them, a U.N. publication like the *Yearbook* must abstain from such judgments, must be impartial, and in its coverage must treat all activities as entitled to reasonable reporting.

There are, however, some guidelines that might be applied which would be fair to all, would result in a substantial reduction of size and cost, and would not deprive the volume of value to its readers. For one thing, the

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summaries of discussions in the principal deliberative organizations, in their committees, and in subsidiary bodies could be substantially shortened without serious loss. Positions of individual countries could be more summarily stated. In those instances where groups of members take a common position, the indication of that common position might suffice. There is some unnecessary repetition. There would seem to be no need, for example, to summarize in detail the provisions of a resolution when the text is reproduced in the Documentary References for the section.

The variety of uses to which the *Yearbook* is put and the variety of users whose needs should be satisfied make the possibility of radical reduction in size out of the question without serious loss. Probably most of the people who might have occasion to use the *Yearbook*, students in high schools and small rural colleges, and concerned individuals without access to large libraries where basic U.N. documentation would be available, find themselves fully dependent on it for the information they need. The *Yearbook*, therefore, must be a self-contained repository of information. When supplemented by such sources as the *Chronicle*, it can serve as a guide to the student and practitioner.

LELAND M. GOODRICH
Columbia University

A Critique of Max Weber's Philosophy of Social Science *by W.G. Runciman. London, Cambridge University Press, 1972.—106 pp. $6.50.*

This is a thoroughly competent, very useful book which should help enormously to clarify much of the relatively confused discussion of Weber's methodology of social science. Though both the author and, even more, the jacket blurb emphasize Weber's mistakes, I gained the impression that they are not of paramount importance. The most important methodological views associated with Weber seem to remain intact after Runciman's searching critical analysis. The mistakes cited by the author (first summarized on page 15) have to do with: (1) the difference between theoretical propositions and implicit value judgments; (2) the manner in which "ideographic" explanations are to be subsumed under causal laws; and (3) the relation of explanation to description.

One may single out three of the main features of Weber's view which survive Runciman's scrutiny. First is the central conception of a "value free" social science that has canons of cognitive validity and cognitive significance fundamentally comparable to those of the natural sciences. This conception, of course, has been widely challenged by those who em-

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phasize "relevance" over canons of objective validity. Second is the sense in which Weber transcended the traditional idealistic German dichotomy between the natural sciences and the cultural disciplines in using Rickert's contrast between "nomothetic" and "ideographic" modes of conceptualization. Weber's view that social science involves the formulation of generalized conceptualization remains, I think, handsomely vindicated, though there are certain respects in which the role of "general laws" is different in the two disciplines. Moreover, Weber took a needlessly relativistic view, as Runciman indicates. This view, however, is related to Weber's third essential proposition, the role of *Verstehen*, which concerns what is sometimes called the "subjective" perspective—the systematic taking into account of the meanings of actions to the actors themselves. Of the three views, this one of Weber's, of course, stands in sharp contrast to those of the behavioristic school of modern behavioral science.

The mistake Runciman imputes to Weber and clearly considers most serious is the undue intrusion of the concept of "value-relevance" into criteria of cognitive validity and significance. I can recognize the validity of the Runciman arguments and points in which Weber's statements were at least ambiguous. It has, however, long seemed to me that the most important use of Weber's concept of value-relevance did not lie in its involvement in criteria of validity and significance, but rather in understanding of the "doing" of social science as itself an action process. Weber was, it seems to me, essentially saying that in order to understand why given investigators were concerned with specifically chosen problems and other selectivities, it is necessary to know something of the value premises under which they operate. Viewed in this way, it does not seem that the concept of value-relevance has very seriously compromised the much more fundamental problem of the criteria of validity and significance or their application of freedom in the choice of values. While social science knowledge is to be evaluated in terms of independent criteria, the social scientist as actor is committed to values on a special level—what some of us have called the values of cognitive rationality. The famous essay written in the last year of his life, "Science as a Vocation," was dominated by the latter point of view, whereas the famous editorial on the objectivity of knowledge in the social sciences by the former.

Let me stress that this is a very able, serviceable book and should be widely used by anyone seriously interested in the problems discussed here.

TALCOTT PARSONS
Harvard University

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The Broken Rebel: A Study in Culture, Politics, and Authoritarian Character *by Rupert Wilkinson, New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London: Harper & Row, 1972.—viii, 390 pp. $12.95.*

In 1950, *The Authoritarian Personality*, a portentous but almost unreadable book by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford, introduced to American empirical social science a line of inquiry that had been nurtured in the pre-Nazi Frankfurt Institute of Social Research. The informing ideas were psychoanalytic and Marxist; the central problem was the social and psychological roots of the Nazi aberration—if aberration it was. The sequelae in American psychology are an open scandal: preemptive concern with the book's methodological deficiencies, neglect of the substantive issues, and, finally, abandonment of the topic in pursuit of other fashions, before the methodological issues, much less the substantive ones, had been at all resolved. In political and social science apart from psychology, the issues could not so readily be set aside. Hofstadter, Schaar, McClosky, Lane, and Bell, among others, kept an interest in them alive. But the impenetrability of *The Authoritarian Personality* as a landmark has never been superseded. It has continued to stand in the way of renewed attack on the interrelations of society and culture, personality, ideology, and politics.

We can therefore be grateful to Wilkinson for producing a lineal descendant that makes the central ideas of *The Authoritarian Personality* accessible and applies them to the role of authoritarianism in political life. As a former colleague of Sanford, Wilkinson represents the broadly psychoanalytic, psychosocial tradition of *The Authoritarian Personality* with authority and sophistication. Also with a reassuring touch of modesty and skepticism: he follows his own prescription that "the authoritarian concept be treated as a perspective rather than as a giant and comforting explanation." He brings a wide and representative range of relevant literature into his integrative sweep.

For Wilkinson, a broad definition of authoritarianism would identify it with "a submissive-aggressive tendency to align oneself with power against symbols of weakness and inferiority, in response to deep conflicts and anxieties." The narrower definition to which he attempts to adhere adds the specification that these conflicts include "a particular ambivalence about authority involving the repression of rebelliousness and its diversion against scapegoats" (p. 42). As he employs the concept, it is an ideal type.

Wilkinson sees authoritarianism as a characterological reaction to social change and cultural disintegration in the presence of cultural orthodoxy and traditional ideology. The effects are substantially mediated by

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the kind of family relations that parents living under such pressures create for their children. This is hardly the "general theory" that he claims it to be; it is, however, a sensible and useful schematization of present thought on the topic. The bulk of the book is devoted to historical cases. These range from Hung Siu-Tshuen and the Taiping Rebellion through Salem witchcraft, Jonathan Edwards, Tom Watson, the Doukhobors, Babbitt, the Nazi leaders, and the American South as seen mainly through the eyes of Cash, Dollard, and Elkins.

The synopses of these and still other cases should be advantageous for teaching; for serious psychohistorical interpretation, breadth of range is attained at the cost of depth, and the cases serve to illustrate and enrich the author's conception of authoritarianism rather than to establish with any firmness particular interpretations of the past. Wilkinson's narrow definition of authoritarianism protects him from global attribution to entire peoples—a special temptation in the case of Nazi Germany. Thus, he suggests only that authoritarianism helped to determine the emphases of Nazi ideology, and specifically determined Hitler's decision to exterminate the Jews. The intrinsic affinity of authoritarianism and rightist ideology is reaffirmed—to me, convincingly.

A concluding chapter assesses the future prospects of authoritarianism and what may be done about it by way of early education, reform in the university, and revision of the male role. His suggestion for the last item illustrates the humane flavor of the book: "The trick, then, is to establish a fusion between the tough and the tender so that neither is furtive" (p. 289). In sum, this is a useful, intelligent, but not very original book, which may help to refocus attention on a theme of continuing concern to democratic societies.

M. Brewster Smith
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

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

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